

handed a letter from Shulgin, in which he asked for an answer on the merits of his proposal. The letter indicated the Parisian address of SHULGIN, to which GRYTSAYUK was to send his reply. (GRITSAYUK himself was not interrogated, as he shows signs of a mental disorder.) A former Red Army soldier of the 469th Infantry Regiment of the 13th

Army, GARIFULIN Sharif, testified that among prisoners of war of Tatar nationality, recruitment was carried out for espionage work and agitation was carried out about the need to fight for the creation of the "Volga Ural state". GARIFULIN was asked to establish contact with the Muslim spiritual administration in the mountains. Ufa.

It was established that in the Utti camp, the Finns created an anti-Soviet choir from the prisoners of war of the 44th rifle division, headed by the regent, a former Red Army soldier of the 44th rifle division LYSYUK. This choir performed monarchist and religious songs and anti-Soviet ditties in the camps.

Some prisoners of war received offers to speak on the radio with anti-Soviet fabrications and appeals to the soldiers of the Red Army to surrender. Prisoners of war YASHIN and ANDREEV, on

the instructions of the White Finns, posed at the film factory for provocative filming. After filming, YASHIN was brought to a radio studio, where he spoke in front of a microphone with a treacherous appeal to the soldiers of the Red Army, offering to throw down their weapons, kill political officers and commanders, and voluntarily surrender. POW camps were visited by correspondents of English, French and other newspapers. In camp No. 3,

10 prisoners of war were called in for a conversation with reporters, including the former assistant commander of the 25th regiment of the 44th rifle division, Major ALIYANOV and the nurse of the 163rd rifle division, KURITSINA.

The testimony of prisoners of war, former Red Army soldiers of the 25th regiment of the 44th rifle division, KALININA and KOMISARCHUK, established that on January 7 of this year, during the period of the White Finns encircling units of the 44th division, a group of fighters and commanders from the 25th and 146th regiments, in the amount of 60 people, according to a preliminary colluding, she threw down her weapon and voluntarily surrendered to the White Finns. KALININ and KOMISARCHUK were among those who voluntarily surrendered.

The Red Army soldiers of a separate telegraph construction company of the 168th rifle division KHOVCHINEN, KIRILLOV, SEMENOV and Evdokimov, who lived before being drafted into the Red Army in the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, also voluntarily surrendered.

KHOVCHINEN, born in 1910, a non-partisan Finn by nationality, was used by the Finns for agitation among the Red Army. In the group of 44 prisoners of war who arrived on

May 14 in the Yuzhsky camp, 21 people were identified who, being in captivity, declared to the Finns their desire to remain in Finland. Despite this, the Finns sent them to the USSR.

As established by the interrogation of prisoners of war FEDCHENKO and SMURYGIN, who arrived with this group, before being sent to the Soviet Union, all persons who expressed a desire to stay in Finland had a special conversation with the colonel of Finnish intelligence, who warned them that they should in no case inform the Soviet authorities about their expressed desire to remain in Finland. Further work to identify among the former prisoners of war those who compromised

themselves during their stay in captivity continues.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA AP
RF. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 580. L. 108-116. Script.
Typescript.

* On the margins there is Stalin's litter: "And the
Russians?" *—* Underlined in pencil.

No.

112 Special message by V.N. Merkulova I.V. Stalin about the fire at the mine

06/07/1940

No. 2319/b

Sov. secret of

the Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade STALIN on May 31 of this year. at 5:35 a.m., a fire broke out at the Lenin mine of the Kizelugol Trust

(Molotov Region). The fire captured the entire third slope of the mine, and instead of coal mining 1500 tons per day is currently 600-700 tons.

Four teams of mountain rescuers are involved in extinguishing the fire in number of 150 people.

The fire is extinguished by installing refractory and end jumpers, the installation of which will be completed by the evening of June 7. According to the preliminary investigation, the fire started from careless handling of fire.

An on-site investigation is underway. head of the UNKVD for the Molotov region. Deputy People's Commissar of

Internal Affairs of the USSR MERKULOV AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 333. L. 198. Original. Typescript. There is a resolution on the sheet: "T. Beria. The perpetrators of "careless handling" of fire should be punished with 5-8 years in prison. I. St.

No. 113

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union
Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on Meshik P.Ya."**

06/10/1940

141 - About Meshik P.Ya. (OB dated 8.VI.40, pr. No. 39, p. 126-
gs) Approve Comrade Meshike P.Ya. head of the 1st department of the
Main Economic Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR, releasing him from the
work of the head of the investigative unit of the Main Economic Directorate of
the NKVD of
the USSR. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1024. L. 40. Original. Typescript.
Protocol number 17.

No. 114

**From the resolution of the Politburo of the
Central Committee of the All-Union Communist
Party of Bolsheviks "on the resettlement of citizens of
foreign nationalities from the city of Murmansk and the Murmansk re**

06/23/1940

Strictly secret

256 - On the resettlement of citizens of foreign nationalities from the city of Murmansk and the Murmansk region

To approve the following draft resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR: "The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decides: To approve the following proposals of the People's Commissariat

of Internal Affairs of the USSR: 1. To instruct the NKVD of the USSR to resettle all citizens of foreign nationalities in the amount of 3215 families from the city of Murmansk and the Murmansk region - 8617 people.

2. Relocated to place: a) in the

Karelian-Finnish SSR - 2540 families, consisting of 6973 people: Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Norwegians, Lithuanians and Swedes - in the following areas: In the Zaonezhsky

district - 600 households, Pudozhsky -

700 Medvezhyegorsk

- 340 Sheltozersky - 900

b) to the Altai Territory

- 675 families, consisting of 1743 people: Germans, Poles, Chinese, Greeks and Koreans - in the following areas:

...

6. Propose to the People's Commissariat of Health of the USSR to provide migrants on their way with medical care, necessary medicines and medical equipment at the request of the NKVD

USSR, submitted to the People's Commissariat of Health of the USSR no later than 3 days before the departure of the

echelons. 7. To oblige the People's Commissariat of Trade of the USSR to organize food for migrants in their route at points determined by the NKVD of the USSR.

8. Set the end date for resettlement as 10.7.1940." RGASPI. F. 17. Op.

162. D. 27. L. 166-167. Script.

Typescript.

Minutes No. 17. The

text contains a typewritten note about distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Beria, Chekmenev, Khlomov - all; Kaganovich - 5, Miterev - 6, Lyubimov - 7.

No.

115 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about the investigation into the case of N.S. Angarsky-Klestov with the application [31] of the protocol of interrogation

06/29/1940

No.

2656 / b

comrade. STALIN At the same time, I present the protocol of the interrogation of the arrested ANGARSKY-KLESTOV Nikolai Semenovitch dated June 26, 1940, a former senior researcher at the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute.

ANGARSKY-KLESTOV admitted that from 1896 to 1915 he collaborated with the tsarist secret police and, on its instructions, carried out active provocative work in the years. Smolensk, Stavropol, Rostov, Kharkov and Moscow (see pp. 1-18).

In 1903, in order to divert suspicions about his activities from himself, with the ANGARSKY-KLESTOV, by provocative agreement Okhrana, leaves for Geneva, where he contacts a group of Social Democrats headed by PLEKHANOV. From Geneva,

ANGARSKY-KLESTOV returned to Russia with illegal materials of the Social Democratic Party, including the minutes of the 2nd Congress of the RSDLP addressed to the Don Committee of the RSDLP (see pp. 9, 10).

After the February Revolution ANGARSKY-KLESTOV repeatedly opposed the policy of the party leadership: in April 1917 - against LENIN on the issue of assessing the political situation of that period; at the VI Congress of the Party - against STALIN on the question of the driving forces of the revolution and assessment of the current moment; in 1918 he was expelled from the party for speaking out in the Moscow Soviet against the policy of the party in the countryside; in 1921 on the Moscow

The city conference spoke from the united opposition of "democratic centralism" and the "workers' opposition" (see p. 19). In 1924, while at work in Berlin as a representative of the Moscow Trade Agency, ANGARSKY, through a member of the foreign delegation of the Mensheviks NIKOLAEVSKY, was involved in work in favor of German intelligence and was associated with the Menshevik emigration (see pp. 19, 20, 21).

ANGARSKY-KLESTOV collaborated with German intelligence until 1938. In 1924, through the former secretary of ARKOS, A. BOGDANOV (convicted), ANGARSKY-KLESTOV was brought to work in favor of British intelligence (see pp. 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28).

In 1932, before being appointed to the post of trade representative of the USSR in Greece, ANGARSKY-KLESTOV was involved by ROZENGOLTS into a right-wing Trotskyist organization and, on the instructions of ROSENGOLTS, carried out enemy work in Greece (see pp. 29, 30, 31).

Since 1935, heading the "International Book", ANGARSKY KLESTOV also conducted enemy work. Of the persons involved

by ANGARSKII-KLESTOV in anti-Soviet work, the following were not arrested:

1. IZAK Ivan Yakovlevich, senior engineer of the export department Narkomles of the USSR (see pp. 27, 28).

2. ADAMSON Vladimir Alexandrovich, former deputy. trade representative USSR in Greece, now without specific occupations (see pp. 31, 33).

3. ELENEVSKY Valentin Anufrievich, former deputy. chairman of the "International Book", now without a fixed occupation (see pp. 35-38).

4. LEVENSON Fedor Savelievich, former. deputy director of the export office of the International Book (see pp. 35-36). IZAK I.Ya., Adamson V.A., Elenevsky V.A. and LEVENSON F.S. The NKVD of the USSR are arrested.

Investigation in the case of N.S. Angarsky-Klestov continues. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA
PROTOCOL OF INTERROGATION of the arrested ANGARSKY-KLESTOV Nikolai Semenovich of June 26, 1940

ANGARSKY-KLESTOV N.S., born in 1873, native of Smolensk, b. member of the CPSU (b) since 1902, before his arrest - senior researcher at the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute. **Question:** You

pleaded guilty to active counter-revolutionary work for many years as an agent of the tsarist secret police and a spy for German and British intelligence services. Do you confirm this? **Answer:** Yes, I do.

Question: Then we give you the opportunity to tell about all your crimes in personal testimony. **Answer:** Now that I have been arrested, not wanting to hide any more of my many years of treacherous work against the Party and the working class, I want to tell all about my crimes to the organs of the Soviet

consequences.

I was considered a member of the RSDLP from 1902, but in fact, four years before that moment, since 1898, I was an agent of the tsarist secret

police. Before showing my path to the Okhrana, I will briefly give my biographical data.

I come from the family of a merchant of the 2nd guild KLESTOV Semyon Alekseevich, the owner of a bookstore, 2 houses and the largest in the mountains. Smolensk Public Library. In 1893

or 1894, while living in Smolensk, I joined a revolutionary circle of administrative exiles led by MYSHLYAEV. In 1896, I was arrested by the provincial

gendarmerie department for the illegal possession of 2 brochures published by Narodnaya Volya under the title "From Motherland to Motherland."

In the winter of the same 1896, during an interrogation by a gendarmerie captain (I don't remember my last name because of the prescription of time), I gave frank testimony about the origin of these brochures, naming the student from whom I

received them while being treated in Moscow. I also told the police that I still had the Social Democrat magazine published by PLEKHANOV. This book - I showed during interrogation in the gendarme department - was sent by me to the student SHAMOVSKY, who lived at that time in Smolensk.

I further stated to the captain of the gendarmerie that I had long since renounced my revolutionary views and had no intention of continuing to take part in a student or other movement against the existing state system.

After 2 weeks, I was released from prison under the guarantee of the elder brother of the student SHAMOVSKII, who occupied a prominent position in the city bank, to whom I later paid up to 1000 rubles for this. A year later, a verdict came from the

Ministry of the Interior, according to which I was subject to imprisonment for a period of 3 months and after that - open police supervision for a period of 2 years.

While in the Smolensk prison, I thought a lot about the fact that I was in counter-revolutionary positions, that I had no relation to practical revolutionary activity for a long time, and meanwhile I was imprisoned and persecuted by the authorities. In prison, for the first time, I had the idea of a permanent connection with the police.

Upon leaving prison, in 1897, I was once invited to a meeting of a student circle in Smolensk, but student TEODOROVICH, who learned from somewhere about my unworthy, treacherous behavior during interrogations in the gendarme department, after consulting with others, suggested that I leave from the meeting, which embittered me even more. This circumstance,

my counter-revolutionary views, as well as my bourgeois origin, all this taken together pushed me onto the path of revenge, denunciations and betrayal, and finally made me a provocateur.

By this time the circumstances were as follows. Upon my release from prison, I had to legalize the library and bookstore, which had been left neglected by the death of my father, which followed in a psychiatric hospital. For these purposes, my mother, as if

carried away by a card game, in a noble club began to lose large sums to the head of the gendarme department, Colonel GROMYKO, while I staged the sale of a trotter and a cab to him, but in reality both were a "noble" cover for a bribe. Marriage to the goddaughter of the ruler of the office of the Smolensk governor, noblewoman

Zinaida Konstantinovna Kazantseva

(died in 1918) completed my moral downfall. I began to repeatedly visit the apartment of the gendarmerie colonel GROMYKO and insistently proved to him that I broke with the revolution forever, now I hold the same views as he does and I am ready to provide appropriate confirmation in practice.

I argued to the colonel of the gendarmerie that "socialism exists - a hypothesis, the result of sick morality", that I recognize the existing order in Russia as the best and am ready to protect it with my life from the encroachments of our original "all-word" intellectuals or "estate" Social Democrats, that I am devoted to the government and "I dream of the happiness of being called a loyal subject of the sovereign emperor." Thus, the gendarmerie

colonel did not even have to put effort into recruiting me, since, in fact, I myself offered to cooperate in the secret police, to which I received his consent. As a result of the efforts of Colonel

GROMYKA and my petition to the police department, after a year of cooperation with the gendarme department, in October 1899, Minister of Justice MURAVYOV informed me that "by the highest order of the Sovereign Emperor" I - Nikolai KLESTOV - was released from open police supervision, about which the prosecutor of the Moscow Court of Justice was informed. From the end of 1898, I began to systematically deliver reports to

the Smolensk gendarme department about the political moods of local liberals and revolutionaries, reported, partly out of revenge, about the anti-state work of the student TEODOROVICH, about whom I showed above, about a local resident who joined the Narodnaya Volya circle, Mikhail VASILYEV, about teacher ALEKSANDROV, about the revolutionary moods of the people who were on the board of the public library, about his own brother, Vasily KLESTOV.

I informed the Okhrana about the illegal printing of the TUNA book on the history of the revolutionary movement, about debates at zemstvo meetings, about a medical society that was radically inclined, about leaders of the county zemstvo with the same sentiments, about local student circles and other data that so much came from me. that at the moment I find it difficult to remember all of them.

The transmission of these reports to the Okhrana was carried out through Colonel GROMYKA, whom I visited from time to time directly in the gendarme department, and through the gendarme sergeant (I don't remember my last name), who received packages from me and sent them to their destination during my stay in the city. Vyazma, near Smolensk. In Vyazma in those

years, my wife had a bookstore, while I corresponded with Smolensky Vestnik and Moskovskie Vedomosti. Having sold her bookstore in Vyazma, my wife soon acquired a similar store in Stavropol, where we moved permanently in 1899. In the summer of 1900, a student of SCHULZ—the brother of a local ophthalmologist—

handed me a leaflet printed on a hectograph in the street protesting the police crackdown on student riots. Having received this leaflet, I went to the police department, but I did not find the chief of police there and then handed the leaflet to

the bailiff on duty. On the same day, I was summoned to the gendarme department, where they kept me for 7 hours, and then, accompanied by a police

officer, they escorted me to my apartment, and the search was carried out not in the place where I indicated (at SCHULZ), but in my apartment, where the chief of police and two bailiffs appeared. In view of the tantrum that my wife threw, the search became

known to all the neighbors, all this excited me extremely.

In connection with the search, which aroused unnecessary suspicions on me, I filed a complaint with the director of the police department, protesting against the actions of the gendarmerie captain in Stavropol, referring to what the police department had long known about my "Smolensk case", and demanded an answer - why on earth my testimony given to the gendarme captain was discussed by the police chief in the presence of the bailiff.

These testimonies - I wrote in my complaint
- could only know

the prosecutor and the head of security, why did they become the property of the bailiff. I also expressed my bewilderment at the fact that a policeman had been placed against SHULZ's apartment, about which I had reported to the police, when someone else could have been entrusted with the case. Here

in the letter, I asked the director of the police department if it was impossible to avoid theatricality, given that the policeman who suddenly appeared made just the opposite effect than what would be useful for the case.

In conclusion, I petitioned the director of the police department to express my speedy confidence in me, "so that my hands do not give up in further work." In the same 1899, bypassing the gendarme

department in Stavropol, I informed the director of the police department in St. Petersburg about the anti-state Zemstvo members of VORONOVSKY, KAVERZNEV, the activities of POSTNIKOV, POLUEKTOV and, in general, the Zemstvo Literacy Committee headed by them, as well as the Assembly, aimed at undermining the existing system, about upcoming demonstrations, about illegal leaflets distributed not only by SCHULZ, but also by other persons known to me, about reading a report on the subject of MIKHAILOVSKY by a local public figure, KULYABKO-KORETSKY. In 1902 I moved to Essentuki, where I got a job as

head of the mineral water department of the Kazbek newspaper.

In the same year, 1902, under the influence of the revolutionary circle of FEDORCHENKO and BERDICHEVSKY, I made an attempt to free myself from the connection with the Okhrana that weighed on me and decided to go to Paris for this.

In Stavropol-Kavkazsky, I went to the governor, to whom I began to tell that I was not a revolutionary at all, that I was going abroad only on personal business and for a short time, that detailed inquiries about me could be made at the police department, where I was in good standing as a loyal subject. sovereign emperor. Two weeks later I received a passport with a

visa for the right to travel abroad and went to Paris, where I did not stay long and then returned to Rostov-on-Don. Returning to Russia in the winter of 1902, I began to

contribute to the newspaper "Donskaya Rech" and at the same time entered the Rostov city government as head of the legal department.

On May 1, 1902, I was arrested at the railway station in Rostov-on-Don and sent to the Novocherkassk prison, where rumors quickly spread about me as a provocateur.

As I understand it, this arrest was made by the station gendarme without the knowledge of the provincial administration, in any case, after 2 weeks I was released and, in order to divert the suspicions that had arisen in provocative activities, I left for Geneva by agreement with the Okhrana. In

accordance with the instructions received from the Rostov Gendarme Directorate, through FEDORCHENKO I got to know PLEKHANOV, Vera ZASULICH and other Social Democrats, and entered into their confidence.

I stayed in Geneva for one month and returned back to Rostov, having received illegal literature and, in one copy, the minutes of the 2nd Congress of the RSDLP, which had just come out, which I carried in a suitcase with a double bottom.

According to the report received by me in Geneva, I handed over all illegal literature to the secretary of the Don Committee of the RSDLP - BOGUTSKA, having previously informed the Okhrana about everything.

About the results of my trip to Geneva, meetings with PLEKHANOV, the mood of the Social Democrats in connection with the split that occurred at the 2nd Congress of the RSDLP, as well as about the appearances I received in Rostov, I informed the gendarmerie captain in every detail, whose name seems to be MARTYNOV, but I don't remember exactly, I only remember well his external features: short stature, slightly pockmarked face, brown hair, with a small beard.

At the beginning of 1904, I received a lucrative offer - to go to Yekaterinodar, to the post of head of the local branch of the Rostov newspaper Donskaya Rech. This proposal suited me perfectly, and the Gendarme Directorate in Rostov had no objection to my departure. Upon arrival in

Yekaterinodar, using the official pretext - a delay in receiving the capital's newspapers, in connection with the outbreak of the Russian-Japanese war, I visited the gendarme department and renewed my contacts, regularly meeting with the adjutant of the department - a young man of high stature, with the rank of lieutenant, surname not remember. At first, I informed the secret

police that I had not yet established contacts with any organizations, but as soon as I get to know the persons of interest to the gendarmes, I will immediately inform her about these

faces. Soon, the Social Democrats organized a workers' demonstration during the discussion of the budget issue in the City Duma. I was present at this demonstration as a representative of the press and then betrayed to the Okhrana the organizers—the writer OLIGER and the exiled settler MARTYNOVSKY; the first of them was arrested, and the second escaped with a search. In November 1904, the

Ekaterinodar Committee of the RSDLP, with which I had already contacted, instructed me to speak at a banquet chaired by lawyer SHIRSKII. I made a revolutionary speech at a banquet in the presence of a chief of police unknown to me, who tried to detain me, but I escaped through the back door.

Fearing failure as a provocateur who gets away with even revolutionary speeches, I left for Novorossiysk that same night, where I stayed for 2-3 days, from there to Kiev, from SMIDOVICH I received a report to Kremenchug, lived there for about a month and went to Kharkov through Ekaterinodar, where after three months, in February 1905, he was arrested.

In Kharkov, during interrogation in the gendarme department, I betrayed the sanitary doctor FILKOVA, the secretary of the committee of the RSDLP, the sworn attorney SHUSTER, to whom I had an appearance, the members of the RSDLP SMIRNITSKAYA, KUCHEROV, BELYAYEV, testified about the strike at the Kharkov steam locomotive plant and Gelferikhs-Sad, and also other enterprises, reported data on workers' circles, which I led as a propagandist, deciphered the illegal apartment of the Kharkov Social Democratic Organization.

At the trial held in Yekaterinodar, the chief of police, who was present at the moment of my speech, appeared as a witness for the prosecution, who, however, this time declared that the phrases in my speech “down with the autocracy!” he allegedly does not remember, and I was released from custody for lack of evidence of the crime.

In the October days of 1905, on the instructions of the Kuban Committee of the RSDLP (b), I again delivered a speech at a demonstration in the same Yekaterinodar, but this speech, thanks to the concerns of the Okhrana, had no consequences for me. On the

night of December 9, 1905, for participating in a military demonstration, I was arrested, but not by the gendarmes, but by the military authorities, and exiled for 5 years to the Turukhansk region. On the way from Omsk

I escaped from the prison in which I spent one night, using someone else's passport and an extremely weak arrangement for guarding prisoners. I received a passport in the name of SHEVTUNOV and a surveyor's uniform at a meeting with the Omsk Social Democrat; then he traveled

through Tyumen and Perm to Moscow. In the summer of 1906, I appeared at the Moscow Security Department, on Gnezdnikovsky Lane. In Okhrana I met with Colonel von COTTEN, to whom I told about myself and my intentions for the future, declaring that for the time being I thought

of doing only literary work. "Well, that's good," said the colonel, "if you need us, we will find you." Then the colonel asked me: "How do you live here?" I said that I fled from Omsk with a passport in the name of Arkady Nikolaevich SHEVTUNOV. The Colonel said nothing to this, only warning me that at any time I could be called on Okhrana business. In the autumn of

1906, in connection with the upcoming conference of the Moscow organization of the RSDLP (b), I was actually summoned to the security department and instructed to attend the conference and provide detailed information about it, which I did, subsequently informing the Okhrana about the speeches of ALEKSINSKY, POKROVSKY and other speakers, and also about the decisions taken by the conference. In 1906-1907. I

systematically covered the activities of the Bolsheviks in the so-called "Typographic extraterritorial district" of the Moscow organization of the RSDLP (b), the book warehouse "Spring", which belonged to the Regional and City Party Committees, as well as the participation of the Bolsheviks in the campaign for elections to the State Duma. According to my

report, a significant part of the literature intended for the elections to the Duma was detained and confiscated at the Nikolayevsky railway station in Moscow.

In 1907, I changed my passport to Alexander Vasilievich Maslennikov, informing the gendarme department about this, and expressed my surprise at the fact that, in my absence, without the knowledge of the Okhrana, a police officer appeared at my apartment and invited me to pay a visit to the police station.

When I was in the secret police, they began to make some inquiries, and then they asked: "What kind of passport do you have now?" I said that, in connection with the visit of the police officer, I had been forced to obtain a new passport for myself in the name of MASLENNIKOV, after which the gendarmes did not return to this issue. Late 1907 or early 1908. I moved to St.

Petersburg, where I got a job at the Zerno publishing house, with the son of a Moscow landlord and notary, Mikhail KEDROV. During this period, I informed the security department (but not Petersburg, but Moscow, with which I maintained constant contact) about the publishing activities of the Bolsheviks and, in particular, about the "Calendar for All", as well as about mass issues devoted to worker and peasant issues. In the summer of 1909, the Moscow Okhrana arrested me, accusing me of deceiving her, not telling everything, and one of the gendarmerie officers present at the interrogation

declared that "I play on both sides, I inform about trifles, and I keep the main thing to myself."

I replied that I consider such a reproach unfair, since about everything that becomes known to me, I inform the secret police.

So it was in reality, but I explain the captiousness of the Moscow secret police by the fact that it was ahead of the Petersburg security department, which had its own experienced provocateur inside the Zerno publishing house and in the Delo party printing house by the name of SCHNEERSON.

In view of the fact that SCHNEERSON had the opportunity to see the St. Petersburg gendarmes much more often than I did with my Moscow gendarmes (I usually went to Moscow once every 2 months), naturally, his reports were more timely. So, for example, as a result of Schneerson's reports, LENIN's works (the collection "For 12 Years") were detained by the Petersburg secret police just before they were taken out of the printing house on Vasilyevsky Island.

During interrogations, the secret police at first were rude to me, then switched to a softer tone, deciding to send me to live out the term of exile, to which I was sentenced back in 1906, but in fact did not serve it. I was immediately warned that I would have to spend in exile not five, but only a little more than two years. From the summer of 1909 to the autumn of 1911, I was in exile, but not in the Turukhansk

region, but on the Angara, where conditions are easier. During my time on

Angara, I only once informed the bailiff about the proposed meeting on the organization of a central library to serve the exile. After leaving the exile, I went to Moscow, where

I appeared at the security department and declared that I intended to remain permanently in Moscow, but they didn't tell me anything specific this time, saying: "Okay, we'll see." In 1912, on the eve of the 100th anniversary of the Battle of Borodino, I was

summoned to the security department, offering to leave Moscow for the duration of the celebrations. I filed a petition in which I referred to all my previous work on assignments from the Okhrana, declared that I was tired, ill, had just returned from exile, was busy with personal affairs that had become upset and would like to avoid expulsion from Moscow. Nevertheless, they did not leave me in Moscow, although they allowed me to leave for one of the Moscow districts. I chose Kashira, waiting there for the end of the Borodino celebrations, after which, with the permission of the Okhrana, I returned to Moscow. In 1913, due to

my lack of real connections with the Bolshevik organization in Moscow, I did nothing for the Okhrana, but continued to keep in touch with it. In 1914 and 1915 I informed the Moscow Okhrana about

anti-war sentiments among writers, both professionals and circle members, about the anti-war speeches of the lawyer Yakhontov, the Bolsheviks SMIDOVICH and STEPANOV-SKVORTSOV, with whom I maintained a close acquaintance, about a meeting in the society of trade officials, which I attended as a member of this society, about a group of students of a commercial institute, standing in defeatist positions.

I also handed over to the Okhrana a leaflet against the war, received from a student of a commercial institute, either KIRILLOV or OSTROVITYANINOV-VA, whom I knew from my book publishing work. The

year 1915 ended my connection with the tsarist secret police, because during the war illegal organizations in Moscow were almost destroyed, and I felt tired and, moreover, suffered from a serious illness of the spine. I turn to my anti-Soviet work after

the October revolution.

I confess that even after 1917 I still remained an enemy of the party, against which, before the revolution, I had been actively working in close cooperation with the Okhrana.

In 1917, as a member of the Moscow Party Committee and organizer of the Khamovnichesky district, I put into practice the Menshevik guidelines, disagreeing with the decisions of the April Conference and the 6th Congress of the RSDLP (b) and remaining as before an opponent of the socialist revolution. In April 1917, at a conference of the

RSDLP(b), I opposed Lenin on the issue of assessing the political situation of that period.

In 1917, at the 6th Party Congress, I opposed STALIN on the question of the driving forces of the revolution and the assessment of the current moment.

In 1918 I was expelled from the party for speaking out in the Moscow Soviet against the policy of the Communist Party in the countryside and in the struggle for bread. In 1919, I

was reinstated in the ranks of the party after a double-dealing confession of my mistakes, but soon after, in 1920, I joined the anti-party grouping of Ignatov and Burovtsev, who stood on the platform of the "workers' opposition".

In 1921, I spoke at the Moscow City Conference on behalf of the united opposition, which included representatives of "democratic centralism", "workers' opposition" and other anti-party groups. However, the most active period of my enemy work

against the party and the Soviet state begins in 1924, when I established a spy connection with a German intelligence agent, a member of the Menshevik foreign delegation in Berlin - NIKOLAEVSKII.

As a representative of the Mosvneshtorg in Berlin, in 1923 I met and, on the basis of common anti-Soviet convictions, quickly became friends with Nikolaevsky. In anti-Soviet conversations with NIKOLAEVSKII, I declared that the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks allegedly did not allow internal party democracy, that the old Bolsheviks were being suppressed, and raised all sorts of other White Guard slanders against the

leaders of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. In 1923-24. I, besides NIKOLAEVSKY, met with the Mensheviks LITKENS, YUGOVA, GUREVICH, with the German Social Democrat BUCHHOLTZ, who were also in an anti-Sov

informed about the situation in the USSR. But my main Menshevik connection of that period was NIKOLAEVSKIY. At the end

of 1924, on the basis of my information, NIKOLAEVSKY published an article in the Socialist Vestnik newspaper in which he slandered the Soviet Union. On this occasion, I expressed my dissatisfaction to NIKOLAEVSKII and asked him not to publish any more articles based on information received from me, as this could lead to my failure.

NIKOLAEVSKY said to this that he was cooperating with German intelligence, to which he passed all the information received from me, and promised not to compromise me in this way in the future, but on condition that I began to supply him with information of interest to German intelligence. I agreed with

Nikolaevsky's proposal and began to periodically transmit to him data on the decisions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, internal party disagreements, on the course of the discussion that took place in the party on the most important political issues, transmitted the contents of the verbatim reports of the Plenums of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which during my visits to I received Moscow for reading from b. secretaries of the MC of the CPSU (b) ZELENSKY and MIKHAILOV, as well as b.

Secretary of the Bauman District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - TSIKHONA. Constantly guiding Nikolaevsky on the international and domestic policy of the party and the Soviet government, I maintained espionage contact with him until the end of 1929, then resumed my intelligence work in

favor of the Germans at the end of 1933. The case took place under the following circumstances. In 1932, I was appointed USSR trade representative to Greece. At the end of 1933, I was summoned by the former. Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Greece DAVTYAN and warned that he was aware that I was connected with

DAVTYAN said that the editor of the Greek newspaper "Vradeni" ARVANTINOS* would come to me, through whom I should continue to communicate with the

Germans. ARVANTINOS indeed soon came to me at the trade mission and, referring to a special conversation on this subject with DAVTYAN, demanded new information for German intelligence. Through ARVANTINOS, I systematically transmitted to the German

intelligence all the information of interest to her about the work of the trade mission and the People's

Commissariat for Foreign Trade. In 1935, in view of my departure from Greece, I was forced to cut off contact with ARVANTINOS, but resumed my espionage work through Olga Alexandrovna, an agent of German intelligence, OLIGER*.

OLIGER worked as a secretary b. USSR Trade Representative in Germany STOMONYAKOV. Her husband had German citizenship and annually traveled to Germany on an official visa. I had known Oliger since 1923, through joint work in the USSR trade mission in Germany, and in 1936 I invited her to work at the International Book in Moscow. In the same 1936, in one of my conversations with OLIGER, I stated that her husband was highly suspicious of espionage. OLIGER, not at all embarrassed, replied that she knew about my connection with the Germans. She immediately admitted that she was collecting the necessary information and passing it on to her husband, who is directly connected with representatives of the German consulate in Moscow.

OLIGER immediately suggested that I continue contact with the Germans, using her services as an intermediary. I accepted this offer, allowed OLIGER to work secretly in the International Book, which made it possible for her to receive many materials of interest to German intelligence.

In addition, through OLIGER, I reported to intelligence the addresses of book warehouses located in Paris and Prague, from where revolutionary literature was illegally transported to Germany. In 1937, OLIGER was

arrested, her husband ELSTER * tried to establish contact by telephone under the pretext of looking for work, but I sent the answer through the secretary that I could not help him in any way. The last time ELSTER called me was in early 1940, but again I declined to see him for fear of my failure. In 1936, I was sent by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade to Paris on the

issue of concluding a general agreement with the French firm Ashet, and during this visit I again transmitted espionage information for Nikolaevsky.

Authorized "Mezhdunarodnaya knigi" in Paris, in the past - Count, now brigade commander IGNATIEV

* Alexey Alekseevich, who works in the department of military educational institutions of the Red Army, introduced me to the director of the Ashet company, a white émigré BOGUSLAVSKII, about

which he gave in writing the most flattering reviews (they were kept in the files of the International Book). BOGUSLAVSKII was

known as an established enemy of the Soviet Union, which, however, did not prevent IGNATIEV, who knew this, from presenting BOGUSLAVSKII to me as a person who fully sympathized with the Soviet system, whom, in addition, he has known since 1914, when IGNATIEV was still the military attache of the tsarist government under Poincare. BOGUSLAVSKII, at a meeting with me, conveyed

greetings from NIKOLAEVSKII and said that if I had any materials, then he - BOGUSLAVSKII - could take them for transmission

NIKOLAEVSKY. On

the second or third day, I gave BOGUSLAVSKII a letter in a sealed envelope addressed to NIKOLAEVSKII, which contained information about the political mood of the population, especially in the countryside, about food difficulties, and also about the inner-party situation in the CPSU (b). This was my last piece of material handed over to German intelligence through Nikolaevsky.

In the future, I maintained contact with the Germans through OLIGER, which I showed above.

My espionage work, however, went in two directions, not only for German but also for British intelligence. At the end of 1924 or

in the early days of 1925. I traveled to London on business of Mosvneshtorg, where I had meetings with Alexei Alekseevich BOGDANOV*, the secretary of Arcos, and concurrently was in charge which By of the representative office of Mosvneshtorg. I knew BOGDANOV's elder brother, Pyotr Alekseevich, who had worked at the Supreme Economic Council in his time, very well, so I quickly established close relations with Alexei. relationship.

Aleksey BOGDANOV, as it turned out from the very first conversations, turned out to be an anti-Soviet person who did not hesitate to express his anger against the party and Soviet power. BOGDANOV

introduced me to the typist MILTON; by nationality - Russian, married an Englishman and went with him to London. Once, in a conversation with me, BOGDANOV let me know that MILTON was suspected of having connections with British intelligence and that the trade mission was going to dismiss her in the near future. He asked

me to protect her, since MILTON, they say, has two children. With my assistance, MILTON was left at work in Mosvneshtorg, London. Before my departure from London, BOGDANOV, who at that time was already quite frank with me, asked me to send him information about the state of urban transport in Moscow, especially about the prospects for Soviet orders for buses and trucks that could be sold by the British.

At the same time, BOGDANOV told me directly that Intelligence Service was interested in this information. I sent the required information to BOGDANOV upon my return to Moscow in the first half of 1925.

of the year.

In the same conversation, BOGDANOV asked me to keep MILTON at work, in which he was interested for certain business reasons. I understood that it was about the interests of intelligence, with which, in addition to BOGDANOV, MILTON was also connected. Soon,

BOGDANOV himself was recalled to the Soviet Union, worked for some time in Mosvneshtorg, and then switched to some kind of big economic work in Moscow. BOGDANOV again, when meeting with me, was interested in the state of transport in Moscow, I gave him the required information, having received it, as a deputy of the Moscow Council, in the Moscow department of communal services.

Since 1926, I have lost sight of BOGDANOV, since he left Moscow. British intelligence resumed contact with me at the end of 1933, when I was trade representative in Greece. One day,

together with ARVANITINOS, the editor came to me maritime magazine, body of Greek shipowners Greek GITIS*.

Initially, GITIS offered to mediate in trade negotiations with the Greek government about my connection with the British and that he was interested in getting some information from me.

At the same time, he was especially interested in the prospects for Soviet chartering. This question, - said GITIS, - I was instructed to find out not only the interested circles of Greek shipowners,

but also the English.

This question was of great interest, since it concerned the whole plan of our transportation, depending on which the Greeks and the British could raise the rates for maritime transportation.

I submitted the required information to GITIS, after which I ordered the freight department in Perea to continue to submit all the materials that the department has, under the pretext that GITIS - they say - favors trade negotiations with the Greek government. In 1934, I submitted to GITIS - at his

request - data on the plan for Soviet timber exports, giving the appropriate order to the head. forestry department of the IZAKU* trade mission.

IZAK, like me, was in a very difficult position, having concluded an extremely unprofitable contract for the supply of timber to Greek firms, in connection with which there was a danger of losing all the currency for the timber we sold and getting only tobacco and currant instead.

In this regard, troubles awaited not only me, but also IZAK, who, together with me, drafted and signed agreements that were unfavorable for the Soviet Union. I was convinced that GITIS and IZAK would fully agree on the issues of interest to them, and IZAK would not dare to contradict me.

After the meetings with GITIS, IZAK said to me: "Why are you sending me a spy?" I made a bewildered face, asking: "How do you know this?" Then IZAK replied: "Everyone in Perea knows about it." I said: "A spy - GITIS or not, but he is a profitable person, and you, please, agree with him."

Later, GITIS established full contact with IZAK. IZAK, whom I knew from conversations with me as an anti-Soviet person, decomposed under the conditions of a long stay abroad and associated with the notorious White Guard Slutsky, with whom he concluded an agreement extremely unfavorable for the Soviet Union on the supply of charcoal to Italy, I completely held in my hands. I must add that in the same

1934, even before the meeting of GITIS with IZAK, the latter, on the basis of our common anti-Soviet convictions, was involved by me in the right-wing Trotskyist organization, which I created in Greece. That is why I sent GITIS to IZAK with such confidence. Spy communication with GITIS was

interrupted in connection with my recall to Moscow in 1935.

I now turn to the last part of my criminal work, connected with my belonging to the anti-Soviet right-wing Trotskyist organization, in which I was involved by ROZENGOLTS back in 1932.

I had known ROZENGOLTS since 1917. He knew about my anti-Party speeches back in 1917 and 1918. In addition, in 1927-28, when FRUMKIN* was being studied at the Moscow Party Conference for his anti-Party speech and support of the Rights, I expressed my sympathy to him. ROZENGOLTS knew that I remained a supporter of the Rights, and when I was involved in an anti-Soviet organization, he referred to FRUMKIN, from whom ROZENGOLTS, in his words, became aware of my agreement with FRUMKIN's right-wing attitudes.

In the summer of 1932, before my appointment as trade representative in Greece, ROZENGOLTS invited me to his Moscow apartment, the Government House.

In a conversation with me, ROZENGOLTS, once again convinced of my disagreement with the policy of the Party, announced the existence of an illegal bloc of Rights and Trotskyists. At the same time, he informed me that there was a group of people in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade adjoining the right-wing Trotskyist bloc, and invited me to take part in the work of this group. When I agreed, ROZENGOLTS named the members of this organization—his deputy FRUMKIN, former head of the export department RABINOVICH*—and offered to establish contact with them on enemy work. Before leaving for Greece, in 1932, I

contacted FRUMKIN and RABINOVICH and received instructions from them on further anti-Soviet activities. The meaning of their instructions boiled down to the fact that I

had to pursue a policy in Greece that would cause material damage to the Soviet Union. To this end, I had to conclude deals unfavorable for the Soviet Union with Greek firms, import goods, regardless of the market situation, and disrupt the timely charter of ships for the transport of Soviet goods.

FRUMKIN stressed that in order to disguise our wrecking work, it is necessary to ensure the quantitative fulfillment of the foreign exchange

plan, and offered to do this by selling goods at reduced prices. Shortly after my arrival in Greece, I

sold about 10,000 tons of bread at very low prices. This wrecking work was so obvious that it was the subject of discussion at a meeting of the party organization of the embassy and trade mission of the USSR in Greece. In 1933, I signed a long-term monopoly agreement, obviously disadvantageous for the Soviet Union, for the sale of Soviet soda products.

The fulfillment of this agreement was associated with great material damage to the Soviet Union, which consisted in the fact that, despite the presence of competitors offering high prices for soda products, we, being bound by a monopoly agreement, did not have the right to sell these products to other persons. Wrecker work was carried out by me

also in the field of chartering. Thus, I was instructed to conclude agreements with Greek shipowners for the transportation of Soviet goods to various European ports. During 1933-34. I disrupted the conclusion of these agreements, which created a tense situation with transportation and

significantly increased their value.

Realizing that it would be difficult to act alone, I enlisted Vladimir Alexandrovich ADAMSON*, Deputy Trade Representative of the USSR in Greece, whom I personally recruited into the organization in 1933, to the anti-Soviet work.

I knew ADAMSON since 1919 through joint work on the Board of the Moscow Consumer Society. Even at that time, ADAMSON shared anti-Soviet views. In 1925 or 1926 Upon my arrival from

Berlin, I appointed ADAMSON as my successor in the position of authorized representative of the Moscow Trade Agency in Berlin. In Berlin, ADAMSON and I had anti-Soviet

conversations, criticized and sympathetically commented on White Guard literature. At the end of 1933, at my request, ROSENGOLTS appointed ADAMSON as my deputy in Greece. Knowing the anti-Soviet sentiments of ADAMSON, given our long-standing friendship and his sympathetic attitude towards my

anti-Soviet speech in 1918, I gradually led him to recognize the correctness of the position, which was to unite the right and Trotskyists to change the political line of the party. I said that the economic people's commissariats could do much to disorganize the economy and force the leaders of the party to make concessions. So I gradually prepared him for recruitment, and then directly raised the question of his participation in the right-wing Trotskyist organization that existed in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade. ADAMSON without

any hesitation expressed his consent and subsequently, together with me, carried out the sabotage installations of ROSENGOLTS. After my departure, ADAMSON,

who remained in Greece, completely continued my sabotage line, chartered steamships from White Guard firms, because of which a whole business arose in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade, continued to buy tobacco through the spies of GITIS and ARVANITINOS, disrupted trade operations with Greece.

Having been recalled from Greece, I also dragged ADAMSON to Moscow, got him a job at the People's Commissariat of Local Industry to P.A.

At the end of 1933, while I was still in Greece, I involved BRUK * (I don't remember his name and patronymic) in the right-wing Trotskyist organization - formerly. head of the grain department of the Soviet trade mission. I repeatedly had anti-Soviet conversations with him. One day I spotted a copy of Breaking News in Brook's possession and exchanged views with him about an editorial. BROOK was sympathetic to the article, saying that the paper's international reviews were quite good. Brook himself worked little

and was poorly versed in the grain business, entrusting it to a Greek émigré who had a Soviet passport. BRUK, having no right to do so, concluded with this Greek, an obvious swindler, a monopoly agreement unprofitable for the USSR on the supply of Soviet wheat to Greek traders.

In 1933, BRUK voluntarily, contrary to my prohibition, left for the Soviet Union, allegedly for instructions to the chairman of Exportkhleb, and instead of himself left all that

the Greek, who, in his absence, independently sold Soviet wheat. Upon BROOK's

return, the question of him was discussed in the party organization of the Soviet colony in Greece. I used all

this compromising material on BROOK during his recruitment, especially the fact that the sale of wheat was disrupted during his unauthorized departure to Moscow. I warned BROOK that he could not escape serious responsibility. At the

same time, I spoke with him on the subject of the economic and political situation in the USSR and outlined the prospects, which boiled down to the rejection of the construction of socialism. In the final analysis, BROOK was involved by me in an anti-Soviet group and accepted my tasks of wrecking organization of the sale of Soviet wheat, regardless of the commercial situation.

The last two recruitments are connected with my work in the International Book, where in the fall of 1936 I was involved in the anti-Soviet organization, Deputy Director of the Export Office LEVENSON * Fedor Savelich, and in the summer of 1937 - ELENEVSKY * (I don't remember my name and patronymic) - Deputy Chairman " International book. LEVENSON was one of the

oldest employees of the International Book. Despite the fact that under him the leadership changed several times, he remained one of the central figures of the sabotage that took place in the International Book. LEVENSON managed to survive, although the question of his removal from work was repeatedly discussed in the party and Soviet authorities.

All export contracts passed through his hands, in which exorbitant discounts were provided to foreign firms without a guarantee of the distribution of a certain amount of Soviet literature, which especially affected the contracts for periodicals with the French company Ashet, the English company Lawrence and the American Bookkniga. The very nature of

the monopoly agreements, without ensuring the sale of Soviet sabotage and hampered the literature, was a certain amount of spread of the Soviet press in the capitalist countries.

In addition, LEVENSON for many years sent abroad technical, military and reference literature on Soviet industry, which, although published legally, provided an opportunity for foreign intelligence services to use generalized and systematized information for their espionage purposes. Some publications, such as reference books on industrial facilities, were not subject to distribution at all, but LEVENSON sent them abroad. Previously a manager of an import office, LEVENSON wrote out

imported literature to the addresses of military units without encryption of addresses, which revealed the location of military facilities in the USSR. For a long time I had conversations with LEVENSON, criticized the line of the party from right-

wing Trotskyist positions, and in this way prepared me for recruitment
anti-Soviet into the organization.

Levenson's recruitment was further facilitated by the fact that, as I have already shown above, long before 1936 he carried on active wrecking work, which now began to be revealed not only in terms of exports, but also in the disorderly pricing of books. So, for example, political literature increased in price, while fiction, on the contrary, decreased. When I raised the question of his participation in an anti-Soviet organization before LEVENSON, he had no choice but to express his consent.

As for the recruitment of ELENEVSKY, it took place under the following circumstances. Being in New York in 1936, I drew attention to the need to eliminate the huge stock of handicrafts that were imported from the Soviet Union and stored in America for several years, for which I had to pay hard currency.

ELENEVSKY, being a consultant on the sale of these goods, expressed the opinion that all this huge stock could be sold at more or less normal prices and in the shortest possible time. He actually sold some of the art products, but a large part remained unsold, despite all his assurances.

In view of the difficult situation that had arisen, ELENEVSKY, under the guise of the permission of the International Book, returned the stale goods back to the Soviet Union. ELENEVSKY chartered a whole ship for this, and upon its arrival in Murmansk, a special train had to be sent to transport goods to Moscow. The sabotage nature of this operation was so obvious that, if it were not for the measures to conceal it on my part, with the assistance of the Deputy People's Commissar, SUDYIN, ELENEVSKY, I, and together with us SUDYIN, would have suffered severe

responsibility. Nevertheless, despite the measures we have taken to hide this wrecking act from the party and public organizations, it has

received partial publicity. While still in America, I became close friends with ELENEVSKY, carried on anti-Soviet conversations with him, visited together the owner of the Bookkniga in his country house near New York, and spent the night with this American merchant. Thus, I had every reason to consider ELENEVSKY my man.

In view of the unsatisfactory results in his work, and also in connection with the depraved way of life that ELENEVSKY led abroad, at the suggestion of the leading Party authorities, he was recalled by me from

New York. In an attempt on my part to re-register him for a job in America by the party authorities, this was denied to me, and ELENEVSKY was left without prospects of getting a job suitable for him. I took

advantage of this circumstance and offered YELENEVSKY the position of my deputy, subject to his consent to take part in the work of our anti-Soviet organization.

ELENEVSKY gave this consent, after which I formalized his appointment as my deputy for the International Book and provided the most important site - import work, on which he carried out my wrecking installations. In addition to the

new recruitments that I carried out, on the instructions of ROSENGOLTS, in 1936, I contacted a member of our organization, KUKINA * Evdokia Nikolaevna, who at that time held the position of director of the Export Office, and through her carried out

sabotage in the export of reference literature on the industry of the USSR abroad. In the very first

days of my work at the Mezhdunarodnaya Knigi, on the personal order of ROSENGOLTS, I closed the branch in New York. This wrecking act disrupted the distribution of Soviet

literature in America and caused great material damage to the International Book.

Together with KUKINA, with the active participation of LEVENSON, I concluded agreements with foreign firms that were unfavorable for the USSR, without certain guarantees for the distribution of Soviet literature, which also led to losses and hampered the distribution of Soviet publications in the capitalist countries.

Reference literature was exported abroad, which gave a detailed description of the industry of the USSR: location, equipment capacity and other data on industrial enterprises, which, of course, greatly facilitated the work of foreign intelligence services. That is all I have to show about my criminal work, which I carried on from 1898 to 1940,

being an implacable enemy of the Party long before the October Revolution, but carefully disguising my true face as a provocateur and spy from it. Nikolai KLESTOV-ANGARSKY INTERROGATED: Deputy. Head of the investigative department of the GEM NKVD, Major

Gosud. SHVARTSMAN Investigator

of the

Investigative Department of the Main

Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD State

Security Lieutenant BORISOVSKY

The interrogation began at 00:10 and ended at

18:30 with a break of 1 hour. AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 377. L. 164-205. Script.

Typescript.

On the first sheet there is Stalin's note: "What is the role of investigator? Is he a listener of Angarsky's narrator, and nothing more?"

The numbers from 1 to 12 are sequentially placed opposite the surnames (number 12 twice).

No. 116

**L.P. in the Council of People's Commissars of
the USSR on the fight against speculation in
goods in Moscow**

07/02/1940

No. 2701/

b Top secret Moscow,
the

NKVD of the USSR from January to June 1940, inclusive, the following work was carried out: For manufactured goods: Buyers arrested and brought to justice - 947 people; fined - 16,853 people for a total amount - 474,696 rubles. In

addition, industrial

goods worth 1,038,279 rubles were confiscated from them. For foodstuffs: Arrested and prosecuted - 463 people; 50,809 people were detained,

from whom 582,688 kg of food products were taken away; of these, 38,962 people

were fined, for a

total amount of 626,556 rubles. Of those sued for speculation

1410 employees of the trading network make up 184 people.

During the same time, administratively expelled from the mountains. Moscow 1220 people of violators of the passport regime, detained in queues.

To strengthen the fight against speculation in industrial and food products in the mountains. In Moscow, the NKVD of the USSR considers it necessary to additionally carry out the following measures:

1. Persons detained by the police two or more times for buying or reselling food and industrial goods in the mountains. Moscow, arrest. 2. Also subject to arrest persons arriving in the mountains. Moscow from other

cities and regions of the USSR caught buying food and industrial goods for speculative purposes.

3. Arrest persons engaged in the purchase and resale of industrial and food products, covering their speculative activities with work in Soviet institutions and

collective farms.

4. Cases against persons arrested for buying and reselling food and industrial goods are to be considered at a Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR.

I ask for your instructions. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA
RGASPI F. 17. Op.

163. D. 1270. L. 1-2. Script.
Typescript.

On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "For (+ in the Central Committee) A. Mikoyan", "I. St., V. Molotov, Andreev, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Kalinin.

No. 117

**From the resolution of the Politburo of the
Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of
Bolsheviks on measures to evacuate the population
from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to Romania**

07/03/1940

Top Secret 59 -

Question of the

NKVD To receive the population evacuated by the Romanian government from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, who expressed a desire to return to their homeland, carry out the following measures: 1.

Organize the following checkpoints: a) at Vasilelupu station (against the mountains . Iasi), consisting of 15 operational workers, headed by Captain V.P. Lebedev;

b) at the Renia station (against Galati), consisting of 15 operational workers, led by Major N.A. Reshetov; c) in the

mountains Izmail, consisting of 15 operational workers, led by captain Nekrasov F.P.;

d) at Vahojneshtie station (near Chernivtsi) consisting of 15 operational workers, headed by Captain Tarasenko V.A.

2. Pass to Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to be made on the basis of documents of the government bodies of Romania, proving the identity of their bearers, indicating the place of permanent residence before evacuation. 3. All citizens returning

from Romania to Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina should be registered with the NKVD, those who are dubious should be obliged to report to the NKVD bodies weekly due to territoriality, and suspicious and anti-Soviet elements should be arrested.

4. Citizens returning to Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina sent for resettlement in places of permanent residence.

To carry out the work of checkpoints on the basis of the instructions developed by the NKVD of the USSR ...

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 28. L. 3-4. Script. Typescript. Protocol
No. 18. The text

contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts
sent by: t.t. Beria, Khrushchev, Khlomov - all; Kaganovich - 5".

No. 118 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about the arrested soldiers of the Red Army [32]

07/20/1940

2917/

b COPY

Top secret To

Comrade STALIN On

March 3, 1940, for treasonable actions that entailed grave consequences during hostilities with the Finnish White Guard, the following were arrested: the commander of the 18th Infantry Division KONDRASHOV Grigory Fedorovich and named by him as his adjutant Boris NOVICHENKOV Borisovich, who later turned out to be assistant chief of staff of the division's

artillery. An investigation carried out by the Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR established that the division, as a result of the criminally negligent actions of KONDRASHOV,

fell into an enemy encirclement. The defense of the blockaded garrison, where the command post of the division was located, was poorly organized by KONDRASHOV, the command heights located in the immediate

vicinity were not occupied. Having received an order to organize an exit from the White Finnish encirclement, KONDRASHOV did not make any preparations for the exit. The rank and file of the planned exit was not fully notified, because of which the exit turned into a disorderly retreat.

The exit from the encirclement was carried out by 2 columns - southern

and northern. After the southern column left, the northern one began to move, along which the enemy concentrated all the strength of his fire. As a result of this, the personnel, hiding from defeat, began to spread to the sides.

Seeing the resulting panic, instead of taking decisive measures to maintain calm and withdraw personnel from the sphere of concentrated enemy artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire, KONDRASHOV abandoned the column and fled to the area where the 20th division of the regiment was located. After this treacherous act, KONDRASHOV in the forest accidentally met with the assistant chief of staff of the

artillery division, ml. lieutenant NOVICHENKOV, whom he called his adjutant when meeting with our units.

The investigation also established that, having abandoned the leadership of the column and hiding from participating in the battles, KONDRASHOV expressed to NOVICHENKOV his intention to surrender to the enemy, but NOVICHENKOV categorically rejected this treasonous proposal. KONDRASHOV pleaded guilty to not organizing the defense of the blockaded

garrison, not ensuring the withdrawal of personnel from the enemy encirclement, leaving the northern column emerging from the encirclement at a crucial moment.

The guilt of KONDRASHOV in the above criminal acts has been fully established, which is confirmed by the available materials and the personal confession of the accused. The NKVD of the USSR considers it necessary for Grigory Fedorovich

KONDRASHOV to be brought to trial by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR for the treasonous actions he committed, in which he pleaded guilty. Junior Lieutenant Boris Borisovich NOVICHENKOV, as he was not KONDRASHOV's adjutant and not related to his

treacherous activities, and also because the investigation did not establish the guilt of NOVICHENKOV himself in treasonous activities, release the latter from custody and close the case against him.

I ask for your instructions.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA AP RF. F. 3.

Op. 58. D. 206. L. 199-201. Script.

Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a resolution: "It is necessary to judge, and more strictly. St.".

No. 119

Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on the composition of the defense committee"

07/24/1940 62 - On

the composition of the Defense Committee (decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council
of People's Commissars

of the USSR) Approve

Committee

defense

V

composition:

t.t. Voroshilov (chairman), Voznesensky (deputy chairman), Stalin, Timoshenko, Beria,
Kaganovich L.M., Kuznetsov, Shaposhnikov.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1026. L. 15. Original. Typescript. Protocol number 19.

No. 120

**Special message L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin with a proposal
to cancel the decision of the Central Committee of the
All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of
People's Commissars of the USSR "on the evacuation of
Lithuanians from the regions of the BSSR bordering Lithuania"**

07/26/1940

No. 3009/b

Top secret of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist

Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade STALIN evacuation of persons of Lithuanian nationality who have expressed a desire to move to live in Lithuania. A total of 36,013 people who expressed a desire to evacuate to Lithuania were registered. The evacuation of the designated persons has not yet taken place. *Currently, citizens registered for evacuation in droves withdraw their applications and refuse to evacuate*. In connection with the changed situation, the NKVD of the USSR considers it expedient not to evacuate citizens of Lithuanian nationality from the regions of the

USSR bordering Lithuania. The NKVD of the USSR asks to cancel the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the

USSR of May 23, 1940 "On the evacuation of Lithuanians from the regions of the BSSR bordering Lithuania." With the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) B comrade. PONOMARENKO the issue is agreed. People's Commissar of Internal

Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1272. L. 291. Original.

Typescript.

There is a resolution on the sheet: "For (I agree). I. Stalin.

No.

121 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about prisoners of war of the Yuzhsky camp of the NKVD of the USSR

07/29/1940

No. 3046/

b Sov. secret

of the Central Committee of the

CPSU (b) - comrade. TO STALIN In the Yuzhsky camp of the NKVD of the USSR, former prisoners of war are kept 5175 people of the Red Army and 293 people of the commanding staff, transferred by the Finns during the exchange prisoners of war.

The operational Chekist group, created by the NKVD of the USSR to check prisoners of war, established that the Finnish intelligence agencies among the prisoners of war of the Red Army and command personnel were recruiting them for enemy work in the USSR.

The operational-Chekist group identified and arrested 414 people who were convicted of active treacherous work in captivity and recruited by Finnish intelligence for enemy work in the USSR.

Of this number, cases were completed and transferred by the Prosecutor of the Moscow Military District to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR investigative cases for 344 people. Sentenced to death - 232 people (the sentence was carried out against 158 people).

The NKVD of the USSR considers it necessary to carry out the following measures in relation to the remaining prisoners of war held in the Yuzhsky camp:

1. Additional arrest and trial by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR - 250 people convicted of treacherous work. 2. Former

prisoners of war, including 4354 people, on whom there is not enough material to bring to trial, suspicious due to the circumstances of captivity and behavior in captivity - by decision of the Special

To condemn the meeting of the NKVD of the USSR to imprisonment in labor camps for a period of 5 to 8

years. 3. Former prisoners of war in the amount of 450 people who were taken prisoner when they were wounded, sick or frostbitten, in respect of which there are no compromising materials, should be released and transferred to the disposal of the People's

Commissariat of Defense. People's Commissar of Internal

Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA AP RF. F. 3. Op. 66. D. 581. L. 78-79. Script. Types

No. 122

Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the deferral of students from the NKVD school from being drafted into the Red Army with the attachment of a special message to L.P. Beria

08/14/1940

Strictly secret 215 -

Question of the NKVD

Provide students of the NKVD school listed in the attached list, a deferment from conscription in the Red Army for a period of one year.

August 13, 1940 v No. 3225/b Sov. secret

of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks to Comrade STALIN By the decision of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 29, 50 graduate students were sent to the school of the NKVD of the USSR to teach them foreign languages and then use them in overseas work.

31 of them, listed in the attached list, who previously enjoyed a deferment as university students, are subject to conscription this year in the Red Army. The NKVD of the USSR asks to grant

these comrades a respite from conscription to the Red Army for a period of one year.

APPENDIX: list of listeners. People's

Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA
RGASPI. F.

17. Op. 163. D 1273. L. 147-148. Script. Manuscript. Protocol No. 19. Published without an

appendix. There is

a resolution on the sheet: "For. I. St.",

"V. Molotov,

"TO. Voroshilov, A. Mikoyan", "Kaganovich", "A. Zhdanov.

No.

123 Editorial correction by I.V. Stalin articles in the newspaper

"Pravda" "death of an international spy" [33]

08/23/1940

DEATH OF INTERNATIONAL SPY The

telegraph brought the news of Trotsky's death. According to American newspapers, an assassination attempt was made on Trotsky, who lived in Mexico in recent years. The assassin, Jacques Mortan Vandendreich, is one of Trotsky's closest people and followers. A man has

descended into the grave, whose name is uttered with contempt and curse by working people all over the world, a man who for many years fought against the cause of the working class and its vanguard, the Bolshevik Party. The ruling classes of the capitalist countries have lost their faithful servant. Foreign intelligence services lost a long-term, hardened agent, an organizer of murderers who did not disdain any means to achieve his counter-revolutionary goals. Trotsky went a long way

of betrayal and betrayal, political double-dealing and hypocrisy. No wonder Lenin, back in 1911, dubbed Trotsky the nickname "Judas". And this well-deserved nickname forever remained with Trotsky. Trotsky began his political career as a

Menshevik *anti-revolutionary*. Already in 1903, at the second congress of the RSDLP, he fiercely opposed Lenin, defending and supporting the views of Martov and other *anti-revolutionary* Menshevik leaders. Soon, by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, Trotsky even more frankly shows his face * as an apostate and anti-revolutionary *. He slides into positions of terry defencism, that is, the defense of the "fatherland" of the tsar, landlords and capitalists.

Trotsky met the revolution of 1905 with the notorious theory of "permanent" revolution. It was the theory of the disarmament of the proletariat, the demobilization of its forces. After the defeat of the 1905 revolution, Trotsky supported the Menshevik liquidators. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin then wrote about Trotsky thus: "Trotsky behaved like the meanest careerist and factionalist..."

He talks about the party, but behaves worse than all other factionalists.

Trotsky was, as you know, the organizer of the August *anti-revolutionary* Menshevik bloc of all groups and trends that opposed Lenin. Trotsky met the imperialist war that began in

August 1914, as one would expect, on the other side of the barricades - in the camp of the defenders of the imperialist slaughter. He covered up his betrayal of the proletariat with "Left" phrases about fighting the war, phrases calculated to deceive the working class. On all the most important questions of the war and socialism, Trotsky spoke out against Lenin, against the Bolshevik Party.

The ever-increasing strength of the influence of the Bolsheviks on the working class, on the masses of soldiers after the February bourgeois-democratic revolution, the enormous popularity of the slogans of Lenin * among the masses of the people, the Menshevik Trotsky assessed in his own way. He joined our party in July 1917, along with a group of his like-minded people, declaring that he had "disarmed" to the

end. Subsequent events showed, however, that the Menshevik Trotsky did not disarm, did not stop fighting *against Lenin for a moment and entered our party in order to blow it up from within*.

Already a few months after the Great October Revolution in the spring of 1918, Trotsky, together with a group of so-called "Left" Communists and Left Social Revolutionaries, organized a villainous conspiracy against Lenin, seeking to arrest and physically destroy the leaders of the proletariat, Lenin, Stalin and Sverdlov. As always, Trotsky himself - a provocateur, an organizer of murderers, an intriguer and an adventurer - remains in the shadows. His leading role in the preparation of this atrocity, fortunately unsuccessful, is fully revealed only two decades later, at the trial of the anti-Soviet "Right-Trotskyist bloc" in March 1938. Only twenty years later, the dirty tangle of crimes of Trotsky and his henchmen was finally unraveled.

During the years of the civil war, when the country of the Soviets repelled the onslaught of numerous hordes of White Guards and interventionists, Trotsky, with his treacherous actions and wrecking orders, in every possible way weakened the strength of the resistance of the Red Army, * in view of which he was forbidden by Lenin to visit the Eastern and Southern fronts *. It is a well-known fact that Trotsky, due to his hostile attitude towards the old Bolshevik cadres, tried to shoot a whole number of responsible communist front-line soldiers who were objectionable to him, thus acting into the

hands of the enemy. At the same trial of the anti-Soviet "Right-Trotskyist bloc" the whole treacherous, treacherous path of Trotsky was revealed to the whole world: the defendants in this trial, the closest associates of Trotsky, admitted that they, and together with them and their boss Trotsky, had already been agents of foreign intelligence agencies were international spies. * They, led by Trotsky * zealously served the intelligence and general staffs of England, France, Germany, * Japan *. When in 1929 the

Soviet government expelled the counter-revolutionary, the traitor Trotsky, from our homeland, the capitalist circles of Europe and America embraced him. It was no accident. It was natural. For Trotsky had long since passed into the service of the exploiters of the worker

class.

Trotsky has become entangled in his own nets, having reached the limit of human fall. He was killed by his own supporters. It was the very terrorists whom he taught about murder from around the corner, betrayal and atrocities against the working class, against the country of the Soviets, who did away with him. Trotsky, who organized the villainous murder of Kirov, Kuibyshev, M. Gorky, ** became a victim of his own intrigues, betrayals, betrayals, atrocities **.

So ingloriously ended his life this despicable man, descending into the grave with the seal of an international spy and murderer on his forehead. RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 1124. L. 63-66. Script. Typescript.

Editorial corrections are given in part.

The text contains Stalin's handwritten notes:
crossed out: "and Stalin";

— inscribed by Stalin; **

—** added instead of the one that was crossed out "another figure of a hardened spy and agent, a sworn enemy of the working people, has left the political arena of the capitalist world."

No. 124

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union
Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on traitors to the motherland"**

08/19/1940

Strictly secret 277

- On traitors to the motherland To

strengthen the fight against traitors to the motherland, carry out the following
Events:

1. In all cases of treason (escape or flight abroad), conduct an investigation and submit materials to the Military Tribunals to bring the traitors to the homeland to court within 10 days. 2. The military tribunals shall decide on cases of traitors to the motherland within 48 hours from the date of receipt of the materials of the investigation.

3. The Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR of the decision on the sentences of the Military Tribunals shall be rendered without delay.

4. The Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, when approving the verdicts of the Military Tribunals for cases of traitors to the motherland, make decisions on bringing to justice members of the families of traitors to the motherland. Copies of these decisions

should be sent to the NKVD for execution. 5. Sentences of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR in relation to traitors to the motherland shall be announced in the military units in which the traitors to the motherland were in the service before their escape.

6. To oblige the commanders of military units and border detachments to serve directly on the state border line to prevent undisciplined and morally unstable fighters. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 28. L. 73. Original. Typescript. Protocol No. 19. The

text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Beria, Bochkov, Ulrich, Pomaznev.

No. 125

Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks on personnel appointments in the NKVD of the USSR

08/22/1940

306 - Question of the NKVD of the USSR (OB dated 14.VIII.40, pr. No. 48, p. 172-
gs)

1. In connection with the appointment of Comrade Bochkov V.M. Prosecutor of the USSR
release him from the work of the head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR.

2. Approve the head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR Comrade
Mikheev A.N., releasing him from the work of the head of the Special Department of the Kyiv
Special Military District. 3.

Approve the head of the Special Department of the Kyiv Special Military District
Comrade Yakunchikov N.A., the current deputy head of the Special Department of the Kyiv
Special Military District.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1026. L. 87-88. Script.
Typescript.

Protocol number 19.

No. 126

Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks "Vopors of the NKVD"

09/10/1940

Strictly secret

142 - Question of the

NKVD Propose to the People's Commissariat of Defense to remove from the military register 1118 people of NKVD operatives born in 1911-1919, who had deferrals on conscription, and transfer them to special registration of the

command staff of the NKVD GUGB. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D.

29. L. 8. Original.

Typescript. Protocol No. 20. The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Timoshenko, Beria, Khlomov.

No. 127

**From the resolution of the Politburo
of the Central Committee of the All-
Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on
the work of the Soviet delegation in the
Soviet-German commission
for the evacuation of German citizens
and persons of German nationality
from the territory of the Lithuanian SSR
to Germany and Lithuanian citizens from Germany to the Li**

09/24/1940

Top secret 261

- On the work of the Soviet delegation in the mixed Soviet-German commission for the evacuation of German citizens and persons of German nationality from the territory of the Lithuanian SSR to Germany and Lithuanian citizens and persons of Lithuanian nationality from the territory of Germany (Memel region) to the Lithuanian SSR, as well as on the settlement of

property claims Approve the draft resolution of the SNK of the USSR On the work of the Soviet delegation in the Mixed Soviet-German Commission for the evacuation of German citizens and persons of German nationality from the territory of the Lithuanian SSR to Germany and Lithuanian citizens and persons of Lithuanian nationality from the territory of Germany (Memel region) to the Lithuanian SSR , as well as for the settlement of property

claims (see Appendix).

APPENDIX to paragraph 261 (OP) pr. PB No. 20 MOST SECRET

ON THE WORK OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN THE MIXED
SOVIET-GERMAN COMMISSION FOR THE EVACUATION AND PERSONS
FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE OF GERMAN GERMAN CITIZENS
LITHUANIA SSR TO GERMANY AND LITHUANIAN CITIZENS AND
PERSONS OF LITHUANIAN NATIONALITY FROM THE TERRITORY OF
GERMANY (MEMEL OBLAST) TO THE LITHUANIA SSR, AS WELL AS
FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF PROPERTY CLAIMS

Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR

(Approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of
Bolsheviks on September 24, 1940) The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decides:

...

4. Determine that the staffing of the representatives of the German
Delegation and representatives of the Soviet Delegation should be as
follows:

Chief German Commissioner with two deputies and no more than 20
support staff. 3 District Commissioners, each with one
deputy and no more than 15 support personnel, no more than 20
territorial commissioners, each with one deputy and two support personnel.
Accordingly, the states of Soviet representatives on Lithuanian territory and
the states of Soviet representatives on the
territory of the Memel region are being built.

5. To oblige the NKVD of the USSR within three days to allocate the
required number of employees as the main representative, deputies, district
main Commissioner, their
Commissioners and their deputies.

6. Propose to the NKVD of the USSR to open the necessary number
of checkpoints on the Soviet-German border for evacuation, providing them
with a customs apparatus in agreement with the People's Commissariat of
Foreign Trade ... Chairman of the Council
of People's Commissars of the USSR V. MOLOTOV

Managing Director of the Council of People's Commissars M. KHLOMOV RGASPI. F.

17. Op. 162. D. 29. L. 13, 105-106. Script.

Typescript.

Protocol No. 20. The

text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Molotov (NKID),
Khlomov.

No. 128

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union
Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the expenses of the NKVD for overseas work**

09/25/1940

Strictly secret

294 - Question of the

NKVD To allocate to the NKVD until the end of 1940 for the costs of overseas work (in the currency of different countries at the request of the NKVD) 1 million rubles and in Mongolian

tugriks 420 thousand rubles. From this sum, 500,000 rubles in foreign currency of various countries and 200,000 Mongolian

tugriks should be allocated in advance. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 29. L. 14.

Original. Typescript. Protocol No. 20. The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Beria, Zverev, Khlomov.

No. 129

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of
the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks
"on checking the work of the NKPS in the
production of mine and torpedo weapons"**

10/04/1940

Strictly secret 57 -

On checking the work of the NKPS for the production of mines
torpedo weapons

Instruct Comrade Mekhlis (People's Commissariat of State Control), with the
involvement of representatives of the NKVD, to check the work of the People's
Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry in the production of mine and torpedo weapons.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 29. L. 126. Original. Typescript. Minutes No. 21. The text
contains a typewritten

note about distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Mekhlis, Beria, Khlomov.

No. 130

Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the Intelligence Directorate [of the Red Army](#)[34]

10/05/1940

Strictly secret 82

- Issue RU 1.

Give out 500 thousand rubles for the expenses of the Intelligence Agency. 2. Instruct the commission as part of t.t. Malenkov (convocation), Bulganin, a representative of the NKVD and Comrade

Golikov to consider the estimate of R.U. until the end of 1940.

RGASPI. F. 17.

Op. 162. D. 29. L. 128. Original. Typescript. Minutes No. 21. The text contains a typewritten note about distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Golikov, Khlomov - all; Zverev - 1, Malenkov, Bulganin, Beria - 2.

No. 131

**Letter to I.V. Stalin from the NKB on the
investigation of the accident at the powder
factory**

10/09/1940

No. 1242s

Confidential

to the SECRETARY of the Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Comrade I.V. STALIN *September 26 this year at
gunpowder factory No. 9 (Shostka) an accident

occurred at the phase of powder sacks*. During the accident, 13 workers died, and 8 people with
severe burns are being treated at a local hospital.

To identify the causes of the accident, I immediately appointed
Commission chaired by my deputy comrade. *Khrenkova*.

*The commission found that the most likely cause of the accident is the
ingress of a foreign metal object into the gunpowder, which, by its impact and
friction, could cause the powder dust to ignite*. The penetration of a foreign
metal object into

the powder was previously observed repeatedly, as there were cases of
unscrewing the nuts securing the elevator buckets, as well as separation and
fall of the elevator buckets. The commission found that the gunpowder sack
apparatus

was not unquestionably contributed to
grounded. This circumstance, the ignition
of powder dust.

The lack of grounding of the apparatus is a gross violation of the existing
safety regulations by the management
factory.

It was also established that the Chief Mechanic of the Department of
Capital Construction comrade Zames, when putting the apparatus into operation
(in April this year), reported to the Admission Committee that the apparatus
was grounded.

The commission revealed that at this phase the schedule for stopping the unit, inspection and washing was systematically violated. The technical management and management of the plant grossly violated the existing rules for the storage of gunpowder, allowing the overload of industrial buildings and even folding finished products near the buildings. At the moment preceding the accident, near

the building, bags of gunpowder (10-15 meters from the building) were 117 tons of gunpowder, which also burned out, which naturally increased the size of the accident. The building contained 54 tons of

gunpowder; thus, a total of 171 tons of gunpowder burned down. For a gross violation

and a criminal attitude to technical safety, I removed from work and *put on trial the following persons*: The head of the workshop, comrade Anikeev. Head

of production comrade Kolpina.

Production mechanic comrade

Marchenko. The chief engineer of the

plant Comrade Korshin. Plant director

Comrade Ivanov. The

Commission's material is submitted to the prosecutor to bring the above-mentioned persons to judicial responsibility. Based on

the results of the Commission's investigation, I am developing additional safety measures at all gunpowder factories to prevent any accidents, and first of all, I have given instructions to carefully check the grounding of all gunpowder production devices.

12 families of the dead workers were given a one-time allowance in the following amount: 5

families - 1,500 rubles each; 5

families - 1000 rubles each; 2

families - 500 rubles each and 1 deceased worker did not have

relatives. By the

decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR - 5 families of the dead workers were personal pensions. The

families of the rest of the victims will receive pensions under social insurance, in accordance with the current legislation.

SERGEEV I.P.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 343a. L. 18-20. Script. Typescript. On the first sheet there is a resolution: "T-schu Mehlis. Comrade Sergeev's "commission" is hardly credible. I would like you, together with Beria, to send a group of 3-4 people to investigate. I. St. *—* Underlined in pencil.

No. 132

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of
the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on providing
the Navy with diesel engines" [35]**

10/10/1940

121 - On the provision of the Navy with diesel engines (note by
Comrade

Beria) Instruct the People's Commissariat of State Control of those
responsible for the failure to fulfill the government's tasks to provide the
Navy with diesel engines - to bring to justice.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1028. L. 31. Original. Typescript.
Protocol number 21.

No.

133 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about the "wrecking" work of the leaders of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition

10/23/1940

No.

4490 / b Top secret

To Comrade STALIN

The NKVD of the USSR has information that the head of the 2nd Main Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition Boris Alexandrovich YEFREMOV, the deputy chief engineer of the same head office Anatoly Fedorovich CHERNYAEV and the head of the Technical Council of the People's Commissariat SIDOR Alexander Fedoseevich are

carrying out wrecking work. Efremov B.A., Chernyaev A.F. and SIDOR A.F. did not take the necessary measures to develop the production technology at factories No. 5 and No. 53 of Shkass igniter primers, which in 1939 and 1940. 171 million rejected.

Efremov and Chernyaev also did not organize the testing of the design and development of the production of fuses for shells, mines and bombs. As a result, the delivery of the D-1 and MB fuses to the Red Army was disrupted.

SIDOR in July 1939 changed the existing process for the manufacture of iron artillery shells, canceling the operation for their heat treatment, which led to mass rejection. Instead of 5,700 thousand pieces, according to the plan, the factories of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition for 1940 produced 1,100 thousand pieces of iron shells, of which 960

thousand pieces were rejected. In addition, the testimony of the former director of the Stalingrad plant "Barricades" BUDNYAK D.S.

(condemned to VMN) Efremov is exposed as a participant in the counter-revolutionary

organization in which BUDNYAKOM was involved in 1932. In 1934-35. Efremov was an assistant to the enemy of the people PAVLUNOVSKY I.P.

According to the testimony of the former director of plant No. 19 POBEREZHSKOY (condemned to VMN), SIDOR is exposed in wrecking work to disrupt the production of parts for

aircraft engines. The NKVD of the USSR considers it necessary to arrest Efremov B.A. Chernyaeva A.F. and SIDOR A.F. I ask

for your instructions. The

arrest of the mentioned persons is agreed with Comrade. MEHLIS and People's Commissar Ammunition tov. SERGEEV.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 343a. L. 57-58. Script. Typescript.

No. 134

Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on the sign" Honored Worker of the NKVD "" with a note by L.P. Beria

10/31/1940

16 - On the sign "Honored Worker of the NKVD"

Approve the following draft resolution of the Council of People's

Commissars of the USSR: "Approve the regulations on the sign "Honored
Worker of the NKVD" and the sample sign presented by the People's Commissar of
Internal Affairs of

the USSR. On
October

31, 1940, No. 4638 / b of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade STALIN,
the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR asks to approve the
attached regulation on the sign "Honored

Worker of the NKVD" and a

sample sign. APPENDIX: according to the text. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the U

POSITION

About the sign "Honored Worker of the

NKVD" 1. The sign "Honored Worker of the NKVD" is established to
reward the personnel of the bodies and troops of the NKVD of the USSR
for merits in the leadership or direct performance of work to protect the
state security of the USSR. 2. Awarding with

the badge "Honored Worker of the NKVD" is made by N.K.V.D of the
USSR. Simultaneously with the badge, a diploma is issued.

3. Those awarded with the sign "Honored Worker of the NKVD" serve as an example of exemplary performance of their duties. They must be: selflessly devoted to the party of Lenin-Stalin, vigilant and merciless in the fight against the enemies of the Soviet state.

4. Awarded with the badge "Honored Worker of the NKVD" have the right to receive preferential housing in the houses of the NKVD *.

5. The awarded may be deprived of the badge "Honored Worker of the NKVD" for misconduct discrediting the title of Chekist by order of N.K.V. Affairs of the USSR. RGASPI. F.

17. Op. 3. D. 1029. L. 8. Original. Typescript; Op. 163. D. 1284. L. 65, 66. Original. Typescript. Protocol No. 22. There is a resolution on the

note: "For (as amended). I. Stalin,
"IN. Molotov, K. Voroshilov, L. Kaganovich, A. Mikoyan.

* Crossed out by Stalin "and pay for the living space they occupy in the houses of the NKVD with a discount of up to 50%"

No.

**135 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about Polish
prisoners of war and
Czechs**

11/02/1940

No. 4713/

b Sov. secret

of the Central Committee of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to comrade STALIN In pursuance of
your instructions on prisoners

of war Poles and Czechs, we have done the following: , majors and captains
- 222, lieutenants and second lieutenants - 691, junior command staff - 4022,
privates - 13,321. Of the 18,297 people, 11,998 are residents of the territory that
has ceded to Germany. POWs interned in Lithuania and Latvia and

taken out to the camps of the NKVD of the USSR, there are 3303 people.

The vast majority of the rest of the prisoners of war, with the exception of
the command staff, are employed in the construction of highways and railways.
In

addition, there are 22 officers of the former Polish army in the Internal Prison
of the NKVD of the USSR, who were arrested by the NKVD as members of
various anti-Soviet organizations operating in the western regions of Ukraine and
Belarus. As a result of our filtering, through familiarization with

accounting and investigative files, as well as a direct survey, 24 former
Polish officers were selected, including: generals - 3, colonels - 1, lieutenant
colonels - 8, majors and captains - 6, lieutenants and second lieutenants - 6.

2. A series of conversations were held with all those selected, as a result of which it was established:

a) they are all extremely hostile towards * Germans *, consider a military clash between * USSR and Germany * inevitable in the future and express a desire to participate in the upcoming, in their opinion, * Soviet-German war * on the side of the * Soviet Union *; b) some of them express the conviction that the fate of Poland and its revival as a national state can be decided only by the Soviet Union, on which they pin their hopes; the other part (mainly from among the Poles interned in Lithuania) still hopes for the victory of the British, who, in their opinion, will help the restoration of Poland;

c) the majority consider themselves free from any obligations of V respect So called the "government" of SIKORSKY, while some declare that they can participate in the war with * Germany * on the side of the * USSR * only if this is sanctioned in one form or another by the "government" of SIKORSKY. The junior officers declare that they will act in accordance with orders received from some Polish general.

3. Specifically, one should dwell on the positions of the following individuals:

a) General YANUSHAITIS stated that he could take * leadership of the Polish units * if they were organized on the territory of the Soviet Union * to fight Germany *, regardless of the attitudes in this matter of the "government" of SIKORSKY. However, he considers it expedient to outline a special political platform outlining the *future fate of Poland* and at the same time, as he put it, "soften the climate" for the Poles living in the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus; b) General BORUT-SPEHOVICH declared that he could take certain steps only at the direction of the "government" of SIKORSKY, which, in his opinion, represented the interests of the Polish people;

c) General PRZHEZDETSKY made a statement similar to BORUT-SPEHOVICH's statement;

d) several colonels and lieutenant colonels (BERLING, BUKOEMSKY, GORCHINSKY, TYSHINSKY) declared that they were completely placing themselves at the disposal of the Soviet government and that they would very willingly take over * organization and leadership of any military formations * from among the Polish prisoners of war intended * to fight Germany* in the interests of creating Poland as a nation state. The future Poland is conceived by them as closely connected in one form or another with the Soviet Union.

4. To probe the moods of the rest of the mass of prisoners of war held in the NKVD camps, teams of operational workers of the NKVD of the USSR were sent to the places with the corresponding tasks.

As a result of the work carried out, it was established that the vast majority of prisoners of war can certainly be used to organize * a Polish military unit *. For this purpose, it seems

to us expedient: Without abandoning the idea of using generals JANUSHAITIS and BORUTS SPEKHOVICH as leaders of the * Polish military unit *, whose names may attract certain circles of the former Polish military, entrust the organization for the first time * division * to the above-mentioned group of colonels and lieutenant colonels (certificates for them are attached), who give the impression of intelligent, knowledgeable military affairs, politically correct and sincere people. This group should be given the opportunity to talk in a conspiratorial

manner with their like-minded people in the camps for Polish prisoners of war and select * the personnel of the future division *. After the personnel is selected, one of the state farms in the south-east of the USSR

should organize * headquarters * and a place of employment * divisions *. Together with specially allocated employees of the * Red Army Headquarters *, a plan is drawn up for the formation of a * division *, the issue of the nature of the * division (tank, motorized, rifle) * is being resolved and its logistics are provided. At the same time, in the camps for Polish prisoners of war among the rank and file and

junior command staff, the NKVD should carry out appropriate work on * recruiting people into the division *.

As the recruitment and verification of the recruits are completed, the last batches are sent to the location of the * division headquarters *, where appropriate classes are held with

them. The organization * of the division * and its preparation are carried out under the leadership of the * General Staff of the Red Army *. At the * division * a * Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR * is organized with the tasks of providing

internal coverage of the personnel of the * division *. 5. As for the Czech prisoners of war, there are 577 people in the NKVD camp (501 Czechs and 76 Slovaks), including: staff captains and captains - 8 people, junior officers - 39, junior command staff - 176

people and privates 354. In in the course of conversations with 13 officers selected from among them, it was established that they all consider *Germany* to be their primordial enemy and want to *fight with it* for the restoration of the *Czechoslovak state*. They consider themselves to be liable for military service of the Czech army, they consider BENESHA their leader, and if any Czech military units * are organized on the territory of the Soviet Union, they will join them on the orders of BENESHA or, at least, their commander * Colonel SVOBODA *, currently abroad. * FREEDOM * called

by us from abroad.

Appendix: according to the text. People's Commissar of

Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA AP RF. F. 3. Op. 50. D. 413. L. 152-157. S

Typescript.

Published without attachment.

— Handwritten in ink.

No. 136

Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the results of the inspection of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition with the attachment of a note by L.Z. Mehlis and L.P. Beria

11/11/1940

123 - On the apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition of the USSR 1. Instruct the Personnel Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to strengthen the NKB apparatus with proven and technically trained workers within two decades, appointing, first of all, the heads of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Glavkov. To warn the head of the 4th Main Directorate, comrade Ivanov, that if he does not improve the work of the Main Directorate within a month, he will be removed from his

post and brought to justice. 2. Remove Deputy People's Commissar Comrade Tolstov from his post and his chief Glavsnab NKB.

3. Remove comrade Akatov from the post of secretary of the NKB party organization as unable to cope with his work. 4. Arrest the deputy. People's Commissar Khrenkov

and hand over the case to the NKVD. 5. In December, to hear at a meeting of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks a report from the leadership of the People's Commissariat and the Personnel Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the work done to strengthen the

NKB apparatus. The Central Committee of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade

STALIN of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Comrade MOLOTOV ON

THE RESULTS OF THE CHECK OF THE

APPARATUS OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OF AMMUNITION OF THE UNION SSR In accordance with the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of September 26, 1940, the People's Commissariat of State Control of the USSR and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR checked the apparatus of the

People's Commissariat of Ammunition. The check was carried out by 55 employees of the People's Commissariat of State Control and the NKVD of the USSR under the leadership of the Chief Controller of the People's Commissariat

State Control Comrade. Gafarov and Deputy Head of the Main Economic Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR comrade. Nasedkin.

The device was checked by personal acquaintance with the employees of the People's Commissariat, with their practical work and by studying the relevant documentary data. At the same time,

there was a check of the production activities of the 1st and 2nd Main Directorates and the Glavsnab of the NKB.

It is established that the ammunition industry is in difficult situation.

For 9 months of 1940, the National Design Bureau fulfilled the annual plan for gross output by only 68.1 percent, and for marketable output - by 61.3

percent. As a result of this, a huge amount of unfinished products was formed at the NKB plants. As of October 1 this year. the balance of work in progress amounted to 1020 million rubles against 688 million rubles (according to the plan for January 1, 1941). The work of the NKB is

deteriorating from quarter to quarter. The plan for the 1st quarter for defense products was fulfilled by 87.9 percent, the second quarter - by 85.1 percent, the third quarter - by 55.8 percent. For 9 months of 1940, the National Design Bureau did not provide the Red Army and the Navy with 4.2 million sets of land artillery rounds, 3 million mines, 2 million air bombs and 205 thousand sets of naval artillery rounds.

In 1940, the NKB was supposed to produce 5.7 million iron shells instead of brass artillery shells. Without working out the technological process, the National Design Bureau produced 1117 thousand iron sleeves in 9 months, of which 963 thousand went into marriage.

During the same time, a large number of fuses of new designs GVMZ and MG-8 went into marriage. Fuse MP and D-1, with a plan of 3.3 million, not a single piece was handed over. The

launch of unfinished structures into mass production, systematic violations of technological processes and the shortcomings of some of them led to the formation of a large marriage at the factories, the losses from which according to the National Design Bureau (without the 3rd head office) amounted to 167 million rubles in 8 months of 1940.

The unsatisfactory formulation of planning and equipment in the NKB, as well as the uneven implementation of plans for individual elements of the shot (sleeves, cases, fuses) led to

to the accumulation in the warehouses of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy on October 1, 1940, incomplete products in excess of the norm by 185 million rubles. The main reason for such an unsatisfactory state of production at the enterprises of the NKB is the weakness of the leadership of the people's commissar:

1. The operational management of enterprises in the NKB has been replaced

issuing numerous orders.

With only 80 enterprises of the People's Commissar of Ammunition Comrade Sergeev for 9 months of this year. issued 633 orders (not counting orders for personnel). During the same period, 4 main departments of the NKB issued another 1079 orders. In a number of orders, the executors were given clearly

unrealistic deadlines. So, for example, in order No. 203s, the director of the Tula plant No. 176 was asked to "build a phosphating department of shop No. 4, mount bathtubs and put them into operation." The order was signed on June 5, submitted for distribution on June 7, and the deadline for completing the work specified in the order was set on June 8. By order No. 189s, plant No. 144 (city of Stalino) was obliged "not later than June 1, 1940, to develop schedules for the work of shops for the month of June, taking into

account the coverage of imperfections for the months of April - May." This order was signed on May 31, and arrived at the plant after the expiration of the deadline.

Order No. 151c notes the poor state of safety at the plants. By paragraph 8, the executors undertake to submit to Comrade Sergeev for approval on April 29 the plan of work, and the order itself was signed on May 4. There is no control over the execution of orders in the NKB, and the orders themselves are

often declarative in nature. By order No. 151s of May 4, the heads of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd headquarters undertook by May 10 "to resolve the issue of the use or elimination of defective products and to prohibit henceforth storing such products in factories in large quantities." This order was not carried out, and the factory yards are littered with defective products. The situation is exactly the same with the revision of the norms for loading and storing explosives and materials in factories. By order of Comrade Sergeev, this work was to be completed in May "in order to

overload of workshops and workshops of explosives did not exceed the established norms. This order was also not carried out, which, in particular, is evidenced by the facts known to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's

Commissars of the USSR regarding the 9th and 80th plants. 2. There is a huge correspondence in the NKB, loading the apparatus. Thus, the 4th Main Directorate of the People's Commissariat for 9 months of 1940 submitted 355 memoranda to the people's commissar and his deputies; technical department of the People's Commissariat - 309 memorandums.

For the 3rd quarter of this year the National Design Bureau received an average of 1,400 letters from the plant and

construction sites daily and sent 880. During the same period, the National Design Bureau sent 1,220 letters to government bodies (the Council of People's Commissars, the Defense Committee, the Economic Council and the Economic Council), i.e. over 5 emails per day. A significant number of questions posed in these letters were not of a fundamental nature and could be resolved directly by the People's Commissariat or its heads.

3. The system of imposition of penalties and removal from work of the management staff of enterprises, workshops and shifts.

For January - August this year. People's Commissar of Ammunition imposed 149 penalties on 72 executives; the head of the 1st main department, Gorin, received 10 penalties; the former director of plant No. 12 Sorokin - 7 penalties. On the same Sorokin, the head of the 1st head office imposed an additional 3 penalties. Director of Plant No. 142 Nozhkin has 15 penalties; director of plant No. 113 Chashin - 8 penalties.

Along with this, during short breaks between collections some factory directors were rewarded for their successful work.

So, on February 11, the director of plant No. 4 Brook was warned for not fulfilling the plan (order No. 52), on March 14 he was awarded a monthly salary for fulfilling the plan (order No. 97s), on April 23 he was reprimanded for poor organization of production (order No. 144s), and on April 29 he is awarded a 2-month salary. In 1940, Bodrov, director of plant No. 10, received 5 penalties and 2 bonuses. For a year and a half, the People's Commissariat removed 26 heads of enterprises and 18 chief

engineers from work. Only at plant No. 78 during this time in shop No. 4, 5 chiefs, 8 deputy heads and 14 heads of departments were replaced, and in shop No. 2 - 3 chiefs,

5 assistant chiefs and 3 senior technologists; at plant No. 9, 22 shift supervisors and 15 foremen were replaced. In the absence

of a sufficient number of engineers in the NKB system, the NKB for 7 months of 1940, according to incomplete data, fired 1226 certified engineers from the plant. 4. Tov. Sergeev is poorly

versed in people, does not know how to recognize them. Inyashkin, the deputy people's commissar for personnel, enjoyed great confidence in him (he was removed from work in the process of checking the NKB). To this Inyashkin, Comrade Sergeev entrusted the whole matter of selecting and placing personnel. As a result, Inyashkin, who was distinguished by idleness, drunkenness and self-sufficiency, ruined the work of personnel. Inyashkin nominated unfit people for leadership work in the people's commissariat and central offices, clogged the apparatus of the people's commissariat with politically dubious and low-skilled workers.

Among the employees of the People's Commissariat there are 14 former officers of the tsarist army, 70 people from the nobility, landowners and kulaks, 31 sued for various crimes, 17 expelled from the CPSU (b), 28 with relatives abroad, 69 people whose relatives were repressed for anti-Soviet work, and etc. Many of these people have no place in the apparatus of the NKB. Meanwhile, in 1940, 171 members of the CPSU (b), 166 engineering and technical workers were removed from the central apparatus in order to reduce staff. The reduction itself was completely entrusted to Inyashkin and the chiefs

glavkov.

It is characteristic that there were 10 people in the leading work in the NKB who had previously worked together with Inyashkin at plant No. 11, somehow: Shibanov - deputy. People's Commissar, Efremov - early. 2nd head office (arrested), Chernyaev - deputy. chief engineer of the 2nd head office (arrested), Kuzmin - early. mobilization department 2 head office and others.

5. Another Deputy People's Commissar Khrenkov N.M. before being nominated for this job (June 1939), he headed the staffing department of the People's Commissariat, which is subordinate to him now. As in 1939, so in 1940, the picking management works very badly.

The work carried out by Khrenkov arouses clear suspicion in sabotage. The

plan of 1940 for the delivery of complete shots against ground artillery to the People's Commissariat of Defense for 9 months was completed only on

57.7 percent, for air bombs - by 59.9 percent; for the delivery of products to the People's Commissariat of the Navy - by 58.5 percent. The plan for firing large-caliber shots was frustrated: not a single shot was fired for the 152 mm BR-2 gun, 210 mm BR-17 and 280 mm BR-5 mortars.

The mobilization department led by Khrenkov also does not work well. In the autumn of 1939, unprepared for the deployment of mobilization work. In October 1940, as chairman of the commission to identify plan factories people's commissariat turned out to be the causes and perpetrators

of the explosion of 175 tons of gunpowder at plant No. 9, Khrenkov tried in his conclusion to lubricate the real causes of the explosion and distract the perpetrators of the explosion from the now arrested.

6. Deputy Commissar Tolstov G.A. works dishonestly. As chairman of the commission at plant No. 53 to find out the reasons for the mass rejection of Shkass igniter primers, Tolstov tried to gloss over the true causes of the marriage, hide the violations of the technical process that took place at plant No. 53, and also hide the perpetrators of the marriage of 159 million igniter caps.

7. Head of the 1st Main Directorate (production of explosives and equipment) of the National Design Bureau - Gorin S.P., a chemical engineering mechanic by profession, does not provide guidance for the work of the Main Directorate and factories. Annual plan for defense products for

9 months of this year completed
Commander-in-Chief by only 57.5 percent.

As the director of Plant No. 80, Comrade Gorin could not cope with his work. Promoted to the position of head of the central office due to his personal connections with the former deputy. People's Commissar Mikhailov, Gorin failed to cover the work and did not ensure the implementation of the production program.

The departments of the head office (planned, technical, capital construction, and others) work unsatisfactorily. Plants No. 12, 15 and 56 were scheduled to equip

76 mm remote grenades for the second quarter, but the production of smoke-enhancing DU-5 bombs for them was not planned. As a result, the Commander-in-Chief's grenade equipment plan was disrupted and 720.8 thousand unloaded grenade cases accumulated at the factories. Of the 200 technological processes subject to approval by

By order of the NKB by September 1, Comrade Gorin approved only two by October 11.

Annual capital construction plan for 8 months of this year completed by only 40.5 percent, and the plan for commissioning new facilities - by 14.0 percent. 8. The head

of the 2nd main department (capsule-explosive) of the National Design Bureau - Efremov (now arrested) did not take measures to eliminate the mass marriage of Shkass blasting

caps. For 9 months in 1940, the marriage of these primers amounted to 159 million pieces. In the mass marriage of the Shkass fuse primers, together with Efremov, the deputy is also guilty. chief engineer Glavka Chernyaev A.F. (now arrested), who was the initiator of the transition without sufficient preparation and testing for varnishing capsules with idiotol varnish instead of shellac. Losses from marriage for 8 months according to Glavka amount to 49.7 million

rubles. Efremov thwarted the implementation of a number of important decisions of the Government, in particular, the decision of the Defense Committee No. 335ss of July 26, 1940 on the manufacture of VG-2 and VG-12 aviation

9. Also, the head of the 3rd Main Directorate (production of gunpowder) NKB Dynkin N.P. does not cope with the

work. The annual plan for Glavka for 9 months for defense products was only 64.3 percent fulfilled.

The technical management of the factories has been launched. A number of technological processes (the production of gunpowder grades A-19 and P-45 and from RP raw materials) were not sufficiently worked out. In 1940, only 4 plants (Nos. 9, 14, 40, 204) spent 745 thousand decaliters of alcohol on the execution of low-quality

gunpowder products. Not paying due attention to the organization of safety measures at factories, Dynkin entrusted this serious area of work to a low-skilled worker Makeev.

Director of Plant No. 9, Dynkin gave permission for the storage of a criminally inflated norm of gunpowder in the production buildings of the plant. At this plant on September 26 of this year. There was a gunpowder explosion that killed 15 people and seriously injured 18 people. The

business of supplying the factories is firmly entangled in Glavka. Plant No. 6 in June of this year. 3 tons of crystalline naphthalene were loaded, while the plant did not order naphthalene. Plant No. 40 was invited to conclude an agreement with Petrovsky Plant

staging 5 thousand canisters under charge 203/50. Having large stocks of pencil cases, Plant No. 40 refused to receive them three times. However, Glavka continued to send unnecessary canisters, stopped their shipment only after the third protest of the plant. Plant No. 59, which had a 9-month supply of centrolite, until very

recently, Glavka continued to send centrolite, despite the plant's requests to stop its shipment. At the same time, plant No. 6 did not have a centrolite at all and was in dire need of it.

10. The enterprises of the 4th Main Directorate (manufacturing of shell cases) for 9 months fulfilled the annual plan for defense products by only 51.5 percent. Losses from marriage at the plants of Glavka for 8

months amounted to 67.2 million rubles. Head of the Glavka Ivanov N.D. did not take any effective measures

to eliminate the marriage. None of the perpetrators of the marriage has been brought to justice. The marriage registration system adopted in the Main Directorate does not reflect the actual situation. 11. Head offices of the People's Commissariat, its departments and administrations are littered with low-skilled and

politically dubious people. The NKVD of the USSR arrested 8 people of senior officials of the NKB (head of the 2nd Glavka Efremov, deputy chief engineer of the same Glavka Chernyaev, head of Glavsnab Cooper, member of the technical council Sidor, head of the technical council section Yanov, head of the technical department Tolsky, engineer-dispatcher Datsuk, engineer Parshin). As a result of the audit, the need for dismissal from

systems NKB 62 people.

Subject to removal from office, as not doing their job, 49
Human.

Lists to be dismissed with characteristics at the same time
attached.

The current leadership of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, in our opinion, is not able to rectify the situation and cope with the tasks facing the ammunition industry. First of all, this concerns Comrade Sergeev, People's Commissar of Ammunition himself.

We consider it necessary: 1.

To instruct the Personnel Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to strengthen the apparatus of the NKB with proven and technically trained workers within two decades, appointing, first of all, the heads of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd chiefs. To warn the head of the 4th Main Directorate, comrade Ivanov, that if he does not improve the work of the Main Directorate within a month, he will be removed from his post and brought to justice. 2. Remove the

Deputy People's Commissar, Comrade Tolstov, from his post, appointing him the head of the Main Supply Department of the NKB.

3. Remove comrade Akatov from the post of secretary of the NKB party organization as unable to cope with his work. 4. Arrest the deputy.

People's Commissar Khrenkov, and hand over the case to the NKVD. 5. In December, to hear at a meeting of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks a report from the leadership of the People's Commissariat and the Personnel Department of the Central

Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the work done to strengthen the NKB apparatus.

Appendix: according to the text. People's Commissar of State Control of the USSR L. MEHLIS
People's

Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA November 5, 1940 No. 3534 AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. Typescript.

Protocol No. 22. In

the text there is a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Mekhlis, Beria, Andreev, Malenkov, Sergeev - all; Khlomov - 2; MK VKP(b) - 3".

No. 137

Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on daily information on the production of engines and aircraft"

11/16/1940

166 - On daily information on the production of engines and aircraft

1. To oblige the directors of the engine and aircraft factories of the NKAP, starting from November 16, 1940, to give daily messages to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry: a) for engine factories - the number of military representatives accepted motors for each type of motor;

b) by aircraft factories - the number of combat and training aircraft accepted by the military representatives for each type of aircraft. 2. Messages to the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the NKAP must be signed by the directors of factories and sent from Moscow factories by top secret mail, and from all other factories by encrypted telegrams. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1029. L. 46. Original.

Typescript. Protocol

number 22.

No.

**138 Special message by V.N.
Merkulova I.V. Stalin about the
arrest of terrorists in Lvov**

11/19/1940

No.

4892 / b to Comrade

STALIN In addition to No. 2760 / b of July 8, 1940, we inform you that the attackers who threw a grenade on July 8, 1940 on the territory of the water pool of the Red Army house in Lvov during the demonstration of the film were identified and arrested. 3 people were

arrested in this case: 1. DEGURSKY

S.V. (aka KORIBUT-VLOKH), unspecified, Pole. 2. DEDERCHUK M.D., head of

the water basin of the house of the Red Army of the Lvov garrison, Ukrainian, and 3. BARSKY V.I., carpenter

of the water pool of the house of the Red Army of the Lvov garrison, Pole. Arrested DEGURSKY,

DEDERCHUK and BARSKY in

they confessed to the crime they had committed and showed that they had thrown the grenade on the instructions of the Polish nationalist insurgent organization Zvenzek Walka Zbroyny (Union of Armed

Struggle). The investigation

continues. Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the

USSR

MERKULOV November 19, 1940 AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 378.

L. 202. Original. Typescript. There are resolutions on the sheet: "T-schu Beria. All these bastards should be shot. St.". "Instruction was given to Comrade. Fedotov. L. Beria. 19.XI.40.

No. 139

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist
Party of Bolsheviks on the resettlement of persons of the German
nationality**

11/27/1940

Strictly secret

78 - NKID question

Approve the draft memorandum of the NKID to the German embassy regarding the resettlement to Germany of persons of German nationality imprisoned in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina (see appendix).

Appendix to paragraph 78

(op) of pr. PB No. 23

Memoir

In connection with the request of the German Embassy, set out in the Memorandum of October 29 this year, regarding the resettlement to Germany of persons of German nationality who were to be evacuated from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has the honor to announce the

following: According to the information of the competent authorities, in 77 people are currently imprisoned, who are members of the families of those evacuated to Germany. Of these 77 people, only 7 people are of German nationality, while the remaining 70 people are not.

Despite this, the People's Commissariat, meeting the wishes of the German Embassy, expresses its consent to the release from arrest and resettlement to Germany of all the above 77 people, about which the competent authorities have given appropriate instructions. Moscow

"" November 1940

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 30. L. 57, 124. Original.

Typescript.

Protocol No. 23. The

text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Molotov (NKID), Vyshinsky, Beria.

No. 140

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee
of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks
"on bringing to justice traitors to the motherland and
members of their families" with the attachment
of a special message by L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin**

12/07/1940

Strictly secret 152

- On bringing to justice traitors to the motherland and members of their families. Adopt a

draft resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, proposed by the NKVD, on bringing to justice citizens of the USSR who arbitrarily leave the USSR for other states as defectors, as well as on bringing to justice the family members of these citizens.

APPENDIX to item 152 prot. No. 23

***ON BRINGING TRAITORS AND MEMBERS OF THEIR FAMILIES TO
RESPONSIBILITY***

Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR 1. In order to strengthen the protection of the state border of the USSR and strengthen the border regime, in law addition to the current (article of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR) providing for a measure of criminal punishment against citizens of the USSR, without permission leaving the USSR for other states, establish that family members of traitors to their homeland who have escaped or flown abroad are subject to exile in remote northern

regions of the USSR for a period of 3 to 5 years, with the confiscation of all their buildings, agricultural implements and livestock, unless they have committed crimes for which, according to the law, they are subject to a more severe punishment. 2.

Members of the families of traitors to the motherland,

who lived with them or were dependent on them at the time of the crime, are subject to liability. 3. The consideration of all cases of bringing to justice members of the families of traitors to the motherland shall be entrusted to the

NKVD of the USSR. 4. To grant the NKVD of the USSR the right, by decision of the Special Meeting, to exile family members of traitors to the

homeland to remote areas of the USSR for a period of 3 to 5 years with the confiscation of all buildings belonging to them, agricultural equipment and

livestock.

5. To instruct the NKVD of the USSR to submit for approval by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR an instruction that determines the procedure for the exile of family members of traitors to their homeland and the confiscation of their property, providing for a minimum of necessary personal belongings and household items that the exiles can take with them. Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party

of Bolsheviks Chairman of the

Council of People's Commissars of the USSR

December 7, 1940 No.

P23/152

December 4, 1940

No. 5250/

b Top secret of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks to Comrade ST A LIN U servicemen. Because of this, the relatives of the traitor to the motherland, if their complicity in the escape or failure to report to the authorities about the fact of the impending

escape known to them, is not proven by the investigation, they are not subjected to repression.

As a result of this situation, especially on the new borders of the USSR (the western regions of Belarus and Ukraine, the border with Romania, the Baltic Soviet Republics), where cases of care for

the border of the inhabitants of the USSR, both singles and groups, continues to take place, the measures currently being taken to combat violators of the state border do not give the desired effect. In order to apply more effective measures to combat violators of the borders of the USSR and strengthen the border regime, the NKVD of the USSR considers it necessary to establish criminal liability for family members of traitors to the motherland (not only military personnel) who fled abroad. Considering that the current legislation also does not provide for the jurisdiction of cases involving members of the families of traitors to the motherland, and based on the need for the fastest consideration of these cases, the NKVD of the USSR considers it appropriate to entrust

the consideration of all cases of family members of traitors to the motherland to the NKVD of the USSR and, in this regard, to give the NKVD of the USSR the right to decide Special Meeting to exile members of the families of traitors to the motherland in certain northern regions of the USSR with confiscation of property. At the same time, I submit for your consideration a draft resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. If there is a need to publish this decision, in this case the NKVD of the USSR considers it expedient to issue a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the draft of which is attached. The draft resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the

USSR was agreed with comrade. Khrushchev. The NKVD of the USSR asks for your decision.
People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L. BERIA

DECREE OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE UNION OF THE SSR

On supplementing the provision on state crimes with an article on the responsibility of members of the families of traitors to the motherland 1. In order to strengthen the protection of the state border of the USSR and strengthen the border regime, establish that family members of traitors to the motherland who have escaped or flown abroad are subject to exile in remote northern regions of the USSR for a period of 3 to 5 years with the confiscation of all buildings belonging to them,

agricultural implements and livestock, if they have not committed crimes for which, according to the law, they are subject to a more severe punishment. 2.

Members of the

families of traitors to the motherland, living together with him or being dependent on him at the time of the commission of the crime, are subject to liability.

3. To propose to the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics to introduce additions and amendments to the criminal codes in accordance with this decree.

Chairman of the

Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M. KALININ

Secretary of the

Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A. GORKIN

INSTRUKTIA

OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIATE OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF
THE USSR On the procedure for exile to remote northern regions of the
USSR

of family members of traitors who fled or flew abroad , mother-in-law, brothers, sisters), living together with him or being dependent on him, if they have not committed crimes for which, according to the law, they are subject to a more serious

punishment.

2. The sending into exile of family members of traitors to the motherland is carried out according to the decisions of the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR. Decisions of the Special Meeting are made on the basis of the materials of the investigation of the NKVD, establishing the fact of the traitor's escape abroad. 3. Those

sentenced to exile are taken into custody by the local bodies of the NKVD immediately upon the announcement of the decision of the Special Conference of the NKVD of the USSR and sent to exile under escort. Minor children of the detainees are accompanied by adults

family members.

NOTE: Underage children are not placed in prison. For their content to be sent to the link must be

allocated a special room. 4. Exiles are allowed

to take with them: a) clothes, underwear, shoes, bedding;

b) tableware, tea and kitchen utensils (spoons, knives, forks, buckets, etc.);

c) food at the rate of a monthly supply for a family; d) small household, household tools and tools for small handicraft or handicraft production (axe, saw, shovel, scythe, rake, pitchfork, hammer, chisel, sewing machine, etc.); e) money at the rate of not more than 500 rubles for each family member; e) chest or box for packing things. The total weight of these items must not exceed 500 kg for the entire

families.

The rest of the property: valuables (including household items), money exceeding the above amounts, buildings, furniture, agricultural implements, livestock are subject to confiscation. Proceeds from the sale of confiscated items

are to be paid to the state.

5. In places of exile, convicted members of the family of traitors to the motherland under the open supervision of the NKVD. AP RF. F. 3.

Op. 57. D. 59. L. 54. Copy. Typescript. L. 55-56, 59, 64-66. Script. Typescript. Protocol number 23.

No.

141 Special message by V.N. Merkulov and B.Z. Kobulova I.V. Stalin on the investigation of the causes of the fire at the gunpowder

12/10/1940

No. 5331/b

Copy of

Sov. secretly of

the Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade STALIN of the NKVD of the USSR as a result of an investigation into the causes of the fire that occurred on September 26, 1940 at the gunpowder factory No. 9 (Shostka) of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition of the USSR, in which 15 workers died and 18 were injured, the following were arrested:

1. IVANOV Leonid Petrovich - former director of plant No. 9; 2. KORSHIN Georgy Efimovich - former chief engineer of that same

factory. IVANOV admitted that since 1937 he was a member of an anti-Soviet organization that existed in the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry, in which he was involved by the former head of the 4th Special Sector of the Giprospezhim N.L. (died in prison).

IVANOV, on the instructions of KOSTETSKY, in 1938 established contact on enemy work with the former chairman of the 3rd section of the Technical Council of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, YANOVYM G.G. (arrested).

Being appointed in 1938 as the director of plant No. 9 (city of Shostka), IVANOV carried out wrecking work, which consisted of delaying the commissioning of new units, incomplete installation of equipment and systematic violation of safety regulations.

In September 1940, IVANOV received a task from YANOV - in order to disrupt the government-established plan for the production of gunpowder at one of the facilities of the 5th (gunpowder) production, prepare and carry out a sabotage act.

YANOV, as IVANOV testifies, emphasized that plant No. 9 was chosen as the object of sabotage, because it provides 22% of the all-Union production of gunpowder. At the suggestion of the same YANOV,

IVANOV involved the former chief engineer of Plant No. 9, G.E. Korshin, in the enemy work. (arrested in the present case).

Having agreed in advance between themselves, IVANOV and KORSHIN on September 25 and 26 of this year. proposed to the 5th production a deliberately overestimated plan for the production of gunpowder, loading the apparatus with bags of BOR (Bureau of Experimental Works) twice as high as a portion. Since the bag apparatus has a large number of rubbing metal parts, overloading led to the appearance of sparks and the ignition of powder dust. As a result, on September 26, at 8:30 am, a fire broke out at plant No. 9. Korshin admitted that since 1934 he was a member of an anti-Soviet organization that existed in the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry, in

which he was involved by the former chief engineer of the Kazan Gunpowder Factory No. 40 - LAPSAL K.G. (condemned to VMN). Korshin confirmed IVANOV's testimony that, on YANOV's instructions, they deliberately overloaded the BOR sack apparatus twice, which resulted in a fire on September 26 of this year. IVANOV'S and KORSHIN's testimonies in enemy work at plant

No. 9 exposed: 1. Nikolai Dmitrievich AFANASIEV - former head of the safety department; 2. ZAMES Petr Gavrilovich - former chief mechanic of the capital construction sector; 3. KARPENKO Alexander Yakovlevich - former mechanic of the 5th

production;

4. ANIKEEV Viktor Mikhailovich - former head of the 54th workshop of the 5th production; 5. KOLPINA Olga Ivanovna - former head of the 5th

(gunpowder) production.

All the listed persons of the NKVD of the USSR were arrested.

AFANASIEV admitted that he was a member of the anti-Soviet wrecking group that existed at the plant number 9, in

which was involved in 1940 by Ivanov L.P.

AFANASIEV, on the instructions of IVANOV, carried out wrecking work at plant number 9, which was expressed as follows:

a) allowed the commissioning of new facilities with imperfections; b) deliberately created an accumulation of a large amount of gunpowder near industrial buildings, which created favorable conditions for a fire. v ZAMES admitted that since 1940 he was a member of the anti-Soviet group operating at plant No. 9, in which L.P. Ivanov was involved. ZAMES confirmed the testimony of IVANOV and KORSHIN that as a

result of the enemy work of the members of the anti-Soviet group on September 26, 1940, a fire broke out in the BOR bag building. In order to hide the traces of the crime committed by the anti-Soviet group, ZAMES after the fire on September 30 of this year. presented a fictitious act on the work done to eliminate imperfections on the BOR bag, indicating that this act was allegedly drawn up on May 7, 1940.

KARPENKO admitted that he committed a systematic violation of safety regulations and did not take the necessary measures to clean the pools from spent pyroxylin, and also put into operation the apparatus of BOR bags without grounding, which contributed to the fire.

ANIKEYEV testified that he personally carried out the instructions of IVANOV and KORSHIN, setting in motion the double-loaded apparatus of BORA sacks, as a result of which a fire broke out.

KOLPINA testified that due to her criminal negligence, the BOR sack apparatus was put into operation with a number of imperfections, and a large amount of gunpowder was stored near the production buildings, which led to serious consequences during the fire on September 26 of this

year. The investigation continues. APPENDIX: 1) Testimony of IVANOV L.P. dated October 29, 1940. 2)

Testimony of G. E. Korshin dated October 31, 1940. Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR MERKULOV Head of the Main Economic Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR KOBULOV AP RF. F.

3. Op. 58. D. 343a. L. 165-170. Script. Typescript.

Published without attachment.

No. 142

Special message by V.N. Merkulov and B.Z. Kobulova I.V. Stalin about checking the apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition with the application of protocols of interrogation of A.F. Sidor and B.A. Efremova

12/10/1940

No. 5333/

B SOV. SECRET*

Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks - comrade. TO STALIN In the process of checking the apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, the NKVD of the USSR was arrested: YEFREMOV Boris Alekseevich -

former head of the 2nd Main Directorate; SIDORA Alexander Fedoseevich - former head Technical Council of the People's Commissariat;

CHERNYAEV Anatoly Fedorovich - former deputy chief engineer of the 2nd Main Directorate;

YANOV Georgy Grigorievich - former chairman of the 3rd section Technical Council of the People's Commissariat.

1. Efremov B.A. admitted that since 1933 he was a member of an anti-Soviet organization that existed in the defense industry system, in which he was involved by the former director of the Stalingrad plant "Barricades" BUDNYAKOM D.S. (condemned to VMN). In 1934, by agreement of BUDNYAK with the former deputy head of the Main

Military Mobilization Directorate (GVMU) of the People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry, Trotskyist YERMAN S.Z. (condemned to VMN) Efremov was transferred to work in Moscow as an assistant to the former head of the Main Military Medical Administration PAVLUNOVSKY I.P. and in 1936,

with the assistance of the same YERMAN, he was nominated director of the capsule and grenade plant No. 11 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition of the USSR in Zagorsk.

Soon after the transfer to plant No. 11, in the same year 1936, Efremov was contacted by the former secretary of the party committee of plant No. 11 G.V. ZOMBE on anti-Soviet work. (in 1938 he was sentenced to imprisonment in a forced labor camp, where he died).

Efremov * was informed by ZOMBE about the presence of an anti-Soviet group at the plant and the affiliation to it of the former head of the shell workshop of plant No. 11, later Deputy People's Commissar of Ammunition INYASHKIN M.S. ** (removed from work) and the former head of the 1st workshop of the plant, time People's Commissar of Ammunition of the USSR, Shibanova V.Ya.

In the spring of 1937, Efremov established direct contact with Shibanova on enemy work, using Shibanova's disruption of the plant's production program for tracers (see page 9 of Efremov's testimony).

According to Shibanova, Efremov became aware of the involvement in the enemy work of the former head of workshop No. 5 of the plant, later deputy chief engineer of the 2nd Main Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, A.F.

CHERNYAEV. (arrested). The wrecking work of Efremov, carried out by him at the plant No. 11, together with Shibanova, was as follows:

a) in creating disproportion in the construction of production and auxiliary shops, delaying the construction of a fire-fighting water supply system and re-equipment of the plant's energy facilities;

b) ignoring safety precautions, which led to repeated explosions with human casualties; c) a

systematic reduction in the output of special types of products intended for the Red Army (see pages 10, 11, 12 of Efremov's testimony).

INYASHKIN, who was appointed Deputy People's Commissar of Ammunition, contributed to the promotion to work in the People's Commissariat of Ammunition as a member of the Board of V.Ya. Shibanova, a member of the anti-Soviet organization, later appointed Deputy. People's

Commissar for Ammunition of the USSR. In turn, Efremov, as deputy chief engineer of the 2nd Main Directorate of the People's Commissariat, was transferred from t

No. 11, a member of the organization CHERNYAEV, with whom he established direct contact on enemy work.

Efremov continued his anti-Soviet work in the People's Commissariat of Ammunition.

The wrecking work of Efremov in the People's Commissariat consisted in the following:

- a) delaying the construction of new equipment factories, as well as backup bases for equipping hand grenades;
- b) disruption of the release of ShKAS igniter capsules (see page 13, 14, 15, 16 of Efremov's testimony).

The work of disrupting the production of ShKAS capsules by Efremov was entrusted to CHERNYAEV, who suggested that factories instead of imported shellac use iditol in the production of capsules according to an undeveloped recipe. The

work to disrupt the fulfillment of the production program of the equipment factories by Efremov was carried out under the leadership of Shibarov, with whom he restored contact on enemy work in the spring of 1940 (see pages 16, 17, 18 of Efremov's testimony). 2. SIDOR A.F. ***

admitted that he was involved in anti-Soviet work in 1932 by the former director of the Kharkov Tractor Plant SVISTUN P.I. (condemned to VMN).

In 1936, with the assistance of SVISTUN, SIDOR was transferred to work in Moscow as the director of Aviation Plant No. 1, and in 1938 he was appointed chief engineer of the Main Ammunition Directorate of the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry. Being in 1932

informed by SVISTUN about the involvement in the anti-Soviet group at the Kharkov Tractor Plant of the former head of the KhTZ foundry, currently the director of the Moscow shell factory No. 70 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition KHOKHULI V.I. on enemy work (see pages 5, 9, 10 of SIDOR's testimony). The wrecking work of SIDOR in the People's Commissariat of Ammunition

consisted of the following:

- 1) intentional non-development of the technological process for the manufacture of iron artillery shells, as a result of which the defect amounted to 50% of all manufactured products;

2) disruption of the government provided for by a special decision
release of iron collapsible sleeves;
3) delaying the development in the production of 122 mm cannon shells
by supplying low-quality metal for their manufacture (see pp. 11, 12, 13). 3.
A.F. CHERNYAEV

*** admitted that he was a member of a wrecking organization that existed
in the defense industry system, and both at plant No. 11 and in the 2nd Main
Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition of the USSR carried
out enemy work on the instructions of the arrested in the present case
EFREMOV B.A.

CHERNYAEV testified that, on the instructions of Efremov, he did not
take the necessary measures to develop the production technology at factories
No. 5 and No. 53 of ShKAS igniter primers, as a result of which there was a
massive rejection; deliberately delayed the development of the tool economy
of the same factories, and also did not work out the design of fuses for shells,
mines and air bombs. 4. YANOV G.G.*** confessed

that he carried out wrecking work in the Technical Council of the People's
Commissariat of Ammunition and deliberately allowed the storage of a large
amount of gunpowder near the production buildings of gunpowder factories,
which caused frequent spontaneous combustion. At the same time, YANOV
denies his involvement in the act of sabotage at gunpowder factory No. 9
(Shostka), as a result of which on September 26 of this year. 15 workers were
killed and 18 were injured. Meanwhile, those arrested

in the case of a fire at plant No. 9, former director L.P. Ivanov. and chief
engineer G. E. KORSHIN, confessing to belonging to an anti-Soviet
organization, testified that the explosion at plant No. 9 was the result of a
sabotage prepared and carried out by them on the instructions of YANOV.

The testimony of Ivanov and Korshin is presented separately.

Since CHERNYAEV and YANOV conceal the entire amount of anti-Soviet
work that they actually carried out, we continue their interrogations and
additional testimony will be presented. v Presenting at the same time the
protocols of interrogations Efremov B.A. dated December 6, 1940 and SIDOR
A.F. dated November 29, 1940, the NKVD of the USSR considers it necessary
to arrest:

1. SHIBANOVA Vasily Yakovlevich - Deputy People's Commissar for
Ammunition of the USSR.

2. INYASHKIN Mikhail Stepanovich - former Deputy People's Commissar for Ammunition of the USSR, removed from work by the Central Committee of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. 3. KHOKHULY Vladimir Ivanovich - director of plant No. 70 of the People's Commissariat

of Ammunition of the USSR. Khokhulya in enemy work is also exposed by the testimony of the former chief metallurgist of plant No. 70, Yu.I. and the former chief engineer of the same plant GUREVICH E.I. We ask for your instructions. APPENDIX: according to the text. Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR MERKULOV Head of the Main Economic Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR KOBULOV ^{Chelyabinsk} factory

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL

arrested SIDOR Alexander Fedoseevich - dated November 29, 1940

SIDOR A.F., born in 1901. Dare-

Salyn village, Crimean ASSR, Ukrainian, former member of the CPSU (b) since 1939. Prior to his arrest, he was a member of the Technical Council of the People's Commissariat for Ammunition of the USSR.

Question: During previous interrogations, you admitted that in 1932 you were involved in a wrecking group that existed at the Kharkov Tractor Plant, by the former director of the same plant, SVISTUN. Do you confirm these statements? **Answer:** Yes, I do. **Question:** Show in detail - under

what circumstances were you involved in enemy work? **Answer:** I met

SVISTUN Panteleimon Ivanovich in 1930 at the Kharkov Tractor Plant, where I worked as head of the forging and pressing shop. In the same

In 1930, I was twice sent by the WHISTER on a business trip to America and stayed abroad for about 8 months.

Staying and the external side of life in America affected my political moods. I have not yet become a fully formed enemy of the Soviet regime, but on occasion, sharing my impressions of my stay in America, I expressed dissatisfaction with life in the USSR, difficulties in the food supply and the lack of consumer goods. My anti-Soviet sentiments were systematically fueled by the WHISTER, who willingly listened to my stories about America and added his own anti-Soviet criticism of the situation in the USSR. Convinced that I share his hostile attitude towards the existing system, the whistler began to

invite me to his house. Since 1931, I have already constantly visited the SVISTUN's apartment, along with other senior workers of the plant.

Question: Name them. **Answer:** In addition to me, SVISTUN was visited at home by: his deputy - *SCHNEERSON Boris

Markovich*, the chief

engineer of the plant - BRUSKIN Alexander Davydovich, the head of the tool shop - *ALBOV Pavel Alexandrovich* and the head of the foundry - KHOKHULYA Vladimir Ivanovich.

All of them made up the entourage of the whistler and used it support.

During the gatherings that took place in the SVISTUN's apartment and were accompanied by constant drinking, conversations were conducted not only around the affairs of the plant, but also in general - the situation in industry, while anti-party attacks were heard against the leadership of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party

of Bolsheviks. SVISTUN declared that the policy of collectivization was not to his liking, that the collective farms had not justified themselves and were allegedly leading to the decline of agriculture. He said that we should not push for the production of tractors, that the peasants would not be able to work for them, since they had not grown up to the tractor.

SVISTUN did not hesitate in my presence to express his hostile attitude towards the party, but in the essence of the practical enemy work carried out at the Kharkov Tractor Plant,

he initiated me only in 1932, when he became convinced that I shared his anti-Soviet views to the end.

At the end of September or in the first days of October 1932, SVISTUN invited me to his apartment for a conversation. Left alone with me, he declared that the situation was becoming catastrophic and "we must save the fatherland." I reproduce this phrase verbatim, as I especially remember it from a long conversation that I then had with the whistler. He talked a lot about the impossibility, allegedly, of mastering the many new enterprises built recently, about the lack of viability of collective farms, the lack of clothing, footwear, food, that the policy of industrialization and collectivization meets, allegedly, a hostile attitude towards itself from the side of the population. At the end of the conversation, the whistler said: "People who think the same way as us should rise up against the injustices existing in the country." When I asked if there were people capable of doing this, SVISTUN replied that a number of leading workers in Ukraine did not agree with the party's policy, but, probably out of caution, he did not name names, limiting himself only to indicating that these people were secretly from the party my job and invited me to join them. At the same time, the whistler said that it was time for me to move from sympathy with his views to business, and I assured the whistler that I was ready to act on his instructions. This is where our conversation ended.

At a meeting that took place a few days later, SVISTUN, in continuation of the previous conversation, told me that at KhTZ he had united a group of people who disagreed with the policy of the party and stood for the practical support of the right. Further, SVISTUN named: BRUSKIN, SCHNEERSON, ALBOV and KHOKHULYA, who at the plant, each in his own area, carry out wrecking work.

In the same conversation, SVISTUN gave me the specific task of carrying out wrecking work: to use low-quality material in the manufacture of parts for tractors. **Question:** Did you complete this task?

Answer: Yes, in my further work I

was guided by the instructions of the SVISTUNA. So, crankshafts and camshafts for tractors were produced by me from poor quality

metal with cracks; rods - from plenistovy metal, and spurs - from metal with a high content of phosphorus.

As a result of the wrecking work carried out by me, only in July 1933, up to 80% of the manufactured crankshafts and 30% of the camshafts were rejected.

At the end of 1933, being appointed head of production at KhTZ, I systematically delayed the supply of parts from the foundry and forge to the mechanical assembly shop. I systematically

delayed the inspection and repair of equipment: conveyors and a drying oven in the foundry and unique machines in the machine shop; All this affected the implementation of the program and the quality of products.

Along with this, I delayed the supply of tools to the production workshops of the plant, which also disrupted their normal operation. I carried

out wrecking work at the Kharkov Tractor Plant from 1933 to 1936. In July 1936, with the

assistance of SVISTUN, I was appointed director of Aviation Plant No. 1 (Moscow). Before leaving KhTZ, I had a conversation with SVISTUN at his dacha, on the outskirts of Kharkov. **Question:**

Reproduce the contents of this conversation?

Answer: At the beginning of the conversation, SVISTUN informed me that I was appointed director of the plant on his recommendation. He said that although we were parting, in Moscow at the aircraft factory I would have to adhere to the same line as at the tractor factory in Kharkov.

Then SVISTUN suggested that upon my arrival in Moscow, I should report to the head of the Secretariat of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry - SEMUSHKIN, from whom I would receive the necessary contacts for

further anti-Soviet work in Moscow.

Question: Have you contacted SEMUSHKIN? **Answer:** In August 1936 I visited People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry, saying that I had an order for him from SVISTUN.

SEMUSHKIN replied that he had been warned about me by the whistler, and offered to receive all the necessary instructions from

Tupolev, who at that time worked as the chief engineer of the aviation Main Directorate of the Narkomtyazhprom.

SEMUSHKIN warned that TUPOLEV himself would call me when the need arose. **Question:** Did your

meeting with Tupolev take place? **Answer:** Yes, in November or December 1936 I was called TUPOLEV to his office.

TUPOLEV offered to contact on his behalf the chief engineer of plant No. 1 - ** SHIKUNOV Evgraf Porfirovich **, stating that the latter would be warned about the need to contact me all the work at the plant.

At the end of the same year, 1936, I established contact with SHIKUNOV, together with whom I carried out wrecking work at Plant No. 1 aimed at disrupting the supply of the Red Army with modern types of combat aircraft. **Question:** What was your

wrecking work at Plant No. 1? **Answer:** SHIKUNOV and I defended the

production of the obsolete design of the Erzet aircraft before the decision-making authorities and sabotaged the development of the production of new types of combat vehicles.

The speed of the Erzet aircraft was at the limit and did not meet the requirements for aviation in 1936. In addition, this aircraft (of the R-5 type) was wooden and quickly subjected to wear and tear. Knowing all this, SHIKUNOV and I still defended the need to produce the Erzet, however, by decision of the government, this aircraft was discontinued and the plant was asked to switch to the production of metal Vulti aircraft and I-15 fighters (modified).

Having received a new government assignment, but still continuing to produce the unusable Erzet, I and SHIKUNOV simultaneously slowed down the development of the production of the I-15 aircraft by delaying the organization of design and production of prototypes. We ignored the requirements presented to the plant by the designer of the I-15 aircraft - POLIKARPOV, did not provide it with premises and designers in time, and also delayed the issuance of drawings for production.

On the Vulti aircraft, I and SHIKUNOV repeatedly changed the technological processes, and also untimely

a grassroots workshop was organized, which also caused a delay in mastering the production of this type of aircraft.

In August 1938, for the collapse of work at the plant No. 1 I was in charge of, I was removed from the post of director, and in October of the same year I was appointed chief engineer of the 21st Main Directorate (Ammunition) of the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry. With the transition to the 21st Directorate, I lost contact with the participants anti-Soviet organization in the aviation industry.

Question: Does this mean that you have stopped your enemy work?

Answer:

I don't say that. My resumption of enemy work took place under the following circumstances. In October or November 1938, Khokhulya came to my work, in the 21st Glavk, about whose involvement in the wrecking group at KhTZ I have already shown

higher.

Khokhulya at the beginning of the conversation expressed his satisfaction with my transfer to Glavk and, in turn, informed me that he was already working in Moscow, director of shell factory No. 70.

Khokhulya asked if I now work in the same way as in my time - at the Kharkov Tractor Plant, under SVISTUN? I said that I cut off all communications that could compromise me.

Khokhulya, however, in response began to reproach me for cowardice and unfounded fears. Khokhulya said at the same time that he was not afraid to work at plant No. 70, why should I change my convictions without using the benefits of my position in the People's Commissariat in the interests of our common cause. Having received my consent to

resume wrecking work, KHOKHULYA suggested that I contact *** COOPER Lev Solomonovich ***, who worked as Deputy Chief Engineer of the 21st Main Directorate. I promised HOKHULA to get in touch with COOPER.

Question: Did you do it?

Answer: COOPER did it himself. In December 1938, COOPER, who knew me from working together for 2 months in Glavka, came to my office and, after a short conversation on official matters, declared that he had an assignment from Khokhulya.

As a result of further conversation, I contacted COOPER, who informed me that he had a task - to interfere with the production

iron artillery shells and delay the release of factories No. 176 and No. 187 (Tula). I asked

COOPER who personally gave him such a task, but this time he evaded answering. Only at the beginning of 1939, after the organization of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, COOPER at one of the meetings said that he was receiving assignments for wrecking work from the chief engineer of the Gunpowder Glavka - YANOV Georgy Georgievich and the deputy of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition - **** KHRENKOV Nikolai Matveevich ****.

Question:

Have you contacted them personally?

Answer: I was not personally associated with YANOVYV and KHRENKOV, but from the words of COOPER I knew about their involvement in a wrecking group in the

People's Commissariat of Ammunition. Upon establishing contact with me, COOPER said that there were still no people in the 21st Glavka who could be relied upon, but we could not do without them, so I must carry out the appropriate agreed to this.

Question: Show in detail about the entire scope of your wrecking work in the People's Commissariat of Ammunition.

Answer: According to the plan approved by the government in 1939, factories No. 176 and 187 (Tula), as well as factory No. 184 (Kazan), were supposed to produce about 800 pieces. iron artillery shells.

To carry out the program for iron shells, it was necessary to work out a mass technological process. Already at the beginning of 1939, it was obvious that the technological process existing at the plant No. 176 according to the hot KUDRYAVTSEV method would not provide both quantitative and, in particular, qualitative implementation of the program for iron sleeves. Despite this, COOPER and I deliberately did not change the process. COOPER also supplied the plant with low-quality iron, as a result of which the program was disrupted in 1939, and even from a small number of manufactured cartridge cases - 50% was rejected. At the plant number 187 there was a technological process for the manufacture of iron sleeves using the cold method of LIM

(Leningrad Metals). At the request of the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, in July or August 1939, the drawing for iron 76 mm shells was changed, but in my opinion Institute

the drawing tool has been incorrectly manufactured according to the instructions. As a result, up to 100 thousand pieces of shells turned out to be unusable.

In 1939, plant No. 187 was obliged to produce one million iron rolled artillery shells. This decision of the government was frustrated by us, and in 1939 not a single rolled sleeve was produced by plant No. 187. I must note that the decision to produce rolled sleeves was made at the initiative of Khrenkov,

who misled the decision-making authorities by not informing them that Plant No. 187 was completely unprepared for the production of rolled

sleeves

In connection with the failure of production at plant No. 187 at the end of 1939, I was called to Khrenkov, who suggested that I deploy a program for the production of 122 and 152 for a number of plants of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition mm iron sleeves.

When I noticed to Khrenkov that there were not even blueprints for these cartridge cases, and that the equipment of the factories was not adapted to the production of iron cartridge cases, Khrenkov said that this was not news to him, and immediately suggested that he follow his instructions by sending the appropriate plan to the factories.

Knowing that in the 1st quarter of 1940, factories No. 176 and No. 187 would not be able to master the production of iron shells of new calibers, which would disrupt the completion of the shot, KhRENKOV nevertheless instructed me to produce iron shells, and suspend the production of brass shells. I accepted this task of Khrenkov for execution and delayed the development of the production of iron shells, which caused significant damage to the state. The protocol was written down from my words correctly and was read by me. SIDOR INTERROGATED: Investigator of the

investigative unit of the GEU of the NKVD of the USSR, lieutenant of the state.
security MARISOV

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL

arrested YEFREMOV Boris Alekseevich, dated December 6,
1940

Efremov B.A., born in 1903, a native of the mountains. Moscow, Russian, ex. member of the CPSU (b) since 1930, before his arrest - head of the 2nd Main Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition of the

USSR. **Question:** You are under arrest for your hostile work in the defense industry system. Do you intend to give exhaustive evidence on the merits of the charges brought against you?

Answer: I do not plead guilty, since enemy work never did.

Question: How did you get a job at the 2nd Main Directorate of the People's Commissariat

of Munitions? **Answer:** In January 1939, I was nominated to work in the apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition from the position of director of the pyrotechnic, capsule and grenade plant No. 11, the same

People's Commissariat in the city.

Zagorsk. **Question:** And how did you get to plant number 11?

Answer: I was appointed director of plant No. 11 at the end of 1936 with the assistance of the former deputy head of the Main Military Mobilization Directorate (GVMU) of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, the

Trotskyist YERMAN Semyon Zakharovich, who was subsequently arrested by the NKVD. **Question:** Where did you work before your assignment to Plant No. 11? **Answer:** In 1934-1935. I worked as an assistant to Ivan Petrovich PAVLUNOVSKY, who was the head of the Main Military

Mobilization Directorate, who was also arrested in 1937. **Question:** Who recommended you to the Mobilization Directorate?

Answer: BUDNYAKOM Daniil Filippovich, former director of the Stalingrad plant "Barricades".

Question: Where is he

now? **Answer:** BUDNYAK in 1937 or 1938. was

arrested. **Question:** How can you explain that established enemies recommend you to one another and promote you to

leadership positions? **Answer:** Probably, PAVLUNOVSKY, YERMAN and BUDNYAK me "my man".

Question: On what basis?

Answer: I believed that they trusted me as a person who would not betray, would cover up their criminal work.

Question: Why did you think so?

Answer: Long before my nomination, in 1933-1934, in repeated conversations with me that took place in Stalingrad, BUDNYAK expressed his sympathy for the Trotskyists and expressed disagreement with the Party's policy on collective farm construction, but out of friendly feelings I did not report to BUDNYAK to the party organs about these sentiments. **Question:** Did BUDNYAK share his

Trotskyist views with you only out of "friendly feelings"? **Answer:** I do not deny that in my repeated conversations

with BUDNYAK I supported his dissatisfaction with the policy of the party. Seeing that I did not disclose the content of the anti-Party conversations that took place between us, BUDNYAK trusted me. **Question:** You do not twist, but tell the truth about the

nature of your relationship with BUDNYAK.

Answer: I will speak the truth. As early as 1933, I was not only a political associate of BUDNYAK, but I was connected with him organizationally in enemy work. **Question:** Show in detail -

when and under what circumstances Have you established an organizational connection with BUDNYAK?

Answer: I met BUDNYAK in 1932 through joint work in the Weapons and Arsenal Association of the USSR People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry. In November 1932, I was nominated by BUDNYAK for the position of his deputy for the commercial part, and in August 1933, after he was transferred to work in Stalingrad as the director of the Barrikady plant, at the insistence of BUDNYAK, I was appointed deputy director of the same plant.

Upon arrival in Stalingrad, BUDNYAK and I settled in the same house and often had drinking parties with women. On the basis of closeness in everyday life between us, frank conversations on political topics repeatedly took place, in which BUDNYAK complained that he was being clamped down, not given a go, and at the same time expressed his sympathies to PYATAKOV, who supported him in everything.

Seeing in me a person who sympathized with him, BUDNYAK began to openly express dissatisfaction with the Central Committee of the Party for

about his personal situation and at the same time declared an intolerant - from his point of view - attitude towards the Trotskyists. BUDNYAK praised the old Trotskyists, emphasized their services to the country and expressed sympathy for the Trotskyist attitudes, declaring his disagreement with the party line on the development and strengthening of collective farms. As a result of conversations with BUDNYAK, I soon began to share his anti-Soviet views.

In November 1933, cases of accidents at the main units of the Barrikady plant became more frequent. At one of my invitations to his apartment, I drew Budnyak's attention to this circumstance and asked him what was the matter? Budnyak told me that a group of workers united at the plant under his leadership, sharing his "special" point of view on the situation in the country, and immediately made me understand that these accidents were the work of this group. Continuing to express dissatisfaction with the leadership of the country, BUDNYAK said that I should join this group. **Question:** How

did you react to this proposal? **Answer:** At first I hesitated, not knowing whether to give my consent to Budnyak's proposal or to apply to the relevant authorities and expose the grouping he had created, but then I decided that there were too many things connecting us for me to betray him. I agreed to BUDNYAK's proposal.

Question: Did BUDNYAK tell you the members of the group he created?

Answer: In a conversation with me, BUDNYAK stated that the members of his group were: KAITANOVICH, the chief mechanic; LERNER, the commercial director; LEBEDINSKY and KAITANOVICH were subsequently arrested, but I don't know anything about the fate of *CHERKASOV and LERNER*.

Question: Did BUDNYAK set any tasks for you when recruiting you into an anti-Soviet group? **Answer:** As

BUDNYAK explained to me in the same conversation, for the first time my task was only to ensure that wrecking work was not carried out at the Barrikady plant.

Soon, however, I fell ill and had to go to Moscow to conducting a long course of treatment.

Before my departure for Moscow, in 1934, BUDNYAK suggested that I contact the deputy head of the Main Military Mobilization Directorate (GVMU) of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry - YERMAN, saying that he would warn the latter about me. Through YERMAN, BUDNYAK said, we will decide the issue of your transfer to work in Moscow. I turned to YERMAN and indeed he was appointed by him as the head of the Narkomtyazhprom GVMU - an assistant to PAVLUNOVSKY.

Question: Have you contacted YERMAN on enemy work?

Answer: I did not establish contacts with YERMAN in enemy work, but it was clear to me that BUDNYAK recommended me to YERMAN as their like-minded person. However, regardless of this, I tried to release an underestimated production plan for the cartridge factories for the 4th quarter of 1935, but the plan launched by me was regarded by the party organizations of these factories as wrecking. Since there was a fuss about this case, it was impossible to keep me in the GVMU, and I was sent to the 17th plant (Podolsk) as a deputy commercial director. Before going to Podolsk, I had a conversation with YERMAN, who

promised to nominate me soon. In September 1936, with the assistance of YERMAN, I was appointed director of the pyrotechnic, capsule and grenade plant No. 11 (Zagorsk).

Question: You are trying to present things in such a way that after you were involved in an anti-Soviet group, you did not conduct any practical enemy work. Does this correspond to reality? **Answer:**

I have carried out wrecking work only since 1936, after my appointment as director of plant number 11.

Question: What was this wrecking work? **Answer:** Shortly after my appointment as director of plant No. 11, I established close relations with the secretary of the party committee of the ZOMBE plant, Grigory Vladimirovich (he was arrested in 1937). From the very first days, we became close not only in the service, but also in everyday life. In 1936, on the

recommendation of BUDNYAK, I was admitted to the plant by the Trotskyist * BRILLIANTOV, shortly after that he was arrested by the NKVD. I also accepted other people with a dubious past at the plant, including the German REIDLICH *, relatives

who lived abroad, RUDENKO, who was not allowed to work at a sensitive plant, and others whose names I do not remember now.

All this gave ZOMBA a reason for a frank conversation, in which he let me know that he was ready to continue to support my line regarding the personnel of the plant.

Further, ZOMBE informed me that he was aware of my connection with the anti-Soviet organization in the defense industry, and made me understand that he knew from BUDNYAK or YERMAN about my connection with them. In turn, ZOMBE informed me about the existence of an anti-Soviet group at plant No. 11 and its composition. **Question:** Who

did ZOMBE personally name from the members of this group? **Answer:** ZOMBE

told me that in addition to him, the group included: SHIBANOV, who was then the head of the 1st workshop, is currently Deputy. People's Commissar, INYASHKIN Mikhail Stepanovich - head of the cartridge case workshop, recently - Deputy. People's Commissar of Munitions, and *****SAVIN***** (I don't remember his first and middle name) - the chief engineer of Plant No.

11. **Question:** Have you

contacted any of the persons listed by ZOMBE? **Answer:** Yes, I did.

Question: With whom?

Answer: With

SHIBANOV. **Question:**

How? **Answer:** In the

spring of 1937, through the fault of SHIBANOV, the implementation of the plant's program on tracer means (cups) was disrupted. I summoned SHIBANOV to my office and bluntly stated that I knew from ZOMBA about his, SHIBANOV, participation in our group and about the real reasons for the failure of the tracer program. I told SHIBANOV that his negligence threatened us all with failure, and suggested that he work more carefully in the future. SHIBANOV was not at all surprised by my statement and said that he would take my instructions into account.

Question: Did you carry out practical enemy work at Factory No. 11?

Answer: Yes, I did.

Question: What was it like? **Answer:**

My enemy work at Plant No. 11 was to the following:

a) creation disproportions between the construction of production and auxiliary workshops, the delay in the construction of a fire-fighting water supply system and the re-equipment of the electrical facilities, as a result of which spontaneous combustion of electrical wires took place, which is especially dangerous due to the accumulation of a large amount of explosives at the plant; b) ignoring safety precautions,

which led to repeated explosions with casualties in shop No. 5 throughout 1938-1939, right up to my transfer to work in the People's Commissariat of Ammunition;

c) a systematic decrease in the output of special types of products intended for the Red Army, and a

corresponding increase in the volume of production for civilian orders, as a result

which the plant systematically did not fulfill the plan for smoke bombs "DM-11", also for hand grenades. In turn, SHIBANOV

disrupted the production of Nordelfeld ignition tubes (ZTN), intended for 45 mm shells. As a result, for 1937 and 1938. about 1 million pieces of ignition tubes were not added to the arsenal of the Red Army. In addition, in 1937, the plant produced several hundred thousand signal cartridges, grenades and air

signals, which were equipped with unstable colored pyroxylon gunpowder and did not withstand the established storage periods. In practical application, these products of the plant gave signals of the wrong color, which is why they were subject to destruction.

The former head of the 5th shop of the plant, recently - deputy. chief engineer of the 2nd Main Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition CHERNYAEV

Anatoly Fedorovich. **Question:** What do you know about CHERNYAEV? **Answer:**

CHERNYAEV is a close person of SHIBANOV. At the insistence of SHIBANOV, CHERNYAEV

at the end of 1937 was appointed by me as the chief engineer of the plant. Then Shibarov told me

that CHERNYAEV was involved in enemy work. After this information from SHIBANOV, I brought CHERNYAEV closer to me and subsequently contacted him in wrecking work.

Question: Continue your testimony about your wrecking work.

Answer: In 1938, I undertook the re-equipment of workshops No. 510, which produced air signals for the production of a luminous aviation bomb (SAB-3). However, instead of equipping the cabins envisaged by the original project, the workshops according to the project were low-quality shields. It was equipped with subsequently modified obvious that the shields did not provide fire isolation during flashes of torches on hydraulic presses. However, SHIBANOV, together with the chief engineer of the plant KOZLOV Fedor Vasilievich, deliberately distorted the project and incorrectly assembled the workshops, as a result of which an explosion occurred in 1939, which killed three workers, and the workshop was temporarily disabled. My personal fault in the implementation of this

wrecking act lies in the fact that, being already the head of the 2nd Main Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, I allowed a deviation from the project and did not prevent a catastrophe. In January 1939, I was

appointed head of the Central Directorate for the Supply and Sales of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, and in May of the same year, head of the 2nd Main Directorate.

Simultaneously with me, INYASHKIN M.S. was appointed to the post of Deputy People's Commissar of Ammunition (for personnel), who immediately began to drag workers of plant No. 11 to the People's Commissariat. , who was first introduced to the Board of the People's Commissariat, and then appointed Deputy. People's Commissar. In turn, on the recommendation of SHIBANOV, I was hired by the People's Commissariat

CHERNYAEV and appointed deputy. chief engineer of the 2nd Main Directorate. With the transfer of CHERNYAEV to the People's Commissariat in September 1939, I established direct contact with him in wrecking work. Thus, a group of former employees of plant No. 11

gathered in the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, which continued its enemy

work. This group included: INYASHKIN M.S., SHIBANOV, CHERNYAEV A.F. and I am Efremov.

Question: What was the expression of your enemy work in the People's Commissariat

of Munitions? **Answer:** I disrupted the development and production of ShKAS igniter capsules. Plant No. 5 (Leningrad) was not given the technical specifications for the metal and the technological process for the production of capsules was not transferred from plant No. 53, which already had relevant experience in the manufacture of these capsules, as a result - until October 1940, plant No. 5 did not have a developed technology production of capsules and actually did not release them. At the

beginning of 1940, the Defense Committee instructed the People's Commissariat of Ammunition to continue to use domestic substitutes for shellac imported from India. The development of the issue of switching to domestic substitutes for shellac when varnishing ammunition according to the 2nd Glavka was carried out by me and CHERNYAEV.

CHERNYAEV proposed Iditol as a substitute for imported shellac. With the correct use of iditol, we would really be freed from the need to use imported shellac, but CHERNYAEV and I, without ensuring the development of the recipe for the use of iditol, suggested that the capsule factories switch to iditol, as a result of which there was a mass production of defective ShKAS igniter capsules. I became aware of the marriage of this type of product as early as July 1940, but I did not take

any measures to prevent the release of marriage. As a result, the waste of ShKAS igniter primers at plant No. 53 (Shostka) amounted to 150 million and at plant No.

5 (Leningrad) - 30 million pieces, and the state suffered a loss of 1 million rubles.

When, as a result of an investigation carried out in the second half of 1940, it was established that the failure of the ShKAS capsules occurred due to the fact that CHERNYAEV was recommended an undeveloped recipe for the use of idiotol varnish, CHERNYAEV began to show concern and, in one of the conversations with me, asked me to get him out of this case, but I replied that I could not do anything, we failed and both of us would have to answer.

In 1940, I also delayed the construction of special workshops for equipping fuse cases manufactured at civilian factories.

Back in November 1939, the government instructed the People's Commissariat of Munitions to build a plant for equipping fuses in the Sofrino-Zagorsk region. Instead of fulfilling this task, I suggested organizing fuse equipment at plant No. 358 (Kuntsevsky district, near Moscow). However, the re-equipment of the plant was delayed, and fuse equipment is still not being produced at this plant. On my instructions, two cellars

were built at plant No. 358 for storing detonator caps worth 100 thousand rubles, but the Moscow Council prohibited the construction of warehouses in the urban area that could explode, as a result of which the People's Commissariat of Ammunition was forced to curtail the construction that had begun.

Meanwhile, on my own instructions, the search for sites for the ammunition factory in Sofrino was suspended, as a result, until the day of my arrest, the construction of a new ammunition factory, envisaged by the decision of the government, had not been started.

Along with this, timely design of new plants was not ensured, in particular plant No. 263 in Murom, plant No. 255 in N. Lomov and sites intended for the construction of new fuse manufacturing plants. As a result, capital investments allocated for the implementation of new construction are not utilized and the construction deadlines set by the government are violated.

Question: Was your enemy work in the People's Commissariat of Munitions limited to this?

Answer: I personally carried out enemy work to disrupt the construction of new capsular pyrotechnic plants, and in 1940 SHIBANOV carried out wrecking work to disrupt the fulfillment of government tasks by equipment factories.

At plant No. 55 (Pavlograd), whose work is directly supervised by SHIBANOV, premature ruptures of shells equipped by this plant systematically occur. As a result of premature ruptures at the Pavlograd test site

a number of heavy artillery systems were put out of action and the production of shells was disorganized. SHIBANOV

was also the construction of the pyrotechnic plant No. 320 in Cheboksary was thwarted, the first stage of which, according to the decision of the government, was to be put into operation in 1940.

Question: And you were personally connected with SHIBANOV through wrecking work in the People's Commissariat of Ammunition?

Answer: Yes. In the spring of 1940, SHIBANOV, appointed Deputy People's Commissar for Ammunition, called me to his office for a conversation. He said that in the People's Commissariat of Ammunition we should work together, just as we had previously worked at plant No. 11 in Zagorsk, and demanded that from now on all the activities of the 2nd Main Directorate should be in contact with him only. I assured SHIBANOV that in the future I would act according to his instructions.

After some time, I reported to SHIBANOV that the construction of pyrotechnic plants No. 253 (Murom) and No. 254 (Kopeysk, Chelyabinsk Region) was being disrupted, as design organizations did not submit working drawings in time, and there was also no electric cable necessary for construction. SHIBANOV, after listening to my information, said that there were issues more important than these construction projects, so this matter should not be pressed, nothing terrible would happen. By agreement with SHIBANOV, I delayed the resolution of all

issues related to the construction of two pyrotechnic plants.

The suspension by me of the construction of a plant for equipping fuses in Sofrino was also sanctioned by SHIBANOV. In July 1940, in a conversation with me,

SHIBANOV complained that he was in a difficult situation, since the factories attached to him had not completed the six-month program. If only you could help me out with your Commander-in-Chief, SHIBANOV said in conclusion, otherwise things are really bad, and you look like you will fail. Further, SHIBANOV stated that the NKVD was following in his footsteps, and expressed his fear that he would be arrested.

SHIBANOV was not only aware of my wrecking work, but also sanctioned the measures I was taking to delay new construction and disrupt the implementation of the program by equipment and capsule factories. That's all I have to show about what I and my

accomplices in sabotage work by the People's Commissariat of Ammunition of the USSR.

Question: You have not shown everything about the work you have done in the People's Commissariat of Munitions.

Answer: I have shown all the main things, I will try to recall all the details of my enemy work and give additional information about them.
indications.

Written down from my words correctly and read by me. Efremov was interrogated:

pom. early

investigator of the GEM NKVD of the USSR Art.

Lieutenant of State Security KLOCHKO, Investigator

of the Investigative Department of the GEM of the
NKVD of the USSR Lieutenant of State Security

KONONENKO AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 343. L. 155-196. Script.

Typescript.

The text contains Stalin's handwritten notes: * surname circled.

** the surname is circled, in the margins

of the litter: "Removed?" *** Surnames are circled and numbered from "I" to

"IV". *—* names are underlined, and in the margins of the litter: "Where are they?" **—

** The names are underlined, and in the margin there is a note: "Where is

he?" ***—*** The last name is underlined, and in the margin is "Where's

Cooper?" ****—**** the surname is underlined, and in the margin there is a note:

"Where is Khrenkov?" *****—***** the surname is underlined, and in the margins of the

litter: "Where

is Savin?"

No. 143

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union
Communist Party of Bolsheviks on refugees from Lithuania**

12/12/1940

Top secret 195

— NKVD question

Approve the following proposals of the
NKVD: Hoover."

2. Allow refugees (1991 people) to travel abroad who have entry visas from the respective states, given that the majority of this contingent is a non-labor element.

Also allow those refugees who have filed a petition to leave the USSR and have the consent of foreign embassies in Moscow to issue them entry visas to travel abroad.

3. Refugees from among the working intelligentsia who have applied for the issuance of Soviet passports, be accepted into Soviet citizenship and used at work in their specialty.

4. Withdraw landowners, factory owners, officers, and policemen from among the refugees and, through the Special Conference of the NKVD of the USSR, send them into exile in Kazakhstan and the

Komi region for a period of 3-5 years. 5. To offer all other refugees to accept Soviet citizenship by issuing temporary police certificates for the right of residence in Lithuania, with the exception of border areas, before passportization.

Persons who refused to accept Soviet citizenship should be withdrawn and through Send the Special Meeting to Kazakhstan for 5

years. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 30. L. 119. Original. Typescript.
Protocol No.

23. The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent by: t.t. Beria, Molotov.

No.

**144 L.P. Beria and V.N.
Merkulova I.V. Stalin about the letter
to M.A. Sholokhov [36]**

12/20/1940

No. 5562/

b

Copy of Sov.

secret of the Central Committee of
the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - to Comrade STALIN
On the merits of the letter from Comrade.

SHOLOHOV we report to you: 1. In his letter to Comrade.

SHOLOKHOV writes: "BELOKONEV told me the following: last year, while imprisoned in the Ukhtpechora camp, he repeatedly saw SLABCHENKO, as he worked with him at one point; from the words of SLABCHENKO, BELOKONEV found out that SLABCHENKO was sentenced to death, but then the execution was replaced by 20 years in prison, followed by disqualification for 5 years. The last time BELOKONEV saw SLABCHENKO was in June 1939, after which SLABCHENKO with a party of

prisoners was sent to the North to Turtkul.... In August, with the prisoner LAGUTIN, who returned from Turtkul to the Ukhtpechora camp,

SLABCHENKO sent greetings to BELOKONEV ... ". To the corresponding question Comrade. SHOLOKHOV ... "BELOKONEV, smiling, replied that he could not have misunderstood, since he and SLABCHENKO were born in the same volost, he knows, BELOKONEV, SLABCHENKO from childhood, since 1920 they worked together, and in 1923 BELOKONEV , being the

secretary of the party cell, accepted SLABCHENKO into the

party. 2. Message comrade. Sholokhov was thoroughly investigated.

At our suggestion, the head of the UNKVD of the Rostov region, comrade. ABAKUMOV

BELOKONEV and questioned him about the circumstances of the meeting with SLABCHENKO.

Then BELOKONEV was taken to Moscow and several times interrogated in detail in the NKVD of the USSR Comrade. MERKULOV and other workers. BELOKONEV

testified: "From Kotlas I

was sent to work on the construction of an iron road located on the territory of the Ukhtpechora camps.

Around June 13, 1939, while working near the railway bridge, on the other side of the bridge, at a distance of about 50-60 meters, I saw, as it seemed to me, a familiar person who looked like SLABCHENKO. I shouted: "Ivan Mikhailovich, great." From there they answered: "Great." I shouted again: "How much did they give you?" And I heard the answer: "20 years." At this, our shouts were interrupted by the guards. "Both then and now, I cannot say that it was

SLABCHENKO, since the person who seemed to me similar in figure to SLABCHENKO was at a great distance, moreover, the weather was cloudy and drizzling. I also could not determine by the voice whether it was SLABCHENKO, since I had not spoken to him for many years. "As

in a conversation with Comrade. SHOLOKHOV, so in a conversation with SLABCHENKO's wife, I did not claim that I

saw exactly Ivan Mikhailovich SLABCHENKO, but on the contrary, talking about this case, I made a reservation that, perhaps, I was mistaken, since I could take for SLABCHENKO another prisoner who had some resemblance to him in figure. (From the protocol of interrogation of BELOKONEV dated November 20, 1940.)

As for the fact that SLABCHENKO (as Comrade SHOLOKHOV writes in his letter) through the prisoner LAGUTIN, when he was in the Ukhtpechora camp in 1939, sent greetings to BELOKONEV, the interviewed BELOKONEV showed that the transmission of greetings from SLABCHENKO did not take place in 1939, and in November 1937, when he happened to be in the same cell with the aforementioned LAGUTIN. LAGUTIN was installed by us in the Soroklag of the

NKVD and, interrogated, showed that he really was sitting with BELOKONEV

in one cell in 1937, but that SLABCHENKO was unknown to him and he did not convey any greetings from SLABCHENKO to BELOKONEV.

Further, during interrogations, BELOKONEV testified that he and SLABCHENKO were not natives of the same volost, that he first met SLABCHENKO in 1923, met him occasionally, did not accept him into the party, and was never a secretary of the party cell.

According to personal data, SLABCHENKO is a native of the city of Tbilisi, and BELOKONEV is a native of Sloboda Olkhovy Rog of the Rostov region.

3. The fact of the execution of SLABCHENKO in August 1937 was verified by us using original documents in the SLABCHENKO investigation file and in the archives of the NKVD of the USSR and the NKVD of the Rostov Region. It was

established that SLABCHENKO was arrested on March 9, 1937, and was held in a prison in the mountains. Millerovo, was not taken to the camps, and on August 16, by the decision of the UNKVD troika in the Azov-Chernomorsky Territory, he was sentenced to death. The sentence, according to the act drawn up by the commandant of the UNKVD of the Azov-Chernomorsky Territory, was carried out on August 21, 1937.

According to inquiries SLABCHENKO Ivan Mikhailovich in camps did not appear and does not

appear. The fact of his execution must be considered established. Tov. Sholokhov was invited to the NKVD of the USSR, got acquainted with all the materials of our investigation and became convinced that BELOKONEV had misled him. 4. From

viewing the investigation file against Ivan Mikhailovich SLABCHENKO, it is clear that he was convicted of enemy work by the testimony of the former. director of Grachevskaya MTS KORENEVA-KORZHIKOVA I.G., former. Chairman of the Working Committee of the Grain State Farm "Krasnaya Zarya" MERKULOV P.D., former. deputy chairman of the collective farm DEMINA I.T. and the testimony of witnesses blacksmith pig farm «Krasny Kolos» KOLUBELOV V.T., PRITUGINA P.A., combine farm pig farm «Krasny Kolos» Kuzmina V.AND., confrontations with SHEVCHENKO AND.G. and MERKULOV P.D. In addition, a number of materials compromising SLABCHENKO are available in the case of the authorized CPC under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for the Azov-Chernomorsky Territory, on the basis of which he was expelled from the party on May 17, 1936.

5. In his letter to comrade. SHOLOKHOV also asked to find the arrested KAPLEEV and SHEVCHENKO, since, according to information available to him, "they were shot in August 1937, and BELOKONEV claims that he saw KAPLEEV in the Millerovsky prison in the late autumn of 1937, and with SHEVCHENKO he sat in the same cell of that same Millerovsky prison until February 1937.

Interviewed on this issue, BELOKONEV testified that he had never met KAPLEEV either in prison or in the camps, and had spent less than a day with SHEVCHENKO in Kamenskaya prison, and he knew nothing about him, except for his last name, and before meeting in Kamenskaya prison, he did not was known to him. Our verification established that SHEVCHENKO and

KAPLEEV were shot on December 31, 1937. 6. In connection with the investigation of the message of comrade. SHOLOKHOV, we in a number of

NKVD bodies, with specially assigned teams, checked the registration of those arrested, convicted, shot, passing on testimony, etc.

Based on the materials of the survey, we have taken measures to eliminate the identified shortcomings and to establish accounting and statistical work in all departments, departments and bodies of the NKVD. People's Commissar of Internal

Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA Head of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR

V. MERKULOV RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 827. L. 97-102.

Script.

Typescript.

No. 145

Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the confiscation of property of convicts by a special meeting with the appendix of a draft decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR [37]

12/21/1940

Strictly secret

129 — Question of

the NKVD Approve the draft Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR presented by the NKVD on granting the Special Conference of the NKVD of the USSR the right to apply confiscation of property (see Appendix).

APPENDIX to paragraph
129

(OP) pr. PB No. 24 DECREE OF THE PRESIDUM OF
THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE UNION OF THE
SSR ON GRANTING THE SPECIAL CONFERENCE UNDER THE

PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE
UNION OF THE SSR THE RIGHT TO APPLY CONFISCATION OF
PROPERTY People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR the
right to apply as an additional measures against persons who, by
decision of the Special Conference, are subjected to imprisonment in
forced labor camps, exile, expulsion - full or partial confiscation of
property personally

owned by the convicted person: a) in
cases of speculation and smuggling; b) in cases of counter-
revolutionary and other crimes, when the investigation established that
the property was acquired illegally or was used for criminal purposes.

2. A special meeting under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR in their decisions on confiscation shall be guided by Art. Art. 40 and 41 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and the corresponding Art. Art. Criminal Code of the Union Republics. Chairman of the

Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR KALININ Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR GORKIN RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 31.

L. 23, 45. Original.

Typescript.

Protocol No. 24. The

text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent by: t.t. Beria, Gorkin, Bochkov, Rychkov.

No. 146

Draft Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the reorganization of the People's Commissariat of In

Affairs of the USSR [38]

01/01/1941

Project

Top Secret

DECISION of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

From "" January 1941, Moscow In

connection with the need to maximize the improvement of the intelligence and operational work of the state security agencies and the increased volume of work carried out by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, its diversity (protection of state security, protection of public order, protection of state borders, military protection of especially important industrial enterprises and railway facilities, management of places of detention, fire protection, local air defense, highway management, maintenance in camps and organization of the labor use of convicts, carrying out major economic work, developing new areas in remote northern regions of the USSR, managing archives and registration of acts of civil status, etc.), the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks DECIDES: 1. To divide the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR into two people's commissariats: a) the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR (NKVD);

b) People's Commissariat for State Security of the USSR (NKGB).

2. Assign to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR performing the following tasks:

- a) protection of public (socialist) property, protection of personal and property security of citizens and protection of public order; b) protection of the state borders of the USSR;
- c) organization of local air defense; d) keeping convicts in prisons, corrective labor camps, corrective labor colonies, labor and special settlements and organizing their employment and re-education; e) fight against child homelessness and neglect; f) reception, escort, protection, maintenance and labor use of prisoners of war and internees; g) state supervision of fire protection and

management of fire fighting activities; h) registration of persons liable for military service; i) construction, repair and maintenance of roads of national importance; j) accounting, protection, scientific and operational development of the state archival funds of the USSR; k) registration of acts of civil status. 3. Approve the following structure of the People's Commissariat Internal Affairs of the USSR (see Appendix No. 1).

4. Entrust the People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR with the tasks of ensuring the state security of the USSR: a) conducting intelligence work abroad; b) the fight against subversive, espionage, sabotage, terrorist activities of foreign intelligence services within the USSR; c) prompt development and liquidation of the remnants of all anti-Soviet parties and counter-revolutionary formations among various sections of the population of the USSR, in the system of industry, transport, communications, agriculture, etc.;

d) the protection of the leaders of the party and government. 5. Establish that the NKGB is exempt from carrying out any other work not directly related to the tasks listed in paragraph 4 of this resolution.

6. Approve the following structure of the People's Commissariat State Security of the USSR (see Appendix No. 2).

7. In the union and autonomous republics, to organize republican state people's commissariats for security and internal affairs, respectively, at the departments of territories and regions, the NKGB and the NKVD. The organization of the republican, regional, regional and district bodies of the NKGB and

the NKVD should be carried out on the basis of the division of the existing apparatuses of the NKVD, building them in relation to the structures of the NKGB and the NKVD of the USSR approved by this decree. 8. The division of the NKVD of the USSR into two people's commissariats must be completed within a month. Within a month, submit

for approval the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and

the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR the regulation on the People's Commissariats of State Security and Internal Affairs.

9. Approve the draft Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on division of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

APPENDIX No. 2 To the

Decree of the Central Committee of

the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks STRUCTURE

OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARY FOR STATE SECURITY

OF THE USSR 1. Leadership

of the People's

Commissariat 2. Secretariat 3.

Intelligence Directorate 4. Counterintelligence

Directorate 5. Secret Political Directorate 6.

Investigation Department

7. Office of the Commandant of the Moscow Kremlin 8.

Department protection of the leaders of the party and government (1 department)

9. Accounting and statistics department (2

department) 10. Department for external surveillance, installations, searches and arrests (3 department)

11. Department of operational equipment (4

department) 12. Department of encryption and decryption work

(department 5) 13. Personnel department

14. Administrative-financial-economic department. RGASPI. F. 17. Op.

163. D. 1295. L. 103-106, 109. Original.

Typescript.

No. 147

Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on

eliminating shortcomings in the activities of the People's Commissariat of Amm

01/16/1941

Strictly secret 140

- Question of the NKVD

1. Instruct the People's Commissar of Ammunition of the USSR comrade Sergeev to eliminate the violations of the technological regulations for the manufacture of gunpowders TsG 12/7 set out in the testimony of Ivanov, Korshin and Anikeev, Comrade Beria to oblige to help comrade Sergeev in this matter. 2.

To prevent possible spontaneous combustion of TsG 12/7 gunpowders manufactured in 1940 and handed over to the warehouses of the Red Army, to propose to the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Comrade Timoshenko, to carry out a thorough check of these gunpowders and remove from the warehouses of gunpowder with signs of decomposition,

using them on current firing. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 31. L. 106.

Original.

Typescript. Protocol No. 25. The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: 'sent by: t.t. Beria, Sergeev (NKB), Timoshenko, Voroshilov.

No.

**148 Special message by V.N. Merkulov
and B.Z. Kobulova I.V.
Stalin about the "anti-Soviet"
group at the Shostka gunpowder
factory with the application of the
portocal of the dopors L.P. Ivanova [39]**

01/17/1941

TOP SECRET COPY OF
THE

CC AUCP(b) TO COMRADE

STALIN In addition to our No. 5331/B dated December 10, 1940 on the enemy work of the anti-Soviet group liquidated by the NKVD of the USSR at the Shostka gunpowder plant No. 9 of the People's Commissariat of Munitions, the NKVD of the USSR

reports: Arrested members of the wrecking group IVANOV L.P. - former director of plant No. 9, G.E. Korshin - former chief engineer of the plant and ANIKEEV V.M. - the former head of the 54th workshop of plant No. 9 admitted to the enemy work they carried out to violate the technology for the production of gunpowder.

IVANOV L.P. and KORSHIN G.E. showed that they systematically violated the technological regulations for the manufacture of gunpowder, as a result of which gunpowder was produced unstable and with poor ballistic data. Such

gunpowder turned into charges for artillery systems and surrendered to the Red Army. Enemy work at plant

No. 9 was carried out mainly on gunpowder TsG 12/7 from granulated cellulose, which, due to a violation of technology, was produced with signs of decomposition of individual grains.

IVANOV and KORSHIN showed that such gunpowder could not be allowed into the charges, since the grains subjected to decomposition would further decompose and could ignite spontaneously.

During 1940, about 400 tons of gunpowder with reduced durability were put into service with the Red Army by Plant No. The above violations of the technological regulations also led to the release of powders that were heterogeneous in

composition, which caused the dispersion of shells during firing. Arrested ANIKEEV V.M. confirmed the testimony of Ivanov and Korshin about the enemy work they carried out at plant No. 9 in the production of gunpowders TsG from granulated cellulose.

According to the People's Commissariat of Defense, on December 10, 1940, 18 charges for the 107 mm / mm gun of the 1910/1930 model were found in the Kaluga warehouse No. 66. with decomposed gunpowder TsG 12/7, manufactured by plant No. 9 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition in February

1940. Arrested IVANOV and KORSHIN, interrogated about the possibility of eliminating the consequences of their enemy work in the production of TsG 12/7 gunpowder, showed: In order to obtain

resistant gunpowder with good ballistics, it is necessary to eliminate the violations of the technological regulations that they deliberately created at the plant, paying special attention to soaking operations, weeds, pressings and bags of gunpowder. The NKVD of the USSR considers it expedient: 1.

To instruct the People's Commissariat of Ammunition of the USSR to eliminate the violations of the technological regulations for the manufacture of gunpowders TsG 12/7, stated in the testimony of IVANOV, KORSHIN and ANIKEEV. 2. To prevent possible

spontaneous combustion of gunpowders TsG 12/7 manufactured in 1940 and handed over to the warehouses of the Red Army, to propose to the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR to carry out a thorough check of these gunpowders and remove from the warehouses of gunpowder with signs of decomposition, using them at current firing.

APPENDIX: Testimony of IVANOV L.P., KORSHINA G.E. and Anikeeva V.M.
Deputy People's

Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR MERKULOV dated 30/XII-40, G.E.
KORSHINA dated 26/XII-40, ANIKEEV V.M.
dated 29/XII-40

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL

arrested IVANOV Leonid Petrovich, - dated December 30,
1940 IVANOV L.P., born in
1906, nee. mountains Kozlova of the Tambov region, Russian, former member of
the CPSU (b) since 1927, before his arrest - director of plant No. 9 in the mountains.
Shostka. **Question:** By confessing to carrying out
hostile work at the Shostka gunpowder factory No. 9, you testified that substandard
gunpowder was handed over to the Red Army. Do you confirm these statements?
Answer: Yes, I confirm, but I would like to supplement the
testimony,

given by me to the investigation on October 29, 1940.

Question: What do you have to tell the investigation?

Answer: Substandard gunpowder was started to be produced by Plant No. 9 at
the end of 1939. In October 1939, white grains were found in the 12/7 grade gunpowder
manufactured by factory No. 9, indicating an insufficient content of diphenylamine and,
consequently, the instability of these gunpowders.

Question: Why did 12/7 gunpowder contain white grains? **Answer:** When
ether and diphenylamine were poured into the mixers, pyroxylin clumped, as a
result of which diphenylamine did not penetrate into the entire mass, and after the
gunpowder was pressed out, a defect was obtained, which consisted in the fact that
unstable grains were found in the gunpowder. Discovered

white grains testified O
of substandard gunpowder, and it was necessary to immediately stop pressing it.
However, by agreement with the participant of our

anti-Soviet group, the chief engineer of the plant - KORSHIN, I ordered the pressing of gunpowder not to stop, continuing to produce obviously unusable products. Pressing was suspended only at the end of November 1939, after the plant had already produced 600 tons of substandard gunpowder.

Gunpowder grade 12/7 with the presence of white grains was not adopted by the Red Army and remained at the plant for the production of current firing. **Question:** And what

brands of gunpowder with reduced resistance
did you surrender to the Red Army?

Answer: Gunpowder "TsG" grade 12/7 was surrendered as substandard, with reduced durability and poor ballistic data. The marriage of gunpowder of this brand occurred due to violations of the technological regime during its manufacture.

Question: What were the violations of the technological regime in the manufacture of gunpowder "CG"?

Answer: In March 1940, in order to shorten the soaking time for gunpowder, I suggested to the head of the 5th production - KOPNINA and the head of the 54th workshop of the same production - ANIKEEV, to change the technological regulations for soaking gunpowder and increase the water temperature from 60 to 70 C. As a result of the increase in water temperature during soaking, the gunpowder acquired a yellowish-green color, indicating its partial decomposition. However, tests of this gunpowder carried out by the factory laboratory

showed satisfactory results in terms of durability, i.e. temporary survivability, although the suspicious color and the presence of green grains indicated that the decomposition process was already taking place. Despite this, in April 1940, I agreed with Korshin - to launch 40 tons of gunpowder manufactured with signs of decomposition in a bag of general batches, in the expectation that the gunpowder handed over to military warehouses would continue to decompose further.

Question: What could result from the further decomposition of gunpowder into warehouse AU?

Answer: To spontaneous combustion and

fires. **Question:** Did you have a special conversation with Korshin about this?

Answer: I did not specifically tell Korshin about the possibility of spontaneous combustion of gunpowder in warehouses, and there was no need for this, since he is a fairly experienced chemist and was aware of the consequences of handing over gunpowder to military warehouses with signs of a decomposition process taking place in it. . Being connected by joint enemy work at plant number 9, we understood each other well and knew that our actions were directed to the detriment of the state.

In total, plant No. 9 of the Red Army delivered about 400 tons of unstable gunpowder.

Question: Describe in detail the No.

9 violations of technological regulations in the manufacture of gunpowder.

Answer: The violations of the technological regulations sanctioned by me for enemy purposes in the manufacture of gunpowder "TsG" grade 12/7 were as follows:

1) The processing of the powder mass in the mixers was carried out with a violation of pressure control, although the processing time corresponded to the technological regulations. So, the control pressure was 90 kg, instead of the required 110 kg, as a result of which the powder tape during pressing was of poor quality.

2) The pressing of the tape was carried out without the control pressure gauges necessary for this operation, which made it impossible to establish what exactly the pressure was when the tape was released, which led to an increase in the percentage of rejects on the presses. 3)

The cut powder was dried incorrectly, a large percentage of substances were left in it (instead of 20-22% - 25-28%), which led to a deterioration in the quality of the powder grains, a decrease in the gravimetric density of the powder, and an increase in the volume and weight of the charge. Gunpowder intended for use under an anti-aircraft system turned out to be unsuitable and was used under a 107 mm gun, or even returned for processing to be mixed with denser gunpowders.

4) Violation of the technological regulations was also carried out with a bag of gunpowder in general batches. It consisted in the fact that small batches were launched into a bag without preliminary mixing after drying and without receiving an analysis from the factory laboratory. As a result, the total batch of gunpowder in its composition was

heterogeneous and when firing such gunpowder gave a large dispersion of shells. A bag of general

batches of gunpowder was carried out in the absence data on volatile substances characterizing the resistance of gunpowder.

In cases where the received analysis indicated unsatisfactory results, the analysis was repeated, and since the limit of deviation from the permissible norms was small, the reanalysis data usually fell within the lower tolerance limit.

Question: The investigation is aware that in your official explanations you tried to prove that the greening of the gunpowder took place not as a result of a violation of the technological regime of soaking the gunpowder carried out on your orders, but because of careless work on the stirrers in the 53rd workshop, where resistant gunpowder gunpowder was mixed with the presence of green grains in them.

Did you give such explanations of marriage?

Answer: No, I did not give such explanations.

Question: And with the military representative of plant No. 9 KRESTYANINOV was there a conversation about the reasons for the greening of gunpowder grade 12/7?

Answer: Yes, there was, but in a conversation with KRESTYANINOV I did not try to attribute the defective gunpowder to the careless work on the stirrers in the 53rd workshop. It was only about the fact that in order to eliminate the marriage, it is necessary to lower the temperature of the water by 10 C during the soaking of gunpowder.

Question: In a conversation with the military representative, you are not responsible for the marriage tried to lay on the head of the 53rd workshop LUSTA?

Answer: I didn't. **Question:**

This is not true. The investigation has evidence that you tried to cover up the real reasons for the marriage, the release of which you organized, with references to careless work in the 53rd workshop. The essence of your negotiations with the military representative of the

plant will remind you one of the accomplices of your enemy work at plant number 9.

(The arrested former head of the 54th workshop of the 5th production of plant No. 9 V. M. ANIKEEV is introduced.) After mutual

identification and a statement about the absence of personal accounts, the arrested were asked the following questions:

Question to ANIKEEV: What do you plead guilty to?

Answer: I plead guilty to the fact that in March-April 1940, I was involved in enemy work at plant No. 9 by the chief engineer of the plant, Georgy Yefimovich Korshin, on whose instructions I took part in the preparation and implementation of the explosion of gunpowder on September 26, 1940 on a bag of BOR.

Question to IVANOV: And what do you plead guilty to?

Answer: I plead guilty to the fact that since February 1939 I was a leading member of the anti-Soviet group that existed at plant No. 9, and in September 1940 I prepared and carried out the explosion of the BOR bag apparatus with human victims.

Question to ANIKEEV: Were you in personal contact with IVANOV on enemy work at plant No. 9? **Answer:** No, but I knew

from Korshin that he belonged to our anti-Soviet group. Question to ANIKEEV: What do you

know about the surrender of substandard gunpowder to the Red Army?

Answer: I know that substandard gunpowder "TsG" grade 12/7 was handed over to the Red Army by plant No. 9 due to the fact that, at the direction of the plant director - IVANOV, in January 1940, the technological regime was changed in the 54th workshop when soaking two or three batches this gunpowder. By order of IVANOV, as far as I know, the temperature of the water during the soaking was increased from 60 to 70 C.

Question to IVANOV: Was the temperature of the water raised during the soaking of gunpowder on your orders?

Answer: Yes, by my order. Question

to ANIKEEV: Continue your testimony. **Answer:** I must

also inform the investigation that IVANOV, in a conversation with the military representative of the plant, KRESTYANINOV, when explaining the reasons for the appearance of green spots in the TsG gunpowder, stated that the marriage occurred due to the fact that the head of the 53rd workshop, LUSTOM, added current production waste containing green dye. With this explanation, IVANOV tried to justify his order to change the technological mode of soaking gunpowder. After IVANOV was pointed out that the analysis showed the

absence of dyes in gunpowder, he continued to assert that

greening still occurs through the fault of LUSTA, on the mixers, where current waste with the presence of green grains is mixed with good powders. Question to

ANIKEEV: How do you know the content of the conversation IVANOV with the military envoy?

Answer: The conversation took place in the following dates of January or in early February 1940 in workshop No. 54, in my presence.

Question to IVANOV: Do you confirm ANIKEEV's testimony? **Answer:**

No, I do not. Question to

IVANOV: Did you talk to KRESTYANINOV about the reasons for the greening of gunpowder?

Answer: I spoke. Question to IVANOV: In whose presence did this

conversation take place? **Answer:** In the presence of ANIKEEV, but it was not about 12/7 grade gunpowder, but about 7/7 grade gunpowder, in which tinted waste was actually added to the mixers. Question to

ANIKEEV: You insist that the conversation with the military representative was talking about gunpowder brand 12/7, and not 7/7? **Answer:** Yes, I

insist. (The confrontation is interrupted.) Question to IVANOV: You are hiding many more facts of your enemy work at Plant No. 9 and will be interrogated about this in detail, but now show me which batches of gunpowder you handed over substandard?

Answer: The total amount of gunpowder "TsG" brand 12/7, handed over to the Red Army with reduced durability, is about 400 tons. All these gunpowders were turned into

charges for a 76 mm anti-aircraft gun and a 107 mm gun of the 1910/30 model. All this gunpowder can start to decompose in warehouses. In order to prevent possible spontaneous combustion, all batches of gunpowder grade 12/7 stored in the

warehouses of the AU, turned into charges in March - June of this year, must be subjected to a thorough check and subsequently taken under special control.

Question: How to eliminate the consequences of your wrecking in the manufacture of gunpowder "TsG"?

Answer: In order to obtain gunpowder "TsG" grade 12/7 with good ballistics and satisfactory durability in the future, the plant must strictly adhere to the established technological regulations, immediately eliminating all the facts of violation of their manufacturing technology that I have listed. In addition, unstable gunpowder put into service with the Red Army should be used for current firing, not allowing them to be stored for a long time in the warehouses of the Artillery Directorate. Written down from my words correctly and read by me. IVANOV The interrogation began at 1:30 a.m. ended at 3 hours 30 minutes. INTERROGATED: Art.

Investigator of the investigative unit of

the GEM NKVD Art. lieutenant of state security - ANDREEV
early. I

department 2 departments of the
GEM NKVD lieutenant of state

security - ZVEREV

investigator of the investigator of the GEM NKVD

lieutenant of state security - SUDYIN AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58.

D. 343a. L. 220-231; 223-234. Script.

Typescript.

No. 149

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee
of the All-Union Communist Party of
Bolsheviks on the assignment of
L.P. Beria the title of General Commissar of State Security**

01/30/1941

97 - On the assignment to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Comrade Beria L.P. rank of General Commissioner of State Security

Approve the draft Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the assignment to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Comrade Beria L.P. the title of General Commissioner for State Security (see appendix).

DECREE

OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPERIOR COUNCIL
OF THE USSR On the assignment to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of
the USSR Comrade L.P. the title of General Commissar of State Security
Assign the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR comrade.
Beria Lavrentiy Pavlovich, the title of General Commissar of State Security.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M. KALININ

Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A.
GORKIN Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V.
MOLOTOV

Manager of Affairs of the Council of People's Commissars of
the USSR Y. CHADAEV RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1294. L. 82. Original.
Manuscript; L. 83. Original. Typescript.

Protocol No. 26.

In the text there is a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Gorkin, Chadaev.

No. 150

**Special message L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin with the
annex of the draft resolution of the Central
Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks
on the division of the NKVD of the USSR into two people's commissariats**

02/03/1941 No.

661/b Sov.

secret of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

to Comrade Stalin At the same time, I present a draft decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks
NKVD of the USSR into two people's
commissariats: 1. People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the
USSR 2. People's Commissariat of State Security. Application: project. People's
Commissar of Internal Affairs
of the USSR L. BERIA

DECREE OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR

ON THE DIVISION OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIATE OF
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
Divide the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR into two
People's
Commissariat: 1. People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the
USSR. 2. People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR. Chairman of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M. KALININ Secretary of
the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet A. GORKIN Moscow, February 3, 1941 RGASPI. F. 17. Op.
163. D. 1295. L. 110-111. Script.

Typescript.

On the first and second sheets there are notes: "Protocol No. 26, item

120." There are resolutions on the special message: "For. I. St.", "t. Molotov, comrade Kaganovich - for (A. Poskr.) "; "T. Voroshilov - for (A.P.) "; "T. Zhdanov - for (A.P.) "; "T. Mikoyan - for (A.P.) "; "T. Andreev - for (A.P.) "; "T. Kalinin - for.

No. 151

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union
Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the appointment of L.P.
Beria People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR**

02/03/1941

123 - On the appointment of Beria L.P. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

Approve the draft Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. DECREE OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE UNION OF THE SSR ON THE APPOINTMENT OF TOV. BERIA L.P. PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER

FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE USSR BERIA Lavrenty Pavlovich People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the

USSR. Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M.

KALININ Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A. GORKIN

Moscow, Kremlin

February 3, 1941 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1295. L. 114. Original. Manuscript; L. 115. Original. Typescript. Protocol number 26.

No. 152

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the
All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the
appointment of V.N. Merkulov People's Commissar for State Security of the USSR**

02/03/1941

124 - On the appointment of Merkulov V.N. People's Commissar for State Security of the USSR. Approve the draft

Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. DECREE
OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE UNION
OF THE SSR ON THE APPOINTMENT OF TOV. Merkulova V.N. FOLK
COMMISSIONER FOR STATE SECURITY OF THE USSR

Appoint tov. MERKULOV Vsevolod Nikolaevich People's Commissar of
State Security of the USSR. Chairman of the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M.
KALININ

Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A.
GORKIN Moscow,
Kremlin February
3, 1941 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1295. L. 116. Original. Manuscript; L.
117. Original. Typescript. Protocol
number 26.

No. 153

L.P. Beria, G.M. Malenkova, V.N. Merkulova

**I.V. Stalin on the approval of the Politburo of
the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist
Party of Bolsheviks of appointments for the
People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR**

02/06/1941

No. 724/b

Copy

Top secret of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks to Comrade I.V. STALIN In connection with the division of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR into two people's commissariats, we submit for your consideration and approval the following proposals for the appointment of People's Commissars for State Security of the Union and Autonomous Republics and Heads of the NKGB Directorate of the Territories and Regions of the RSFSR. We ask you to approve: I People's

Commissars of State Security of the Union Republics: 1) Ukrainian SSR - comrade MESHK

P.Ya., working as the head

of the first department of the GEM of the NKVD of the USSR.

2) Byelorussian SSR - comrade TsANAVA L.F., who works as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the BSSR.

3) Azerbaijan SSR - comrade S. F. EMELYANOV, who works as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Azerbaijan SSR. 4) Georgian SSR -

comrade RAPAVA A.N., working as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the GSSR. 5) Armenian SSR -

comrade A. V. KOROTKOV, who works as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Armenian SSR.

6) Uzbek SSR - comrade SAJAY A.N., working as People's Commissar Internal Affairs of the Uzbek SSR.

7) Kazakh SSR - comrade BABKIN A.N., working as People's Commissar Internal Affairs of the Kazakh SSR.

8) Turkmen SSR - comrade DAVIDOVSKY I.I., working head of the DTO of the NKVD of the Ashgabat railway.

9) Tajik SSR - comrade KHARCHENKO A.V., who works as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Tajik SSR. 10)

Kirghiz SSR - comrade SD ABUSHENKO, who works as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Kirghiz SSR.

11) Karelian-Finnish SSR - comrade BASKAKOV M.I., working People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the KFSSR.

12) Lithuanian SSR - comrade GLADKOV P.A., working as the first deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Lithuanian SSR.

13) Latvian SSR - comrade SHUSTIN S.M., working first Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Latvian SSR.

14) Estonian SSR - comrade KUMM B.G., working as People's Commissar Internal Affairs of the Estonian SSR.

15) Moldavian SSR - comrade N.S. SAZYKIN, who works as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Moldavian SSR.

II v

Heads of the Departments of the NKGB of the territories and regions of the RSFSR: 1) Moscow region - comrade P. N. KUBATKINA, who works as head of the NKVD in the Moscow region.

2) Leningrad region - comrade P.T. KUPRINA, who works as the head of the UNKVD of the Khabarovsk region *. 3) Khabarovsk

Territory - Comrade Chesnokov A.N., working deputy. Head of the UNKVD for the Khabarovsk Territory. 4) Primorsky Territory

- Comrade GVISHIANI M.M., who works as the head of the UNKVD for Primorsky Territory. 5) Gorky region - comrade

GUBIN V.V., working as head of the UNKVD for the Gorky region. 6) Sverdlovsk region - comrade IVANOV I.V., working

head of the UNKVD for the Sverdlovsk region.

7) Chelyabinsk region - comrade SOTNIKOVA I.D., working head of the UNKVD for the Chelyabinsk region.

8) Novosibirsk region - comrade KUDRYAVTSEV G.I., working as head of the UNKVD in the Novosibirsk region. 9) Molotov region - comrade POTASHNIK M.M., working head of the UNKVD for the Molotov region.

10) Kuibyshev region - comrade LAPENKOV N.E., working as the head of the department of the GEM of the NKVD

of the USSR. 11) Rostov region - comrade Pokotilo S.V., working deputy. head of the UNKVD in the Rostov

region. 12) Ordzhonikidze region - comrade V.M. PANKOV, who works as the head of the UNKVD for the Ordzhonikidze region.

13) Krasnodar Territory - comrade F. I. SHULISHOV, working head of the UNKVD for the Krasnodar Territory.

14) Altai Territory - comrade Z. V. NIKOLAEV, who works as the head of the UNKVD for the Altai Territory. 15)

Arkhangelsk region - comrade PANFILOV V.I., working head of the UNKVD for the Arkhangelsk region.

16) Vologda Oblast - comrade P. P. KONDAKOV, who works as the head of the UNKVD for the Vologda Oblast. 17)

Voronezh region - comrade PISMENSKY S.F., working head of the UNKVD in the Voronezh region.

18) Ivanovo region - comrade BLINOV A.S., who works as the head of the UNKVD in the Ivanovo region. 19) Irkutsk

region - comrade SMIRNOV N.V., working as head of the UNKVD in the Irkutsk region. 20) Kalinin region - comrade

TOKAREV D.S., working head of the UNKVD for the Kalinin region.

21) Kirov region - comrade Egoshina K.D., who works as the head of the UNKVD in the Kirov region. 22) Kursk

region - comrade AKSENOV P.M., working as head of the UNKVD in the Kursk region. 23) Krasnoyarsk Territory

- comrade SEMENOVA I.P., working head of the UNKVD for the Krasnoyarsk Territory.

24) Murmansk region - Comrade A.F. Ruchkin, who works as the head of the UNKVD in the Murmansk region. 25) Omsk

region - comrade ZAKHAROV M.E., working as the head of the UNKVD in the Omsk region.

26) Oryol region - comrade FIRSANOV K.F., who works as the head of the UNKVD in the Oryol region. 27) Penza region - comrade GORELKIN

G.S., working as head of the UNKVD in the Penza region. 28) Ryazan region - comrade YURYEV S.G., who works as the head of the UNKVD in the Ryazan region. 29) Saratov region - comrade Ivkin G.M., working

head of the UNKVD for the Saratov region.

30) Smolensk region - comrade KUPRIYANOV E.I., working as the head of the UNKVD in the Smolensk region. 31) Stalingrad region - comrade AI

VORONIN, who works as the head of the UNKVD in the Stalingrad region. 32) Tambov region - comrade S.T. MITRYASHEV, who works as the head of

the UNKVD in the Tambov region. 33) Tula region - comrade S. G. RESHETNIKOV, who works as the head of the UNKVD in the Tula region.

34) Chita region - comrade PORTNOV I.B., who works as the head of the UNKVD for the Chita region. 35) Chkalovsk region - comrade

BZYRINA I.V., who works as the head of the UNKVD in the Chkalovsk region. 36) Yaroslavl region - comrade NOSOVA M.A., working

head of the UNKVD in the Yaroslavl region.

III

People's Commissars of State Security of the autonomous republics that are part of the RSFSR: 1) Buryat-Mongolian ASSR - Comrade Shabalin

I.S., who works as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the BMASSR. 2) Bashkir ASSR - comrade Sokolov A.G., working

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the BASSR.

3) Dagestan ASSR - comrade PANTELEEV A.I., working
People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Dagestan ASSR.

4) Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic - comrade KRYLOV P.A., working as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the

KBASSR. 5) Kalmyk ASSR - comrade GONCHAROV G.Ya., working
People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Kalmyk ASSR.

6) Komi ASSR - comrade S. I. KABAKOV, who works as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Komi ASSR.

7) Crimean ASSR - comrade G.T. KARANADZE, who works as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Crimean ASSR. 8) Mari ASSR -

comrade M.N. IVANOV, who works as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Mari ASSR. 9) Mordovian ASSR - comrade SAVINOVA M.I.,
working

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Mordovian ASSR.

10) ASSR Volga Germans - comrade Astakhov A.M., working as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Volga German ASSR. 11) North Ossetian

ASSR - comrade ZODELAVA A.S., working as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the SO ASSR. 12) Tatar ASSR -

comrade E.M. MOROZOV, working as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Tatar ASSR. 13) Udmurt ASSR - comrade M. V.

KUZNETSOV, who works as the head of the NKVD department of the Udmurt ASSR. 14) Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

- comrade RYAZANOV P.N., who works as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the CHIASSR. 15) Chuvash ASSR - comrade

BELOLIPETSKY S.E., working as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Chuvash ASSR. 16) Yakut ASSR - comrade NEKRASOVA

M.P., working as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Yakut ASSR. MALENKOV L. BERIA V. MERKULOV Moscow RGASPI.

F. 17. Op. 163.

D. 1298. L.

14-18. Script.

Typescript.

On the first page there is a resolution: "For (so that Goglidze be placed at the disposal of the Central Committee). I. Stalin"; For - Molotov; For - Zhdanov; For - Andreev; For - Kaganovich; For - Mikoyan; For Voroshilov. Crossed out "t. GOGLIDZE S.M., who works as the head of the

* UNKVD of the Leningrad Region.

No. 154

Special message by G.M. Malenkova, L.P. Beria, V.N.

**Merkulova I.V. Stalin on the approval of the Politburo of the
Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party**

of Bolsheviks of the appointments of the leadership of the NKGB of the

02/08/1941

No. 722/

b Copy

Top secret of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist

Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade I.V. STALIN In connection with the division of the NKVD into two people's commissariats, we submit for your consideration and approval the following proposals for the appointment of senior officials of the People's Commissariat of

State Security of the

USSR. Please approve: First Deputy People's Commissar for State Security of the USSR comrade. SEROV Ivan Aleksandrovich, working as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR.

Deputy People's Commissars for State Security of the USSR:

Comrade. KOBULOV Bogdan Zakharovich, who works as the Head of the GEM of the NKVD

of the USSR; Tov. GRIBOVA Mikhail Vasilyevich (personnel), working deputy. head of the personnel department of the

1) chief NKVD of the USSR. Intelligence Directorate comrade. FITIN P.M., working as the head of the fifth department (INO) of the NKVD of the USSR;

his deputies:

comrade SUDOPLATOV P.A., working deputy. head of the fifth department of the NKVD of the USSR;

comrade Zarubin V.M., working deputy. early department of the fifth department of the NKVD of the USSR.

2) Head of the Counterintelligence Directorate comrade. FEDOTOV P.V., working as the head of the third department (KRO) of the NKVD of the USSR;

his deputies:

comrade Borshchev T.M., who works as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Turkmen

SSR; comrade RAIHMAN L.F., working deputy. head of the second (secret-political) department of the NKVD of the USSR.

3) Head of the Secret Political Directorate comrade. MILSHTAIN S.R., working as the head of Ch. Transport Administration of the NKVD of the USSR;

his deputies:

comrade GORLINSKY N.D., working deputy. head of the third department (KRO) of the NKVD of the

USSR; comrade SHEVELEVA I.G., working deputy. head of the second department (secret-political) of the NKVD of the USSR.

4) The head of the investigative unit comrade. VLADZIMIRSKY L.E., working deputy. head of the third department (KRO) of the NKVD of the USSR;

his deputies:

comrade ESAULOV A.A., working as the head of the Investigative Department of the NKVD of the

USSR; comrade SHVARTSMAN L.L., working deputy. Head of the Investigation Department of the GEM NKVD of the USSR.

5) Head of the Office of the Commandant of the Moscow Kremlin, Major General Comrade. SPIRIDONOV N.K., working in this position.

6) Head of the Department for the Protection of Party Leaders and government comrade. VLASIK N.S., working in this position.

7) Head of the Accounting and Statistics Department Comrade. BASHTAKOVA L.F., who worked as the head of the first special department of the NKVD of the USSR.

8) The head of the department for external surveillance, installations, searches and arrests, comrade. SHADRIN D.N., who works in this positions.

9) The head of the department of operational equipment comrade. LAPSHINA E.P., who works as the head of the second special department of the NKVD of the USSR.

10) Head of the department of encryption and decryption work
comrade KOPYTSEV A.I., working in this position.

11) The head of the administrative, financial and economic department,
comrade. DAVYDOVA A.M., working deputy. head of the AHU of the NKVD
of the USSR.

12) Head of the Secretariat comrade. GOLOVANOV V.A.,
working deputy Head of the Secretariat of the NKVD of the
USSR.

MALENKOV

L. BERIA V.

MERKULOV Moscow RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1298. L. 11-13. Script.
Typescript.

No. 155

Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "on the transfer of a special department from the NKVD of the USSR to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy of the USSR" [40]

02/08/1941

Top secret 49 - On the

transfer of the Special Department from the NKVD of the USSR to the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy of the USSR (decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of

People's Commissars of the USSR) During their existence, the special departments of the NKVD did a lot of work and played a positive role in the defeat of the counter-revolutionary elements that had penetrated the Red Army and the Navy. At present, in connection with the strengthening of the Red Army and the Navy, a significant

increase in their power and combat readiness, the growth of well-trained and devoted to the cause of the party of Lenin-Stalin, the command and political personnel of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR consider it expedient to transfer organs special departments from the jurisdiction of the NKVD to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy:

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR DECIDE:

1. Eliminate the Special Department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR.
2. Organize under the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy special departments of the NPO and the NKVMF, subordinating them directly to the people's commissars of defense and the Navy

Fleet. Name the special departments of the NPO and the NKVMF, respectively, the Third Directorates of the NPO and the

NKVMF. 3. Assign the following tasks to the Third Directorates of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's

Commissariat of the Navy: a) the fight against counter-revolution, espionage, sabotage, sabotage and all kinds of anti-Soviet manifestations in the Red Army and the Navy; b) identifying and

informing, respectively, the people's commissar of defense and the people's commissar of the Navy about all the shortcomings in the state of the army and navy units and about all available compromising materials and information on the military personnel of the army and navy. 4. To determine that these tasks are

carried out by the Third Directorate of the NPO and the NKVMF by: a) organizing an agent-

information apparatus in the army, navy and among the civilian population, which has direct contact with the military units, institutions, contact with the supply apparatus and individual military personnel;

b) conducting investigations into cases of counter-revolution, espionage, sabotage, treason, sabotage in the Red Army and the Navy and among the civilian population indicated above and through searches, arrests and seizures in connection with this.

NOTE: The recruitment of agents among the population indicated above, as well as the arrests among them, are carried out by the Third Directorates of the NPO and the NKVMF and their peripheral bodies in agreement with the relevant bodies of the NKGB of the USSR in terms of territoriality.

5. Organize under the NKVD of the USSR the Third Department with the functions of security service of the border and internal troops of the NKVD of the

USSR. 6. To form in Moscow a Central Council of representatives of the NKGB of the USSR, NPOs, the NKVMF and the NKVD of the USSR as part of the People's Commissar for State Security of the USSR, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, the head of the 3rd department of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the head of the 3rd department of the People's

Commissariat of the Navy . To form on the ground in the military districts similar councils consisting of the heads of local bodies of the NKGB and the NKVD of the USSR and

heads of the relevant peripheral bodies of the Third Directorates of the NPO and the NKVMF. Assign to the councils

being formed the task of coordinating the fight against anti-Soviet elements, in particular, the development of common methods of work, the issuance of instructions and instructions on individual cases and issues affecting the interests of the relevant bodies of the NKGB, NGOs, the NKVMF and the NKVD, the resolution of disagreements that arise in the process of work, etc. Central Council and Local Councils meet as

necessary, but at least once a month.

7. To transfer to the staffing of the organized Third Directorates of the NPO and the NKVMF the personnel of the liquidated Special Department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR and its peripheral bodies.

8. Transfer, respectively, to the organized Third Directorates of the NPO and the NKVMF, the letter, undercover and investigative cases currently being conducted in the Special Department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR, listing the arrested behind them.

9. Arrested people who are registered with the Third Directorates of the NPO and the NKVMF and the Third Department of the NKVD of the USSR may be kept in the prisons under investigation of the NKVD of the

USSR. To organize under the Third Directorates of the NGOs and the People's Commissariat of Navy and their peripheral departments the chambers for the preliminary detention of the arrested.

10. Establish that the bodies of the Third Directorates of the NPO and the NKVMF and the 3rd Department of the NKVD of the USSR, in agreement with the bodies of the NKGB, use the appropriate means of the NKGB to carry out the necessary operational activities (surveillance, operational equipment). The bodies of the Third Directorates of the NPO and the NKVMF organize the necessary operational accounting by sending copies of their registration cards to the relevant departments of the NKGB - UNKGB. Finished undercover and investigative cases by the Third

Directorates of the NPO and the NKVMF, when they are no longer needed, but no later than a year after completion, are sent for storage to the archives of the respective NKGB-UNKGB. The procedure for submitting cases to the archives, exchanging operational documentation, coordinating the

recruitment of agents and arrests is determined by a special instruction approved by the Central Council.

11. Transfer from the NKVD of the USSR, respectively, to the NPO and the NKVMF, the loans and cash allocations intended for the maintenance of the Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR in 1941, as well as the vehicles assigned to the NGO.

12. Appoint the head of the Third Directorate of the NPO comrade. Mikheeva A.N.; head of the Third Directorate of the NKVMF comrade. Petrova A.I.; head of the Third Department of the NKVD of the USSR comrade. Belyanova A.M.

13. All peripheral bodies of the Special Department of the NKVD (districts, armies, corps, divisions, fleets and flotillas) should be transferred to the jurisdiction of the NPO and the NKVMF, respectively.

14. Establish the following order of subordination of the bodies of the Third Directorates of the NPO and the

NKVMF: a) the heads of the Third Directorates of the NPO and the NKVMF are subordinate, respectively, to the people's commissars of defense and the Navy. All

appointments of the operational staff of the Third Directorates of the NPO and the NKVMF, starting with the operational regiment and the corresponding unit in the fleet, are carried out by orders of the people's commissars of defense and the Navy;

b) the head of the Third Department of the Military District (Front) reports to the head of the Third Directorate of the NPO and the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR; c) the head of the Third

Department of the Corps is subordinate to the head of the Third Department of the district (front) and the commander of the troops of the district (front); d) the head of the 3rd division

of the division is subordinate to the head of the 3rd corps department and corps commander; e)

the representative of the 3rd section in the regiment is subordinate to the head of the 3rd section and the division commander; f) the

appropriate order of subordination is established through the bodies of the Third Directorate of the NKVMF. 15. The structure of the

bodies of the Third Department of the NKVD of the USSR is established by the order of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. 16. The transfer of the organs of the

Special Department from the jurisdiction of the NKVD of the USSR to the jurisdiction of the NPO and the NKVMF must be completed within 5 days.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 7. L. 101-104. Script.

Typescript. Protocol number 27.

No. 156

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the
All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on Milstein
S.R." with the attachment of a special message L.P. Beria**

03/10/1941

200 - About Milstein S.R.

Appoint Comrade Milshtein S.R. First Deputy to the Acting People's Commissar of the Forestry Industry of the USSR Comrade Saltykov. March 10, 1941

Top secret of
the USSR NK to
comrade V.M. MOLOTOV. Comrade

SERGEEV, People's Commissar of the Forestry Industry of the USSR
10 months in the position of the People's Commissar, has been ill for 6
months and is now on a three-month vacation.

For this reason, and also as a result of the poor work of the former
Narkomles Comrade ANTSELOVICH, the affairs of the People's Commissariat of Forests of the
state.

The question of the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Forests must
be decided now, since the organization of logging, timber hauling and the
forthcoming timber rafting require a lot of hard work by the People's Commissariat,
which cannot be achieved without

a leader. Acting People's Commissar comrade SALTYKOV is clearly unable
to cope with his work. It

is difficult to find a candidate for the position of People's Commissar from
among the leading workers now working in the apparatus of the People's
Commissariat of Forests, with whom I had to get acquainted. Therefore, we
consider it possible to appoint an employee who, although not knowledgeable in
forestry, is able to organize and restructure the work of the People's Commissariat
for Forests,

as the head of the People's Commissariat for Forests. As People's Commissar
of the Forestry Industry of the USSR, we present for your consideration the candidacy of Comrade

S.R., who worked for the last year and a half as the Head of the Main Transport Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR (now works in the People's Commissariat of State Security).

Tov. MILSHTAIN has

been working in the NKVD for about 12 years and has been in party and Soviet work for over 6 years. After the appointment of the People's

Commissar, we will submit for consideration the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR measures to restructure the structure and other organizational issues of the People's

Commissariat

of Forests. L. BERIA MALENKOV RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1302. L. 197. Original. Manuscript; L. 198. Original. Typescript. Protocol No.

28. The text

contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts: Chadaev, Saltykov, Merkulov, Beria, Malenkov." On the first page there is Stalin's

resolution: "I propose to appoint Milstein as the first deputy under ION Saltykov, look for three or four months, allow Milstein to enter the case during this time, and only after that raise the question of Milstein's drug addiction. I. Stalin. "For - V. Molotov"; "T. Kaganovich - for; Comrade Mikoyan - in favor; comrade Andreev - for; comrade Voroshilov - for; comrade Kalinin - for.

No.

**157 Special message by V.N.
Merkulova I.V. Stalin about observing
General Malandin**

03/19/1941

Sov. secret of

the Central Committee of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade STALIN In

pursuance of your instructions, I checked the presence of compromising materials on * the head of the operational department of the General Staff of the Red

Army, Lieutenant General Malandin *. It has been established that there are no compromising materials on *Malandin*

in the NKGB of the USSR and in the 3rd Directorate of NPOs. *

Malandin * a native of the mountains. Nolinsk, Kirov region, member of the CPSU (b) since 1940, Russian, in the tsarist army had the rank of lieutenant, in the Red Army

since 1918, graduated from the Academy of the General

Staff of the Red Army. *Malandin* is carefully

monitored. The results will be reported later. People's Commissar of

State Security of the USSR V. MERKULOV AP RF. F. 3. Op.

58. D. 207. L. 1. Original. Typescript. *—* Entered by hand.

No. 158

Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks "the issue of the NKID"

03/22/1941

Top secret 155 —

Question of the People's

Commissariat of Foreign Affairs Approve the instructions of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the relationship of plenipotentiaries in Germany, Turkey, Italy, Romania and Bulgaria with trade representatives, military attachés and employees of other Soviet institutions in these countries (instruction attached).

APPENDIX to

clause 155 of pr. PB No. 29

INSTRUCTION SNK USSR

ON THE RELATIONS OF THE POLITARY REPRESENTATIVES IN

GERMANY The work of Soviet institutions and officials abroad, especially in the present conditions, requires the elimination of any inconsistency and inconsistency in their activities. This makes it necessary to centralize the management of the activities of Soviet institutions abroad by assigning appropriate duties to plenipotentiaries, in a similar way to the practice of foreign missions of other states. Such a centralization of the management of the work of Soviet institutions abroad is necessary in the first place in Germany, Turkey, Italy, Bulgaria and Rumania, in view of the special international political significance of these states and in connection with the military events now developing. In order to implement the above centralization, and also in order to establish correct relations between plenipotentiaries and trade representatives, military attachés and employees of other Soviet institutions, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR obliges plenipotentiaries,

trade representatives and employees of other Soviet

institutions in Germany, Turkey, Italy, Bulgaria and Romania to be guided by the following:

1. The Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR is entrusted with the management of the activities of all Soviet institutions, enterprises and organizations located in his country of

residence. The heads of these institutions, enterprises and organizations, and in general all Soviet officials who are abroad, are obliged to unconditionally report to the Plenipotentiary Representative and obey all orders of the Plenipotentiary Representative, fulfilling all his requirements and instructions exactly

and in a timely manner. 2. For the purpose of timely and proper use of the economic measures of our economic agencies abroad in the general political interests of the USSR, the Plenipotentiary Envoy is obliged to systematically monitor the implementation of trade agreements, economic and other agreements concluded with the USSR, to inform the Government of the USSR about this in a timely manner and submit the necessary proposals for its consideration. 3. The

plenipotentiary in relation to all Soviet institutions, organizations, enterprises and officials located in the country of residence of the plenipotentiary is entitled to:

a) demand systematic information on all issues of the work of these institutions and persons, in particular - on issues relating to the internal and external political situation of the host country; b) get acquainted with all the reports and reports sent by the above-mentioned officials to the corresponding central bodies of the USSR, with all orders and instructions given by these persons to the institutions and organizations subordinate to them, as well as with all their measures for the selection of personnel of the above-mentioned institutions.

4. The plenipotentiary is charged with the obligation to take the necessary measures to eliminate violations of the general policy of the USSR and Soviet or local legislation discovered by him in the activities of Soviet institutions, organizations and officials, as well as to correct other irregularities in the actions of the institutions and persons indicated above. The plenipotentiary is obliged to immediately notify the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the measures taken, sending relevant materials to its disposal.

In necessary cases, the Plenipotentiary has the right to suspend the wrong actions of the above-mentioned Soviet officials with an immediate notification of this to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. In case of protest by interested institutions of the order of the Plenipotentiary Representative, the issue is finally resolved by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in agreement with the relevant departments. However, the order of the Plenipotentiary to suspend the relevant events is carried out immediately, regardless of the protest. 5. Employees of the

NPO and the NKVD working in the apparatus of the embassy of the USSR are obliged to perform work in their officially occupied positions and are responsible for this work to the plenipotentiary along with the rest of the employees of the embassy in full.

6. Plenipotentiary representatives of the USSR must provide the workers of the NKVT, NPO and NKVD with the necessary assistance and assistance in the successful fulfillment of their tasks related to their work abroad through the NKVT,

NPO and NKVD. 7. Employees of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, NGOs and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs are obliged to inform the plenipotentiary, at his request, of all information and materials at their disposal on all issues relating to foreign policy and the internal situation of the country of residence of the plenipotentiary

and its relations with the USSR. NOTE: In the case when plenipotentiaries transfer to the NKID information received from employees of the NKVT, NPO and NKVD, they are required to indicate in the appropriate form the source of the information they received.

8. Secondment by the Plenipotentiary of employees of the NPO or the NKVD working in the apparatus of the embassy may take place only with the permission of the

NKID. The recall or summons of NCOs or the NKVD of their employees who hold an official official position in an embassy or consulate is carried out in agreement with the NKID. 9. The

plenipotentiary is granted the right, in cases of urgency, to second to the USSR employees of any Soviet institution, organization or enterprise located abroad, and without prior approval from the NKID and other relevant departments.

In these cases, the plenipotentiary must immediately send to the NKID all materials that served as the basis for taking such a measure.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 33. L. 9, 38-41. Script.
Typescript.

Minutes No. 29. The
text contains a typewritten note about distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Molotov (NKID), Mikoyan, Timoshenko, Chadaev, Malenkov.

No.

159 Exchange of cipher telegrams N.S. Khrushchev and I.V. Stalin about the unrest in the border areas with Romania

04/02/1941

Moscow, Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade STALIN Today, on April 1, part of the peasants of the nearest four villages of the Glyboksky district of the Chernivtsi region went to the regional center, the village of Glybokoye, with a demand to send them to Romania. The crowd numbered about

one thousand people. In the middle of the day on April 1, the crowd entered the village of Glybokoye, approached the building of the regional department of the NKVD, some carried crosses, there was one white banner (which, as the participants in this procession themselves explained, was supposed to symbolize peaceful intentions). An inscription was pasted on one cross: "Look, brothers, these are the crosses that the Red Army soldiers crippled." The crowd members did not have any weapons. After they explained the illegality of such a gathering in the border zone near the building of the NKVD district department and demanded to disperse, the crowd melted away. Some approached the building of the district executive committee with the same request: to send them to Romania.

In the village of Glybokoye, located 15-16 kilometers from the border, there is already the first secretary of the regional party committee, the chairman of the regional executive committee, the head of the UGB and other regional workers, loyal people from the local population who know the Romanian language were sent there from the city of Chernivtsi.

By the evening of April 1, those who came to the village of Glybokoe gradually dispersed.

The head of the UGB gave instructions to arrest the instigators, which was done tonight. Two days ago,

several groups of peasants with the same demand came to the district executive committee of the Storozhynets border

district. It turned out that they were incited by kulaks and guardists. Identified instigators in the Storozhinetsky district were arrested. Today comrade leaves for the Chernivtsi region.

Burmistenko. At about 7 pm on April 1, a crowd of 500-600 people in the Glybok region tried to break into Romania. The border guards opened fire. As a result, according to preliminary data, about 50 people were killed and wounded, the rest fled. Nobody broke through the border. Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine KHRUSHCHEV April 2, 1941 No. 451/sh Kyiv. Khrushchev From your message it is

not clear what is the nationality of the peasants who wanted to leave for Romania, are there Ukrainians among them, what percentage? In general, it is clear from your report that your work in the border areas is going very badly, it is, of course, possible to shoot at people, but shooting is not the main method of our work. Explain the word "guardists". Waiting for an answer from you. STALIN April 3, 1941 No. 429/sh Moscow, Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks comrade. STALIN I.V. I inform you that the peasants who wanted to leave for Romania are Romanians by nationality, there are no Ukrainians among them. The

word "guardists" in the exact

translation means "guard". So recently the Iron Guard party called itself.

Your comment about the weakness of our work in the border areas is correct. To improve work, Burmistenko left for the Chernivtsi region yesterday. Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of

Ukraine Khrushchev RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 59.

L. 5, 7-8. Script.

Typescript.

No. 160

**Special message by V.N. Merkulova I.V. Stalin
about the case of Zh.K. Bach with
an appendix of the protocol of interrogation** [41]

04/07/1941

922/M

Top secret A copy of the
Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist

Party of Bolsheviks submits to Comrade STALIN the NKGB of the USSR the protocol of the interrogation of the arrested former commander of the Zemgale division of the Latvian army, General BAH Zhanis Karlovich, dated March 27, 1941.

In 1921-1922, being the Latvian military attaché in Moscow, the BAH, through its residents and secret agents, carried out active intelligence work on Soviet territory.

In 1922, the OGPU authorities exposed the spy network of the Latvian intelligence. In this regard, at the insistence of the Soviet government, the Latvian government authorities withdrew BACH from Moscow. BACH

admitted that since October 1940 he was a leading member of an anti-Soviet, military officer conspiratorial organization operating on the territory of Latvia, in which he was involved by the former head of the Latvian Military School, General KLINSON.

BACH showed that a conspiratorial military-officer organization was preparing cadres for an armed uprising against the Soviet regime at the time of the alleged war of Germany against the USSR. The leading member of the

organization, KLINSON, with the assistance of the secretary of the German embassy in Riga, established contact with the Latvian military attache in Germany, Colonel PLENSNER, who was in Berlin.

CLINSON received a message from PLENSNER that German government circles had promised - at the right time - to provide appropriate assistance to the military officer organization.

BACH testimonies are exposed as leading participants anti-Soviet military officer organization:

1. DANNEBERGS Arthur Yakovlevich, currently serving in the Red Army as chief of artillery of the 24th territorial rifle corps, major general of artillery (pp. 28, 30 and 32); 2. DALBERGS Artur Yanovich, currently head of

supply of the 24th territorial rifle corps, major general of the quartermaster service (pp. 28, 31 and 33); 3. Julius Krishyanovich ROSENTAL, former colonel of the Latvian

army. Currently, the chief of staff of the 181st Infantry Division in the mountains. Tukume (Latvia), colonel (pp. 28, 32);

4. PUKSIS Ivan Ivanovich, former officer of the White Army, currently commander of the 20th Cavalry 24th Territorial Rifle Corps in Mitava, colonel (p. 32); 5. KLINSON Rudolf Mikhailovich, former head of the Latvian military school, former general of the Latvian army, dismissed from military service. Lives in the Latvian SSR (pp. 22-33);

6. ABELITIS Nikolai Yakovlevich, former lieutenant colonel of the Latvian army. Currently commander of the 295th Infantry Regiment of the 183rd Division (p. 27, 30, 32);

7. BALODIS Nikolai Davydovich, former lieutenant colonel of the Latvian army. Currently, he is serving in the 285th Infantry Regiment in the mountains. Cýsis (p. 32), and others. Due to

the fact that the overwhelming majority of the persons named by BACH are servicemen of the Red Army (24th Territorial Latvian Rifle Corps), the investigation file by BACH was transferred for further investigation to the 3rd Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense. With regard

to civilians passing on the testimony of BACH, we have given instructions to the NKGB of the Latvian SSR to take the necessary intelligence and operational measures.

Appendix: according to

the text. People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR

V. MERKULOV

<i>INTERROGATION PROTOCOL</i>

BAKHA Zhanis Karlovich

dated March 27, 1941

Bakh Zh.K., born in 1885, a native of the Satik volost of the Kuldiga district, Korchma Berzu (Latvia), Latvian, former commander of the Zemgale division, general of the Latvian army, was awarded three Latvian, one Estonian, one Swedish and two Polish orders. At the time of his arrest, he was a planner at the Riga plant of the People's Commissariat for River Fleet. **Question:**

Since when did you start serving in the Latvian army? **Answer:** Since December 13, 1918, that is, since the announcement of independence of bourgeois Latvia.

Question: What were you doing before that? **Answer:** Until 1918 I was an officer in the Russian tsarist army. At the time of demobilization from the tsarist army, I served as senior adjutant of the headquarters of the 37th army corps.

At the beginning of February 1918, already after demobilization from the tsarist army, I left for Ukraine, and then moved permanently to Latvia, where I was soon accepted into the service of the Latvian national army.

Question: What post?

Answer: With the assistance of my former school friend, Attorney at Law ANTONS, I was accepted into the military ministry as head of the general department.

Question: What did ANTONS have to do with the War

Ministry? **Answer:** None. However, ANTONS was on close terms with the then leader

of the Radical Democratic Party of Latvia, later President of the Republic ZEMGALS, through whom he, ANTONS, got me a job in the War Ministry.

Question: Who then headed the bourgeois government of Latvia?

Answer: At that time Karl ULMANIS was at the head of the Latvian government of Latvia. It must be said that the bourgeois government of K. ULMANIS, like the government of NEDRA later, did not have any support from the Latvian people. Therefore, despite the absence of its own armed forces, the Ulmanis government did not dare then to carry out even a partial mobilization of the population into the army. Meanwhile, ULMANIS was not idle. At the end of 1918, he entered into negotiations with the

official representative of the German command in Latvia, WINING, on the creation of joint armed forces to fight against the revolutionary movement growing in the country.

Question: Do you know the results of this agreement? **Answer:**

As a result of negotiations with WINING, three national units were created: German, Latvian and Russian, which were subordinated to the representative of the German command, Major SCHEIBERT, and later to the organizer and leader of the Landeswehr, Major FLETCHER. SCHEIBERT's assistant was Lieutenant Colonel Robert KLYAVINS, now commander of a separate territorial Latvian corps. The Russian part was staffed by Russian White Guards and various criminal elements, while the Latvian part was

predominantly made up of former captured Latvians held in concentration camps in Germany. With the establishment of Soviet power in Latvia in December 1918, the revolutionary movement intensified even more, in particular in the western regions, where the ULMANIS government fled. The

revolutionary movement embraced even the newly formed Latvian national units, which were under German rule.

command.

As a result, approximately in the second half of December, 1918, uprisings took place in the Latvian units, but they were brutally suppressed by the government of ULMANIS. **Question:** What armed forces did he rely on then?

ULMANIS?

Answer: The revolutionary uprisings in the Latvian units were suppressed by the government of ULMANIS with direct assistance

counter-revolutionary German and Russian White Guard units.

By this time, the Ulmanis government had formed a number of new units from among the reactionary officers, kulaks and students. In particular, there were created: an officer company under the command of Janis BALODIS, a Cesov company under the command of Lieutenant PURINS and a student company under the command of Captain GRUNTMAN.

Despite the massacre of the rebellious Latvian units and the creation of a new united counter-revolutionary German-Latvian army, the Ulmanis government, together with its troops, was forced to leave Riga and flee to the city of Libava under the onslaught of the red regiments. Together with the government of ULMANIS, all government institutions were evacuated to the city of Libava, including the Ministry of War, the head of the general department of which was I - BACH. Using its stay in the city of Libau and the suspension of the offensive of the Red troops,

unexpected for us, the government of ULMANIS made considerable efforts in order to obtain

help from outside.

Question: What kind of outside help do you mean? speak clearer.

Answer: From the city of Libava, ULMANIS, together with some members of the government (I do not remember their names), went abroad to negotiate with the governments of England, France and Germany on their assistance in the fight against Soviet troops.

ULMANIS did not stay abroad for long. Around the end of February 1919, he, together with the persons accompanying him, returned back to the mountains. Libau. By this time, a new commander-in-chief, Major FLETCHER, arrived from Germany, who reorganized the German units, creating the so-called Landeswehr.

As a result of negotiations between ULMANIS and representatives of England, France and Germany, weapons, uniforms and military units began to arrive in Latvia intensively.

Around the end of February 1919, the German General von der GOLTZ arrived in Latvia, who led all the armed counter-revolutionary units that fought against the Red Army.

At the same time, on behalf of the government of ULMANIS, Minister of War ZALITIS reorganized all Latvian units. As a result, the disparate counter-revolutionary Latvian units operating in the west of Latvia were consolidated into one battalion, which was subordinate to the German command.

Question: Who led the newly created battalion?

Answer: The commander of this battalion was originally Colonel KOLPAK, and after his death, the White Latvian units were headed by BALODIS.

Approximately 10-15 days after the arrival of General von der GOLTZ in Libau, the so-called "Iron Division" arrived at his disposal from Germany. All the counter-revolutionary forces gathered in the west of Latvia, under the direct leadership of von der GOLTZ, were sent to fight against the red units.

Question: You personally, as you know, did not stand aside from this. Show your role.

Answer: Throughout all this time I held the post of head of the general department of the War Ministry and took part in organizing the struggle against the Red Army. In April 1919, after the putsch carried out by pastor NEDRA with the help of German troops, I, together with other supporters of ULMANIS, resigned from the military ministry.

Question: What were you doing?

Answer: At the direction of ZALITIS, I, together with Captain HARTMAN, Colonel PLENSNER (he was recently the military attache of Latvia in Germany), Senior Lieutenant RAMATS, Lieutenant LEYMAN and other officers illegally left for Estonia, at the disposal of Colonel ZEMITAN.

Question: What role did Zemitan play at that time in Estonia and for what purpose were you sent to his disposal? **Answer:**

In January-February 1919, while ULMANIS was abroad, he managed to conclude an agreement with the White Estonian government on joint armed struggle against the Red Army.

In accordance with this agreement, the so-called "Northern Army" was formed on the territory of Estonia, which was part of the White Estonian units. All work on the formation in

The Estonian White Latvian units were led by Colonel ZEMITAN. He later commanded these units in their armed struggle against the Red Army. In turn, ZEMITAN was subordinate to the commander of the White Estonian army, General LAIDONER.

At the direction of ZEMITAN, I went to the city of Pskov to carry out the evacuation to Latvia of the Latvians living there, where I stayed until July 1919. With

the second coming of ULMANIS to power, in the summer of 1919 I returned to the city of Riga and, by order of General SIMANSON, I was appointed head of the department of the operational department of the newly formed headquarters of the commander-in-chief of the Latvian army.

As head of the operations department, I did not work for long, since from January 1920 I was assigned to temporarily act as head of the operations department. **Question:** It is known that with

the creation of the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, among other departments, departments of domestic and foreign intelligence were organized. What functions were assigned to these departments?

Answer:

Conducting intelligence and counterintelligence work against Soviet Russia. I must say that the department of internal intelligence, along with counterintelligence work, led and directly carried out the struggle against revolutionary-minded people, mainly against the communists.

From the first days of its existence, the foreign intelligence department of the headquarters of the commander-in-chief began to transfer its secret agents to the rear of Soviet Russia with sabotage and espionage missions.

Question: Who was in charge of the domestic and foreign intelligence departments? **Answer:** The founder and head of the foreign intelligence department for a number of years was the captain of the Latvian army Hugo ROZENSTEIN, who most recently was the chief of the general staff of the Latvian army. Captain

STREYPA was the assistant to the head of the foreign intelligence department.

The department of internal intelligence was led by BECKER, and later by the ALP. All of them acted on instructions and in accordance with government policy.

Question: What was the policy? Tell me.

Answer: From the very beginning of its existence, the Latvian bourgeois government, headed by ULMANIS, took sharply hostile positions towards Soviet Russia. They in every possible way prevented any actions aimed at rapprochement with Soviet Russia, and in their policy they were guided by the Western imperialist states, primarily by Britain and France. For example, I know that in

January 1920 the first Latvian delegation left for Moscow, which was instructed to probe the ground about a possible agreement with the Soviet government. Meanwhile, the delegation did not limit itself to these functions and concluded an armistice agreement. ULMANIS and the commander-in-chief of the Latvian army BALODIS were very unhappy with this act and did not recognize it. **Question:**

What is it from? **Answer:** After the return of the delegation, the ULMANIS government did not give any instructions on the cessation of hostilities. From the words of BALODIS' adjutant, Captain BEKERS, I knew that ULMANIS and BALODIS were outraged

at the armistice. **Question:**

What was the reason for this? **Answer:** The anti-Soviet policy of ULMANIS, as well as pressure on him from

France and England. From BECKERS, I learned that the British and French governments, having learned about the armistice with Soviet Russia through their leaders of military missions, systematically besieged ULMANIS and BALODIS, demanding that they continue the armed struggle against Soviet Russia, and in

connection with this they promised to increase assistance to Latvia. Along with this, the department of foreign Latvian intelligence, which was headed by Captain ROZENSTEIN, essentially turned
By of the of the former headquarters, by order
commander-in-chief of the Latvian army, colonel RADZINS, the foreign intelligence department regularly transmitted to all heads of military missions of the imperialist states located on

the territory of bourgeois Latvia, the materials at his disposal in relation to Soviet Russia. Contacting the work of Latvian

intelligence with the intelligence services of other countries against the USSR, as I know from the words of ROZENSTEIN, continued until recently. **Question:** With

which of the representatives of foreign intelligence was ROSENSTEIN associated in joint intelligence work against Soviet Union?

Answer: I knew from ROZENSTEIN that he was connected with French intelligence through the French military attaché in Latvia, Colonel ARSHAN. The names of representatives of other intelligence agencies with whom ROZENSTEIN was associated in intelligence work against the Soviet Union are unknown to me.

Question: You cannot be unaware of this, since you yourself took an active part in intelligence work against the USSR. Show the truth. **Answer:** I am telling the truth.

Surnames of representatives of foreign intelligence agencies with which ARSHAN was connected are unknown to me.

As for my personal participation in intelligence work against the Soviet Union, I do not hide this. In 1921, I was appointed

Latvian military attaché to the RSFSR to supervise the intelligence work of the headquarters of the Latvian Army Commander-in-Chief directly on Soviet territory.

Question: Who other than you was sent to Soviet Russia for the same purpose?

Answer: I remember that in addition to me, the following Latvian intelligence officers were sent to the RSFSR: KRUMINSH Albert, INDRIKSON, STRODS, MEDAUS Alfred, DERUMS, NIKBERG and, it seems, BONDERS. In order to encrypt and create favorable conditions

for intelligence work, all these persons were sent to Soviet Russia as employees of official Latvian institutions organized on Soviet territory, in particular, under the guise of members of the repatriation commission.

It must be said that with the conclusion of a peace treaty between Latvia and the Soviet government, the foreign intelligence department of the headquarters of the commander-in-chief of the Latvian army, represented by ROZENSTEIN

made extensive use of the right granted to Latvia under the peace treaty with the RSFSR to organize its official institutions on Soviet territory. The foreign intelligence department introduced its employees into these institutions, who carried out espionage work in the RSFSR. I know, for example, that the

Latvian intelligence officers A. KRUMINSH, IDRIKSON, DERUMS, STRODS and NIKBERG were formally listed as members of the re-evacuation commission of the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and MEDAUS was listed as the secretary of the military attaché. Each of the listed persons had an agent network in his communication, with the help of which he conducted intelligence work. However, I do not know their agents.

Question: First of all, tell us about your secret agents. Who was in touch with you personally?

Answer: I personally also had a network of secret agents from whom I received secret information that was of interest to our intelligence, but I remember only a few of these agents.

Question: Who

exactly? **Answer:** Of the secret agents who were in touch with me in Moscow, I remember the

following: NEIMAN - had several surnames, he is a Pole by nationality, now he should be about 45-50 years old, he worked in one of the Soviet military institutions (which one, I don't remember), he signed his reports with the nickname "Putnis". **Question:** Who

recruited him? **Answer:** For

undercover intelligence in Soviet Russia, NEJMAN was recruited by the Polish military attaché in Latvia (I don't remember his last name) and, by agreement with Latvian intelligence, was transferred to the territory of Soviet Russia. This was before my departure for work in the mountains. Moscow.

Question: What secret information did NEYMAN pass on to

you? **Answer:** Most often, I received orders from the headquarters of the Red Army from NEIMAN, information about the strength and deployment of Red Army units, and a number of other secret data, the content of which I remember.

Question: Where and how did NEYMAN obtain this data?

Answer: He managed to extract some of the materials at the place of his services, and he received some information through his acquaintances.

Personally, NEIMAN was in touch with me for a short time, in 1922 he was arrested.

Question: How did you hear about this?

Answer: I was specifically notified of the arrest of NEIMAN from the Foreign Intelligence Department of the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Latvian Army. How they knew about it, I don't know.

Question: And you haven't met NEIMAN since? **Answer:**

In the summer of 1922, unexpectedly for me, NEIMAN appeared at the Latvian embassy and told that he was under arrest, but he managed to escape from custody. From the story of NEYMAN, I got the idea that the version of the escape is a fiction and that he, being arrested by the Cheka, was re-recruited. This opinion was formed not only by me, but also by other senior officials of the foreign intelligence department who personally knew Neumann. In addition to NEYMAN, I also had a colonel of the tsarist army AVEN (I don't remember his name and patronymic),

a Latvian, now he is about 55-60 years old. He was personally recruited by me in the spring of 1921. AVEN sought to leave for permanent residence in Latvia, and in this regard, he repeatedly turned to me for information. I used this circumstance to recruit him.

Since AVEN served at the headquarters of the Red Army, I managed to get from him very interesting information about the combat training of the Red Army, its strength, plans related to the reorganization of the army, and a number of other equally important information.

Question: Do you know where AVEN has been lately? **Answer:** I am well aware that AVEN at the end of 1921 left for permanent residence in Latvia, where he was an assistant to the commander of the Talsi regiment of Aizsargs. No more data about AVEN I have.

Question: Who else from the secret employees of the Latvian intelligence were you in touch? **Answer:**

I also remember that TUPPE was in touch with me (I don't remember his name and patronymic), a Latvian by nationality, then he was about 30 years old. As far as I remember, he was an assistant to the commandant of the headquarters of the Red Army. **Q:** TUPPE was also personally recruited by you?

Answer: No. For espionage work for the Latvian intelligence service, TUPPE was recruited by my secretary MEDAUS. In 1922, during the temporary absence of MEDAUS in Moscow (he traveled to the city of Riga), I had several visits with TUPPE, during which I received very valuable information from him.

Question: What kind?

Answer: From TUPPE I received copies of top secret orders on the Red Army and information relating to the size of the Red Army. When I was already in Latvia, I learned that TUPPE had been arrested in the USSR and sentenced to death by firing squad.

Question: You have named far from all the secret secrets known to you. Latvian intelligence agents. Who are you hiding?

Answer: I do not deny that I did not really name all the secret agents who were personally in touch with me and my employees, but I cannot remember them because of the prescription of time. Actually, the main part of our secret agents was opened by the Cheka back in 1922 (I also don't remember the names of the arrested agents). In May 1922 my assistant MEDAUS was exposed and arrested, and in August 1922 I left for Latvia and never returned to Moscow.

My resignation from the post of Latvian military attache in the RSFSR was due to the fact that, following the exposure of our secret agents, the Soviet government in its note demanded that the Latvian government recall me from the post of military attaché.

Question: Who took charge of intelligence work on Soviet territory after your departure from Moscow? **Answer:** After

me, intelligence work in Soviet Russia was headed by FREYBERG (I don't remember his first and middle name). I handed over to him the rest of the secret agents that had not yet been exposed. **Question:**

Which of the agents did you hand over to FREIBERG?

Answer: As far as I remember, I gave FREIBERG a total of about 6-7 secret agents for communication. Of this part of the agents, I remember only NEIMAN and TUPPE. I can't remember the names of the rest of the agents now.

I am not aware of further intelligence work in the RSFSR, since in the middle of 1922 I left Moscow and had nothing more to do with intelligence.

Question: What did you do when you returned to Latvia?

Answer: I entered the service in the personnel units of the Latvian army. In November 1922, I was appointed Chief of Staff of the Vidzeme Division. I remained in this position continuously until the end of June 1931, after which I was transferred to the post of commander of the 4th Valmer Infantry Regiment, and in August 1934 I was appointed commander of the 5th Tsesov Infantry Regiment. Then I was an assistant commander of the Latgale division and from the autumn of 1936 to November 1940 - the commander of the Zemgale division.

I repeat that when I entered the service in the personnel units of the Latvian army, I stopped intelligence work and had nothing to do with it.

Question: However, they were directly related to anti-Soviet work. Show about it.

Answer: From the very beginning of its organization and until recently, the Latvian army was brought up by us in the spirit of hatred for the Soviet Union. Even in 1939, despite the conclusion of an agreement on mutual assistance with the USSR, educational work in this direction did not weaken, but, on the contrary, intensified.

Question: What did it mean?

Answer: With the conclusion of an agreement on mutual assistance between the USSR and Latvia and the creation of Soviet military bases on Latvian territory, special so-called "interview hours" were introduced in our army, which were sharply anti-Soviet, slanderous in nature and had the goal of inciting anger in the soldiers towards the Soviet Union. For the same purpose, the

then chief of staff of the army, General ROZENSTEIN, sent out reports to the unit commanders on the course of hostilities between Finland and the Soviet Union, clearly slanderous against the USSR.

There were, obviously, other similar facts, but I cannot recall them now. **Question:**

You evade a direct answer to the question posed. Do not hide behind ROSENSTEIN. It is known that you personally were a reactionary general of the Latvian army and, together with other officers, until recently took

active participation in the struggle against the Soviet Union. We invite you to talk about it.

Answer: I believe that the reactionary elements of the former Latvian army, and mainly those officers who were not enrolled in the newly created "territorial corps", are conducting underground anti-Soviet work. **Question:** We

are asking you about the concrete facts of your anti-Soviet activities, and not about "assumptions". Do you understand it?

Answer: I

understand. **Question:** In this case, you have no choice but to tell the truth to the end. Start with yourself.

Answer: I must confess that during the previous interrogations I really hid from the investigation everything I knew about the existence of an anti-Soviet, conspiratorial organization in Latvia.

Question: Why did you hide it?

Answer: Nationalist feelings were strong in me, and therefore I did not want to betray my like-minded people and accomplices who are members of the conspiratorial organization.

Question: Show in detail what kind of organization this is and what position you personally occupied in it?

Answer: I am talking about an anti-Soviet, military officer, conspiratorial organization operating on the territory of Latvia, which unites the most reactionary part of the officers of the former Latvian army. Most of the members of this conspiratorial organization known to me in the past took an active part in the armed struggle against the Red Army. As far as I know, the organization sets itself the task of wresting Latvia from the Soviet Union by means of an armed uprising and establishing a bourgeois system in it. I personally was an active member of this organization. **Question:**

Since when? **Answer:** Since October 1940. My entry into the conspiratorial

organization took place under the following circumstances. Around October 8, 1940, General Robert KLYAVINS (now commander of the Latvian "territorial corps")

held a meeting of division commanders of the former Latvian army in connection with the forthcoming transfer of military property to the newly created "territorial corps" of the Red Army.

After the end of the meeting, I was returning home together with the commander of the Kurzeme division, General SPANDEK, and the commander of the Latgale division, General KLINSON.

We were all in an excited state, realizing that in connection with the ongoing events we were left out of work. Along the way, we had a conversation about just that. I had a desire to speak more frankly in a narrow circle about possible prospects.

Noticing this, CLINSON offered to go to the restaurant "Rum" (Roman hotel). "There," as Clinson put it, "we'll talk." Me and SPANDEK agreed.

Question: And talked in plain sight and in

the presence of other visitors to the restaurant? **Answer:** No. We prudently settled down

in a separate office, having previously asked for food to be served to us. In the restaurant, in a favorable intimate

atmosphere, each of us, without hesitation, openly expressed his dissatisfaction and bitterness against the measures of the Soviet government.

After a brief, unanimous exchange of opinions on this matter, CLINSON put the question directly before us that "we will not tolerate such a situation and must act decisively."

It was absolutely clear to me and General SPANDEK that CLINSON meant to organize the reactionary officers of the former Latvian army, dissatisfied with the Soviet regime, to fight against the newly established state system in Latvia. CLINSON at the same time guided us that some steps in this direction had already been taken. **Question:** What exactly did he inform you about? **Answer:**

CLINSON said that we have like-minded people among the "young" officers. At the same time, he told us that he was approached by representatives of the "association of officers who graduated from the Latvian military school" (he did not mention his last name) with a request to take the initiative to create a military officer organization that would train in Latvia

armed uprising against the Soviets with the aim of seizing power in their own

hands. **Question:** What explains the fact that representatives of the "association of officers who graduated from the Latvian military school" turned to CLINSON about this?

Answer: This is explained by the fact that KLINSON enjoyed great prestige among the reactionary part of the "young" officers of the former Latvian army. In 1919, KLINSON was the organizer, and later the head of the Latvian military school, whose cadets took an active part in the armed struggle against the Red Army. KLINSON himself was awarded the military order "Lachplesis" by the Latvian government for his personal active participation in the struggle against the Soviet troops.

Accepting the offer of "young" reactionary officers, KLINSON took over the leadership of an underground anti-Soviet military officer organization in the Latvian SSR. CLINSON personally told me and SPANDEK about this. **Question:** Did

CLINSON inform you only about this? **Answer:** No.

CLINSON said that we were faced with the task of preparing a "territorial corps" for use as the armed force of a conspiratorial organization. For these purposes, continued CLINSON, it is necessary to create their own cells in parts of the corps.

Further, CLINSON informed us that he had already managed to create such cells in the Cesis division and that the corresponding preparatory work was being carried out in the Tukums division (he did not name the names of the members of the cells).

To my and SPANDEC remark to CLINSON that we could not do anything with the help of only one "territorial corps", he replied that he was taking measures to receive appropriate assistance from one European power. **Question:** What power was it?

Answer: CLINSON said that we could get the most substantial help from the government circles of Germany, because she had not abandoned her claims to the Baltic states. As for her treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union, it was concluded not out of love, but because of profit. CLINSON gave us his opinion that how

As soon as Germany ends the war with England, she will start hostilities against the Soviet Union.

Question: How was it conceived to establish contact with German government circles? **Answer:** CLINSON

decided to apply to the German embassy in Riga in order for them to assist in establishing contact with the former Latvian military attache of Latvia in Germany, a defector Colonel PLENSNER, who is in Berlin. CLINSON hoped through PLENSNER to get the opinion of the German government. At the same time, we agreed that SPANDEK and I, upon returning to our duty stations, would begin

recruiting anti-Soviet officers into our organization. The latter, in turn, will be tasked with grouping reactionary officers around themselves and spreading various anti-Soviet fabrications in the "territorial corps". We decided to confine ourselves to this for the time being, and in the future, depending on the situation, to give additional instructions to the new members of the organization. The main task of that period

was to spread rumors that the Soviet power in Latvia was temporary, that the former state system would soon be restored in Latvia. Along with this, the members of our organization had to exaggerate the version of the inevitable defeat of the Soviet Union in the upcoming war with Germany. **Question:** Who exactly was involved in the conspiratorial

organization by you personally?

Answer: In Dvinsk, I involved in the organization the commander of the 10th regiment of the Zemgale division, Colonel SKUENSHA, and the commander of the 11th regiment of this division, Colonel ABELITS. I was well aware of the anti-Soviet sentiments of these individuals from my joint service in the division, and therefore I gave them instructions in the light of the tasks that CLINSON set before me.

SKUENSH, who in the period 1919-1920, showed particular anger against the Soviet regime. was the head of the White Latvian unit operating against the Red Army. For active participation in the armed struggle against the Soviet regime, SKUENSH was awarded by the Latvian government with two combat

orders of "Lachplessis". With the liquidation of the Latvian army, he was dismissed from military

service. **Question:** How long did you stay in

Dvinsk? **Answer:** I did not stay long in Dvinsk and on November 2 I returned back to Riga, and on November 4 I was already dismissed from the army. A few days later, CLINSON came to my apartment.

Question: How did he know about your return to Riga?

Answer: I believe that CLINSON found out about my arrival in Riga in connection with the issued order to dismiss me from the army.

Question: For what purpose did he visit you at the

apartment? **Answer:** In order to orientate me about the affairs of our organization, CLINSON informed me that he had established contact with the chief of supplies of the "territorial corps" General DALBERGS, the chief of artillery of this corps General DANNEBERGS, the former chief of aviation of the Latvian army General INDANS and the chief of staff of the division of the "territorial corps » Colonel ROSENTHAL and involved them in a conspiratorial organization.

In addition, CLINSON informed me that he had visited the German embassy and negotiated with the secretary of the mission to assist our organization in establishing contact with PLENSNER.

Question: It must be assumed that CLINSON guided you about the results of these negotiations. So?

Answer: Yes. CLINSON told me that the embassy secretary at first did not want to receive him, fearing a provocation, but subsequently agreed to accept a letter from him to pass on to PLENSNER.

Question: What was this letter?

Answer: In his letter to PLENSNER, CLINSON reported in detail about the anti-Soviet conspiratorial organization he had created in Latvia and asked to contact the German government circles to find out their point of view on this and whether the organization could count on armed assistance from Germany.

After some time, CLINSON again appeared at the embassy and received a reply letter in which PLENSNER reported that he had managed to contact representatives of the German government.

PLENSNER pointed out that he had been promised further assistance to the organization, but everything would depend on the international situation.

Along with this, PLENSNER recommended that we continue the work we had begun "to take possession of the territorial corps." This meant that we must continue to create cells of our conspiratorial organization in the "territorial corps".

Question: Can you tell me who is keeping the letter at this time?
PLENSNER to CLINSON?

Answer: This letter, as KLINSON informed me, was destroyed by him in the premises of the German embassy in Riga. This was done at the insistence of the secretary of the embassy. In

turn, I informed CLINSON that I had personally recruited SKUENSH and ABELITIS into the organization in Dvinsk.

There were no more conversations between me and CLINSON.

Question: Would you like to say that this is where your connection with the conspiratorial organization ended.

Answer: No. I just answered incorrectly. I meant to say that there were no other conversations between me and CLINSON when they met at my apartment. In the future, I continued to keep in touch with the members of our organization.

Thus, for example, at the beginning of December 1940, I took part in an illegal gathering of the leading members of the conspiratorial organization, which took place at the apartment of General DANNEBERGS, who is now the chief of artillery of the "territorial corps".

Question: What was the nature of this gathering?

Answer: This was the first organizational meeting of the leading members of our conspiratorial organization. At the meeting, each of those present informed about the work he had done in the field. After that, KLINSON, who chaired the meeting, suggested that the officers of the units establish contact with the local Aizsargs. At the same time, he informed the meeting participants that the members of our organization from the Cesis division had already established contact with the Aizsargs.

General INDANSU, who was present at this meeting, was asked to establish contact with the Aizsargs of the city of Riga.

Q: Do Aizsargs carry concealed weapons? **Answer:** I don't know. It was assumed that, if necessary, the Aizsargs would receive weapons from the quartermaster warehouses of the "territorial corps". A member of our conspiratorial organization, General DALBERGS, who, as I have already shown above, will have to assist in this, is the head of the supply of the "territorial corps". **Question:** Who else from the

members of the conspiratorial organization besides you, CLINSON and INDANCE attended this illegal meeting?

Answer: At the illegal meeting of the leading members of our conspiratorial organization, which took place in the apartment of DANNEBERGS, besides me, there were: 1)

General KLINSON - the former commander of the Latgale division;
2) General DALBERGS - head of supply of the "territorial corps"; 3) General

INDANS - former chief of aviation of the Latvian army; 4) General DANNEBERGS - head of artillery of the "territorial corps"; 5) colonel PUKSIS - commander of the cavalry regiment of the "territorial corps"; 6) Colonel ROZENTHAL - chief of staff of the division of the "territorial corps"; 7) Colonel ABELITIS - recently served in the Cesis division, who was personally recruited into the organization by me; 8) Colonel BALODIS - officer of the Cesis division. In addition to the persons I have listed,

the meeting was attended by other members of our organization - representatives of various parts of the "territorial corps", but I do not know their names. After the end of the meeting, the following remained at DANNEBERGS's apartment: I -

BACH, CLINSON, INDANCE, DALBERGS and DANNEBERGS.

DALBERGS told us that he had spoken to the chief of staff of the "territorial corps" General UIDENTINS, who was told that "officers are organizing to fight against Soviet power in Latvia and that this is being led by a general who has been suspended from service in the "territorial corps".

UDENTYNS, as stated by DALBERGS, approved of our

actions and advised us to inform the commander of the "territorial corps" General Robert KLYAVINSH about this. At the same time, we instructed CLINSON to personally contact KLYAVINSH

and ask the latter to take over the leadership of the organization.

Question: What reason did you have to contact KLYAVINSH

with a similar proposal, not knowing his relationship to the organization?

Answer: UDENTYNSH, apparently, did not accidentally recommend that we turn to General KLYAVINSH, namely because, as we believed, that he was already aware of the existence and activities of our organization. I must say that DALBERGSU

was instructed to fully inform UDENTYNSH about the plans of our conspiratorial organization and invite him to join us.

Question: What are the results of these negotiations? **Answer:** I don't know, because soon, that is, in the second half of December 1940, I had already been arrested. Therefore, I do not know anything more about this organization.

Question: Is this true? **Answer:** Yes, that is correct. I know nothing more about the military-officer organization. However, I am aware of the existence in Latvia of yet another anti-Soviet, nationalist organization uniting Aizsargs and reactionary students. **Question:** How do you know

about this? **Answer:** I became aware of the existence in Latvia of an anti-Soviet nationalist organization from among the Aizsargs and reactionary students approximately on December 17 or 18, 1940, that is, literally a few days before my arrest. I was informed about this by the brother of the former Prime Minister of Latvia, Karl BLODNEK, with whom I recently worked at the Riga shipbuilding plant of the USSR People's Commissariat of River Fleet.

Question: Why did BLODNEK tell you about this? What did you have in common with him? **Answer:** In

the past, Karl BLODNEK was my school friend, besides, he was well aware of my anti-Soviet sentiments. That is why he shared with me about the existence of an anti-Soviet organization.

Question: What exactly did BLODNEK tell you about this? **Answer:**

BLODNEK told me that his brother Adolf BLODNEK, who has recently been in the service of the Riga branch of the International Sleeping Car Society, is an anti-Soviet nationalist organization of Aizsargs and reactionary students. BLODNEK told me leads

nothing more. **Question:** Do you know the members of this anti-Soviet organization? **Answer:**

No. BLODNEK named only his brother Adolf as the head of this organization. He did not tell me anything about the belonging of other persons to this organization. Interrogation began at 13:00.

00 minutes. Interrupted at 3 o'clock. 25 minutes. (Break from 4:45 p.m. to 8:30 p.m.) I read the protocol, everything was written down from my words and in a way I understand

Russian is correct. J. BACH

head of

the

investigation department of the NKGB of

the USSR, captain of the states. security of

RHODES, beginning. 6 sec. 2 departments of

the investigation department of the NKGB of the

USSR ml. states lieutenant. safety RIDES AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 206. L. 203-232. So

Typescript.

No. 161

Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist

Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the

USSR "on accidents and catastrophes in the aviation of the Red Army" [42]

04/09/1941

125 - On accidents and catastrophes in the aviation of the Red Army (decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR) The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR establish that accidents and catastrophes in the aviation of the Red Army not only do not decrease, but more and more increase due to the laxity of the flight and command personnel, leading to violations of the elementary rules of flight service.

The facts show that due to laxity, on average, 2-3 aircraft die in our country every day in accidents and catastrophes, which amounts to 600-900 aircraft per year. The current leadership of the

Air Force has proved incapable of leading a serious struggle to strengthen discipline in aviation and to reduce accidents and catastrophes. The leadership of the Air Force, as the facts show, not only does not fight for the observance of the rules of the flight service, but sometimes itself pushes the flight personnel to violate these rules. So it was, for example, during the flight on March 27, 1941, of 12 DB-3F aircraft from the airfield of plant No. 18 in Voronezh to the 53rd air regiment (Krechevitsy), when the head of the operational flights department of the Red Army Air Force Headquarters, Colonel Mironov V.M., despite obviously unfavorable weather, allowed the specified flight. As a result of this clearly criminal order, 2 crashes and one forced landing occurred, in which 6 people died and 3 people were injured. Slackness and indiscipline in aviation are not only not suppressed, but are, as it were, encouraged by the leadership of the Air Force by the fact that the perpetrators of accidents and catastrophes remain,

in fact, unpunished. The leadership of the Air Force often hides from the Government the facts of accidents and disasters, and when the Government discovers these

facts (41), then the leadership of the Air Force tries to gloss over these facts, resorting in a number of cases to the help of the People's Commissar of Defense. This was the case, for example, with the disaster in Voronezh, in respect of which Comrade Rychagov was obliged and promised to send a report to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, but did not fulfill this obligation and covered himself with the authority of the People's Commissar of Defense, who, without understanding the matter, signed the "explanation", covering up the whole thing. The same attempt by Comrade Rychagov to cover up laxity and indiscipline in the Air Force took place in connection with a serious accident that took place on January 23, 1941, during the flight of an aviation regiment from Novosibirsk through Semipalatinsk to Tashkent, when, due to a gross violation of elementary flight rules, 3 aircraft crashed, 2 planes crashed, killing 12 and injuring 4 crew members.

About the collapse of discipline and the lack of proper order in Borisoglebsk aviation school, the Government learned in addition to Comrade Rychagov.

On violations by the Air Force of decisions of the Government prohibiting skiing, the Government also learned in addition to the Air Force.

What the collapse of morals in the Air Force has reached is shown by an unprecedented fact for our aviation, when an aircraft under the command of the flight commander, junior lieutenant comrade, disappeared in the 29th air division. Koshlyak M.V., and the command of the division and the leadership of the Air Force did not take serious measures to search for the missing pilot. Twenty days later, the lieutenant was accidentally found frozen in the cockpit. From the letters he left, it can be seen that the pilot was healthy after landing, lived 8-9 days, the last letter was written to them on the 8th day after landing. The letter says that he tried to find a settlement, but due to deep snow he was forced to return to the plane. Pilot Koshlyak died of hunger and cold. Since Comrade Koshlyak himself was discovered by accident during a training flight not far from the settlement, it is quite obvious that if the Air Force or the 29th Air Division took elementary measures to search for the aircraft, he, Koshlyak, would have been saved. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decides: 1. Remove Comrade Rychagov from the post of head of the Red

Army Air Force and from the post of Deputy

People's Commissar of Defense as an undisciplined and failed head of the Air Force.
2. Colonel Mironov to be put on trial for an obviously criminal

an order that violates the elementary rules of flight service.

3. Fulfillment of the duties of the head of the Red Army Air Force
assign to the 1st Deputy Chief of the Air Force comrade. Zhigarev

4. To suggest Commissar of Defense Comrade Timoshenko to submit to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks a draft * resolution * of the Main Military Council in the spirit of this ** decision ** for distribution to the air division, regiment, school *** in the form of an order from the People's Commissar ***. Secretary of the Central

Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks,

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1308. L. 208-210. Script. Typescript.

Minutes No. 30. *—

* Inserted in place of the crossed-out "order". **—** Inserted

in place of the crossed-out "decree". ***—*** Inscribed by Stalin.

No. 162

Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "on the third departments of NPOs and the NKVMF"

04/19/1941

132 - On the Third Directorates of the NPO and the NKVMF (decree of the Central Committee

of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR) The practice of applying the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of February 8, 1941 "On the transfer of a special department from the NKVD of the USSR to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy of the USSR "showed that this resolution did not take into account the need for mutual information from the state security agencies and the Third Directorates of the NPO and

the NKVMF and the expediency of the unity of actions of these bodies against anti-Soviet elements, who are working simultaneously

both within the system of the Army and the Navy, and outside her. In order to eliminate this shortcoming, in addition to the above decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, they DECIDE: fortified areas, garrisons, military academies, schools, navies, flotillas and naval bases) positions of deputy chiefs of the Third Directorates (departments, departments), directly subordinating them to the respective NKGB-UNKGB in terms of territoriality, with their simultaneous subordination to the heads of the Third Directorates (de

The above-mentioned deputy heads of the Third Directorates (departments, departments) of the NCO and the NKVMF are appointed, transferred and dismissed by orders of the USSR NKGB and maintained at the expense of the USSR NKGB. Establish that the main duty of the

deputy heads of the Third Directorates (departments, departments) of the NPO and the NKVMF is to inform the heads of the Third Directorates (departments,

departments) on cases that are in the production of state security agencies and are directly related to the work of the bodies of the Third Directorates, and in informing the relevant bodies of the People's Commissariat of State Security about all cases that are in the production of the Third Directorates (departments, departments). 4. To oblige the bodies of the Third Directorates of the NPO and the NKVMF to

immediately report all arrests made by them, as well as the results of interrogations of those arrested, to the state security organs: in the center - the NKGB of the USSR, in the field - the NKGB-UNKGB by territoriality through the deputy heads of the Third Directorates (departments, departments). 5. Grant the right to the state security agencies to take into their proceedings any investigative or undercover case conducted in the bodies of the Third Directorates

of the NPO and the NKVMF, with a listing of those arrested and agents.

6. Grant the right to the bodies of the Third Directorates of the NKVMF to demand from the state security bodies the transfer of cases that are directly related to the system of the Army and Navy.

7. Establish that the Central Council and local councils, organized in accordance with paragraph 5 of the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of February 8, 1941, are convened under the chairmanship of representatives of the bodies of the People's

Commissariat of State Security. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 34. L. 25. Original.

Typescript. Protocol number 31.

No. 163

Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on the withdrawal of counter-revolutionary organizations in the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR" [43]

05/14/1941

Strictly secret 117

- On the seizure of counter-revolutionary organizations in Western

regions of the Ukrainian SSR (decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR)

In connection with the increased activity of the counter-revolutionary "organization of Ukrainian nationalists (OUN)" in the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR, expressed in armed OUN raids on village councils, collective farms, and the killing of rural activists, in order to decisively suppress the criminal activities of the OUN, violating the peaceful labor of collective farmers in the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR, the Central Committee VKP(b) and Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decide:

1. To oblige the bodies of the NKGB and the NKVD of Ukraine to continue the seizure members of counter-revolutionary OUN organizations.
2. Arrest and send into exile to a settlement in remote areas of the Soviet Union for a period of 20 years with confiscation of property: a) family members of members of counter-revolutionary Ukrainian and Polish nationalist organizations, the heads of which have gone underground and are hiding from the authorities;

b) family members of participants in these counter-revolutionary nationalist organizations whose heads have been sentenced to VMN.

3. Bodies of the NKGB and the NKVD to strengthen the intelligence and operational work, ensuring the good organization and conduct of operational activities. The

NKGB and the NKVD of Ukraine to send operatives to help their local bodies in the western regions for the rapid identification, prosecution and removal of members of bandit groups.

4. To house the troops of the NKVD of Ukraine in separate units in the most affected by banditry areas of the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR to use them in the fight against bandit groups. 5. The Central Committee of

the CP(b)U and the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR to strengthen the Party and Soviet cadres of the

districts of the western regions affected by banditry. 6. Apply with all severity the order of the NKVD of the USSR on the prohibition, without special permission, of storing and carrying firearms, arresting and prosecuting persons who are found to have weapons without permission.

7. To organize the fight against bandit groups in the western regions of Ukraine, on the basis of this resolution, send the deputy of the NKGB of the USSR comrade. Serov. 8. Instruct

the NKVD and the NKGB of the USSR and the Secretary of the Central Committee of Belarus, Comrade Ponomarenko, to discuss the issue of carrying out

similar measures in Western Belarus. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 34. L. 156. Original. Typescript. Protocol number 32.

No. 164

Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the procedure for the movement of representatives of foreign states across the territory of the USSR

05/15/1941

Top secret 6 - On

the procedure for the movement of diplomatic and consular representatives in the USSR of foreign states and employees of foreign embassies and missions through the territory of the USSR

Approve the following resolution of the Council of People's

Commissars of the USSR: "1. Establish that the movement through the territory of the USSR of diplomatic and consular representatives in the USSR, foreign states and employees of foreign embassies, missions and consulates can take place only if these persons have previously notified the relevant bodies of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, NPOs and the NKVMF about the proposed trips, indicating the route, stopping points and the duration of the trip in order to register these trips with the indicated authorities. 2. To oblige the bodies of the People's Commissariat of

Foreign Affairs, NCOs and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, in the event of reports by the persons indicated in paragraph 1 of alleged trips through the territory of the USSR, to prevent them from leaving for the forbidden points and areas of the USSR listed in the appendix.

3. To oblige the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to bring to the attention of foreign embassies and missions the establishment of this procedure and to inform the points and areas of the USSR

declared forbidden. 4. This procedure does not apply to cases of transit travel across the territory of the USSR.

5. Representatives of embassies and missions that have their own consulates and vice-consulates on the territory of the USSR are granted the right to visit the locations of these consulates and vice-consulates.

consulates, however, also subject to prior notification of their trips to the relevant authorities of the NKID, NCOs and the NKVMF.

APPENDIX to paragraph 6

LIST of

Forbidden Points and Localities of the USSR (Annex to Article 2) Arkhangelsk, Arkhangelsk Region, Murmansk, Murmansk Region, Petrozavodsk, Leningrad, Leningrad Region, Karelian Isthmus, Estonian SSR, Latvian SSR, Lithuanian SSR, Western Regions of the Byelorussian SSR, Minsk, Western regions of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev, Dnepropetrovsk region, Zaporozhye region, Chernivtsi, Moldavian SSR, Odessa, Nikolaev, Kherson, Crimean ASSR, Sevastopol, Taganrog, Rostov, Novorossiysk, Tuapse, Bereznyaki, Gorky, Kazan, Kuibyshev, Sverdlovsk, Stalingrad, Engels, Grozny, Baku, Baku oil regions, Yerevan, Turkmen SSR, Uzbek SSR, Tajik SSR, Kirghiz SSR, Kazakh SSR, Buryat-Mongolian ASSR, Irkutsk, Chita region, Khabarovsk, Khabarovsk Territory, Vladivostok, Primorsky Territory. In addition, all points located in the border strip. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 35. L. 4, 30-31. Script.

Typescript.

Minutes No. 33. The

text contains a typewritten note about distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Molotov, Vyshinsky, Beria, Merkulov, Timoshenko, Kuznetsov, Chadayev.

No.

165 Special message by V.N.

Merkulova I.V. Stalin about

I.F. Sacriere with interrogation protocol attached

05/15/1941

No. 1674/m

At the same time, I am sending you the protocol of interrogation of I.F. Sacriera from May 11,

1941 The investigation of the case continues. People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR V.N.

MERKULOV Transcript

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL

SACRIER Ivan Filimonovich

dated May 11,

1941 SACRIER I.F., born in 1900, a native of the village of Abaklydzhav volost, Bendery district, Moldavian, citizen of the USSR, formerly. member of the CPSU (b), with higher education. Prior to his arrest, he was deputy chief of armaments and supplies of the Main Directorate of the Air Force of the Red Army.

Interrogation began at 2:00

pm. 15 minutes. **Question:** You have been charged with carrying out subversive and espionage work for a number of years. Do you plead guilty to this?

Answer: I plead guilty to the fact that in 1936 I was involved by the then head of the Artillery Directorate Nikolai Alekseevich EFIMOV, an agent of German intelligence, to wrecking work to disrupt the armament of the Red Army air force.

Question: What was your relationship with the Air Force? **Answer:** In 1936 I was appointed head of the Armaments Directorate of the Air Force. My functions included arming combat aircraft of the Red Army.

Question: You stated that YEFIMOV was an agent of the German intelligence. How do you know about it?

Answer: EFIMOV personally opened up about this at the moment I was involved in wrecking work in 1936. **Question:**

You are not saying something, and therefore it is not clear what was the point of EFIMOV to open up to you in his connection with German intelligence. Show in detail how it happened?

Answer: EFIMOV told me about his cooperation with the Germans for a reason, but because he was aware of my connection with German intelligence.

Question: So, you were

not only carrying out wrecking work to disrupt the weapons of the Air Force, but you were also a spy. So?

Answer: Yes. I must frankly declare that I began to engage in sabotage in the line of disrupting the weapons of the Air Force of the Red Army precisely because I had previously been recruited by German intelligence for espionage work. EFIMOV became aware of this, and, as I have already shown above, in 1936 he used this circumstance to involve me in joint wrecking work through the Air Force. **Question:** To what period do you establish contact with German intelligence on espionage work? **Answer:**

I became a German agent in 1931, and from that moment until my arrest, I passed on espionage information to German

intelligence about the quantitative and qualitative state of the artillery of the Red Army and the weapons of the Air Force. **Question:** We will interrogate you in detail about the nature of the espionage information you passed on to German intelligence, but now tell us who,

and under what circumstances, attracted you to cooperate with German intelligence? **Answer:** For espionage work, I was recruited in 1931 by the captain of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff of the German Army SHPALKE.

Question: Where did you work in 1931?

Answer: At that time I was a teacher at the Artillery Academy named after Dzerzhinsky in Leningrad.

Question: That's where you met with SHPALKE?

Answer: No. My meeting with him took place in Berlin, where I was sent in July 1931 through the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, together with the former secretary of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs - Alexander Grigorievich ORLOV, the teacher of the Artillery Academy - Mikhail Maksimovich STRUSELBA and the Deputy Inspector of Communications of the Red Army - KOKADEEV Nikolai (I don't remember his patronymic). **Question:** For what purpose did you go to Berlin?

Answer: We were sent along the line of the Intelligence Directorate to be present at the firing of artillery units of the Reichswehr and stayed on a business trip for about 2 months. During this period, we all got to know a number of German officers and listened to several lectures at the War Ministry on the use of artillery. Captain SHPALKE accompanied us as an interpreter on all trips and lectures. **Question:** We are not asking about lectures, but about the circumstances in which you were recruited by German intelligence for espionage work. Show about it!

Answer: Captain SHPALKE skillfully entangled me. Towards the end of our trip in September 1931, ORLOV and I, on behalf of our entire group, arranged a dinner for representatives of the War Ministry, in particular for Major BETHER and Captain SHPALKE, who lectured to us at the Kempinsky Restaurant (on one of the central streets of Berlin).

At this dinner, I got drunk and blurted out to Captain SHPALKA some secret information about the structure and organization of the artillery units of the Red Army. This circumstance served as the basis for the fact that SHPALKE began to actively work on me and to subordinate me more and more to his influence.

Captain SHPALKE tried in every possible way to compromise me, involving me in drunkenness and debauchery. He several times invited me to the night taverns located in the area of "Victoria-Louise" square,

surrounded me with unknown women of easy virtue, with whom I reveled and debauched. There were times when I got very drunk and they took me to some apartments to women of easy virtue. As a result, Captain SHPALKE

so entangled me that I was finally compromised as a representative of the Red Army.

Question: After all, you were in Berlin not alone, but with a group of other representatives of the Red Army. How could you often visit the taverns with SHPALKE without fear that ORLOV, KOKADEEV and STRUSELBA would become aware of this? **Answer:**

I must say that by this time ORLOV, KOKADEEV and STRUSELBA had already left Berlin and from the whole group I remained one.

On the instructions of the Artillery Directorate of the Headquarters of the Red Army and the Engineering Department of the Berlin Trade Representation, I went to Holland for a while to the Zeiss plant to accept the ordered anti-aircraft artillery fire control device "KOGNAD-B", but soon returned to Berlin again and finally fell into the hands of the German scout Shpalke. **Question:** Did you have

any business with Captain SHPALKA? **Answer:** No. **Question:** Why did

you meet with him? **Answer:** My meeting with Captain SHPALKE happened by accident. After returning from Holland to Berlin, I stayed there for a few days to write a trip report.

One day in October 1931, not far from the embassy building on the street Unter den Linden, I met with Captain SHPALKE. He asked where I lived and how long I would stay in Berlin. I replied that I would leave for the Soviet Union in a few days.

At this meeting, SHPALKE was emphatically attentive to me and offered to spend the evening with him and have fun. I agreed. The next day, by prior arrangement, he picked me up at Geisberstrasse 39, where I lived in a private room in a Soviet boarding house. After staying with me for 25-30 minutes, SHPALKE

offered to take a ride with him in the car. We got into a taxi, drove a few

blocks around the city and stopped at one of the restaurants in the Victoria Louise Plaza area.

SHPALKE invited me to a restaurant, where by that time there were already some women. As soon as we sat down at the table, several women, as if on special orders, came up to our table, unceremoniously sat on their knees, hugged and kissed me. All this was accompanied by a joint drink for a treat to SHPALKA.

Late at night, when I was already very drunk, I was taken to a separate room of the same restaurant, along with one of the women of easy virtue, with whom I debauched until the morning. Captain SHPALKE

organized all these "treats" on his own check.

A couple of days later, together with SHPALKE, I was in another restaurant, where I also drank and then debauched with women in some special apartment.

Question: What kind of

conversations did Captain SHPALKE have with you during joint drinks?

Answer: Usually, when

we were alone, SHPALKE did not miss an opportunity to extract from me information characterizing the strength and combat power of the Red Army. During this time, I fell under the influence of

SHPALKE so strongly that I answered all his questions about the state of discipline in the army, about the changes being prepared in the material part of the Red Army Artillery, etc. **Question:** Did you pass the secret

information about the Red Army in writing?

Answer: At that time, I had not yet transmitted it. True, during lunch at the Kempinski restaurant, a notebook disappeared from my pocket, in which I made notes about the collected secret information regarding the German army and its weapons. I hid the fact of the disappearance of my notebook and did not tell anyone about it.

reported.

Question: How did this notebook disappear from you? **Answer:** I don't know for sure, but I believe that he quietly pulled it from me from the pocket of Captain SHPALKE, who was sitting next to me.

These circumstances led to the fact that SHPALKE each time more and more insistently demanded and received from me the information of interest to him in relation to the Red Army.

Question: Did you receive any gifts or money from Captain SHPALKE?

Answer: I did not

ask, he himself persuaded me to accept from him present.

Question:

Which one? **Answer:** Once, in a conversation, SHPALKE asked what I bought for myself in Berlin and what I intended to take with me as a gift. I replied that I would like to purchase some things, but I do not have enough funds for this. SHPALKE was silent in this case, and at the next meeting, when we were heading to one of the taverns, he offered to stop by a department store on the way, where, as he put it, I could see the things I needed, and indicated that this store was directly involved in sending parcels to the Soviet Union. **Question:** Do you agree? **Answer:** Yes, in the store SHPALKE

offered me to buy the necessary things and said that he could be kind and reciprocally pay for my purchases. **Question:** Did you agree to this as well? **Answer:** By this time, I had already become so confused in my connections with the German intelligence officer SHPALKE that I agreed with all his proposals, in particular, with the "courtesy" offered by him to purchase things in the store at his expense.

As far as I remember, I bought myself a coat, a gold watch, boots and, in addition, sent a parcel to my wife in Leningrad with women's and children's things. SHPALKE fully paid for the cost of the things I had purchased and at the same time slipped into my jacket pocket a wad of money, which, as I later calculated, turned out to be several hundred marks.

Q: What is the total

amount you received from SHPALKE?

Answer: In total, I received money and gifts from captain SHPALKE about two thousand marks.

Question: Captain SHPALKE gave you money and gifts for a reason, but, obviously, for certain services. What demands did he make of you? **Answer:** When I was

leaving Berlin, SHPALKE was at the station and here he directly raised the question of my collaboration with German intelligence. During this last meeting with

Szpalke, he hinted unambiguously that my time with him in Berlin compromised me to such an extent that I would have to continue to render him certain kind services. SHPALKE said that if I did not want to have trouble on my return to the Soviet Union, then I should continue to provide German intelligence with the information it needed.

Everything that happened between me and SHPALKE in Berlin did not give me any opportunity to refuse his proposal. In addition, at the station, SHPALKE, at the end of everything, stunned me with one circumstance.

Question: How?

Answer: He

showed me several photographs in which I was taken with him in the company of women of easy virtue in a rather

intimate positions.

After that, I had no choice but to accept SHPALKE's offer of cooperation with German intelligence in espionage work, and I agreed.

Question: What tasks did you receive from Szpalke when you left Berlin?

Answer:

SHPALKE said that he would restore contact with me in Leningrad through a special messenger with a password: "Greetings from SHPALKE," to whom I should transmit information of interest to German intelligence. I received no other instructions from SHPALKE personally, and we parted ways. **Question:** When did you

return to Leningrad? **Answer:** In mid-October

1931. **Question:** And when and under

what circumstances was contact restored with you on behalf of German intelligence? **Answer:** I served in the Dzerzhinsky Artillery

Academy on the Vyborg side, and lived on the Zhores embankment,

about 15 minutes walk from the academy. I usually went to work and returned home on foot across the Liteiny Bridge.

Question: Do not confuse and answer the question directly. What do the addresses of the Academy and your apartment have to do with restoring contact with German intelligence?

Answer: One evening in December 1931, I was returning from the academy and walking along the Jaurès embankment towards the house. I was approached by an unknown man above average height, heavy build, wearing glasses, he was wearing a brown coat with a collar and a brown cap. Coming up with me, this man

asked: "Are you Ivan Filimonovich?" I answered in the affirmative. Then he, asking for an apology, said that he had to talk to me. To my question - who are you and on what issue do you want to talk with me - the stranger looked at me intently and instead of answering said: "Greetings to you from Shpalke." It became clear to me that this was the special contact of the German

intelligence, which SHPALKE spoke about at the train station in

Berlin. **Question:** Who is he, what is his name?

Answer: I don't know his last name, because he didn't give his name. Since the meeting took place not far from my house, the stranger offered to take a walk along the embankment with him. I agreed, but was obviously nervous. Noticing this, the German intelligence agent asked me not to worry, took a cigarette case out of his pocket, lit a cigarette and offered me a

cigarette. **Question:** Do

you smoke? **Answer:** No. I refused to take a cigarette and told him that I didn't smoke. However, the stranger was very insistent on this, and, as I later

found out, not by chance.

Question: What does this mean? **Answer:** He opened the cigarette case not so much in order to treat me with a cigarette, but with the aim that I could see my photograph contained in it and be fully convinced that this person was a representative of

SHPALKE. **Question:** When did this meeting of yours with the German intelligence liaison take place?

Answer: I have already said that it was at 7 o'clock in the evening at the end of

December 1931. **Question:** It is known that at this time it is completely dark. It's not clear how you could have noticed that there was your photo card in the

cigarette case? **Answer:** We were walking along the embankment, which is illuminated by electric lamps. The stranger opened and brought me a cigarette case in close proximity to the lantern, so that its contents could be seen. I clearly saw my photograph in the cigarette case.

Then the messenger said that I was instructed to prepare information about the new types of guns being introduced into service with the Red Army for transfer to SHPALKA. At the same time, he noticed that a piece of paper was placed in the mouthpiece of the cigarette indicating the order in which the digital information should be presented (caliber, gun weight, system, muzzle velocity, rate of fire, projectile weight, explosive charge weight, weight of the entire cartridge, actual fire range and maximum firing range). He offered not to throw away the mouthpiece, to use the instructions in the note, more precisely, to remember well the order in which the numbers were presented according to the information of interest to German intelligence, and then to destroy the note.

The liaison officer warned that if it becomes necessary to comment on the figures in words, then the handwriting must be changed and written in block letters. Along with this, he remarked: "Do not try to tell us false information, as we check everything and find it out. In that case, blame yourself. You obviously understand well that no one should be told either about the very fact of our meeting or about the content of the conversation that took place between us. You are entirely in our hands, and the slightest rash step can lead you to unpleasant consequences.

Question: They demanded information from you only on artillery? **Answer:** No, I was offered to get other spyware

intelligence. The liaison officer said that I had the duty to keep an eye on the changes taking place in the Red Army and other branches of the military, and to report on this as well. At the same time he remarked:

"You work at the academy, where there are materials on experimental objects, pay attention to this and will inform us."

"In order to maintain secrecy," the messenger said, "the password for communication will not always be the same, but will change at each meeting." For the next meeting, he set the password: "Greetings to you from Vasily."

The messenger said that he would not rush to complete the task, and he scheduled the next meeting for the month of March (I don't remember the exact date) at 12 o'clock in the afternoon in the building of the city station near the large

map of the railways. After that we parted ways. I went towards the house, and he went in the opposite direction.

Question: How did this contact find you? **Answer:**

Obviously, at the apartment address, which I told SHPALKA back in Berlin, and from my photograph that he had. I should note that the specified contact also came to the apartment of
to me.

Question:

When? **Answer:** On the same day, shortly before my meeting with him on the Jaurès embankment.

Question: Were you at home at that time?

Answer: No, I was on duty.

Question: How do you know that he came to your apartment? **Answer:** I was very alarmed by the meeting of the German intelligence liaison with me and did not immediately go to the apartment, but wandered the streets of the city for about two hours. When I returned home, my wife's mother said that today a man came and asked when I was at home. I inquired about the signs of the person who came, and it turned out that it was he, a German intelligence liaison. **Question:** Where is your wife's mother at this time? **Answer:** She died in 1938. **Question:** Did

your wife see this man? **Answer:** No, since at that time she was
at her

friends.

Question: Did you carry out the task of German intelligence received through a messenger?

Answer: Yes, I did. At the agreed time, i.e. in March 1932, I reported to the city station, where the same messenger soon approached me. He imperceptibly said hello, went out into the corridor, and I followed him.

Having seized the moment when there was no one in the corridor, I handed him the prepared secret information on the material part of the artillery, rolled up into a tube, which he immediately put into a cigarette case.

Question: What kind of information did you give him?

Answer: As far as I remember, these were classified data about a modernized field gun and a modernized anti-aircraft gun. At the same time, I handed over to the contact information about the divisional cannon * that was being developed at the academy. Svyaznik

suggested that for the next meeting, which was scheduled for the end of May or the beginning of June 1932, to prepare information on the number, condition and armament of the Red Army units quartered in Leningrad. He said that another person might come to this meeting with me, but this should not embarrass me, since he will name the password and show my photograph in the cigarette case.

I don't remember what the next password was, but we agreed to meet on the bridge in front of the park of culture and recreation on the islands. Indeed,

another person appeared at the next meeting: 25 years old, somewhat round-shouldered, with damaged teeth. After he told me the password, I handed over to him the collected secret information prepared according to the assignment, in particular about the artillery control devices developed at the academy and known to me in the development through the Artillery Directorate.

fire.

Question: Who was this second contact?

Answer: I do not know him, just as I did not know the first and two subsequent liaisons who received from me espionage information for German intelligence in the period 1932-1934, i.e. until the moment of departure from Leningrad to work in Moscow.

I only remember that in each individual case, the meeting with the contact took place using a predetermined password. I met him on the embankment of the Neva River near the Winter Palace, at the corner of Ligovka and Nevsky Prospekt, and on the street across Nevsky Prospekt (I don't remember its name) near Eliseev's shop.

Question: This is a formal answer. You could not help but know the persons with whom you were connected in espionage work. What are the names of the German intelligence liaisons you met in Leningrad? **Answer:**

I confessed that I was a spy, I do not hide my practical work as an agent of German intelligence, and now I am not at all interested in hiding anyone. I sincerely declare that I do not know the names of the German intelligence liaisons to whom I transmitted espionage information. I remember such a case: when meeting with one of the contacts, I asked him to give his name, to which he answered me: "It is not in my interests and not in your interests." Since then, I have not turned to liaisons with such questions, and they themselves have never identified themselves.

Question: Is this true?

Answer: Yes, that is absolutely correct. I did not know the persons who came to me on behalf of German intelligence. During my work in Leningrad, I transmitted the following espionage materials through messengers: about work on prototype guns, experimental anti-aircraft and naval artillery firing devices, and on naval artillery I reported the information that I was directly aware of from factory No. 213, which developed these devices .

Question: What was your relationship with Plant No. 213? you had are there espionage connections?

Answer: No. I visited plant number 213 as a consultant on optical instruments. The secret information I knew about this plant, I passed on to the Germans.

In addition, I transmitted to the German intelligence characteristic data from secret signs on the state of discipline and combat training in the army.

Question: You

indicated that in 1934 you moved to work in Moscow. What assignment did you receive? **Answer:** In March 1934,

I was appointed head of the Department military instruments of the Main Artillery Directorate.

Question: Was German intelligence aware of this? **Answer:**

No. In Leningrad, my last meeting with a German intelligence liaison was scheduled for the first days of May 1934, but it did not take place, since in March I had already left for Moscow at the place of my new job and therefore could not inform about the new

appointment. Subsequently, already in Moscow, when I was again contacted on behalf of the German intelligence service, I gave the exact location of my new job, which satisfied them

quite well. **Question:** How does it happen, in one case you say that you did not warn the signalman about the transfer to a new job, but meanwhile in Moscow you again contacted German intelligence. It turns out that you yourself sought to restore contact with the Germans.

Answer: No, they found me. Contacts in Leningrad knew the phone number of my apartment and, obviously, called home. The family members, not suspecting anything, reported, probably, that I had moved to work in

Moscow. In September 1934, when I was already provided with an apartment at No. 12 on Bolshoy Ovchinnikovsky Lane, the messengers must have found me at the address bureau.

In September, a representative of German intelligence met with me not far from my house and, using the last password, for the failed meeting in Leningrad, established contact with me.

Subsequently, German intelligence liaison officers came to me at the appointed time and place. In each individual case, a new password was called, of which I remember: "Greetings from Odessa", "Greetings from SHUMSKY" and "Greetings from Ufa", but there were other

passwords. **Question:** Which of the contacts in Moscow do you know? **Answer:** I don't know any of them by last name. In the majority, as could be determined from the conversation, they were Germans.

Question: Do you speak German? **Answer:** I can't speak German. **Question:** How did you communicate with the messengers? **Answer:** All of them spoke Russian well and talked to me quite freely about the essence of the assignments of German

intelligence. **Question:** What did they

come down to? **Answer:** Until the end of 1936, the tasks of German intelligence were limited to supplying it with information of interest on the Red Army.

Question: What kind of espionage information did you transmit during this time?

Answer: In 1934-1935, during the period of my work in the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, I transmitted the following espionage information to German intelligence through its special liaisons: technical and quantitative data on anti-aircraft artillery rangefinders in service, on the number and types of anti-aircraft devices, about searchlights and sound detectors, about experimental objects for sights, rangefinders and artillery fire control devices. Since 1936, i.e. after transferring to the service in the Directorate of the Air Force, I transmitted to

the German intelligence information: about the armament of Soviet combat aircraft (the number of firing points, types of machine guns and cannons, the amount of ammunition); main combat characteristics of aircraft; data on the 23 mm guns "TAUBINA", "VOLKOVA-YARTSEV" and "SALIZHEVA-GALKINA", on the 20 mm gun "ShVAK", on the machine guns "SHKAS", "SAVINA - NOROVA", "BEREZINA"; data on ammunition for these cannons and machine guns (on incendiary and armor-piercing cartridges and shells), as well as data on individual types of bombs and fuses*. Later, I reported data on the consumption of ammunition following the results of the Finnish war. Thus, I gave the German intelligence information on all

the main objects of armament of the aviation of the Red Army.

Question: From what you have shown, we can conclude that after 1936 you were engaged in more than espionage work on assignments from German intelligence. It's right?

Answer: Yes, that's right. At the end of 1936 or the beginning of 1937, I received an assignment from German intelligence - along with the transfer of espionage information, to begin subversive activities along the line of disrupting the weapons of Red Army combat aircraft.

Question: Who exactly gave you this task and under what

circumstances? **Answer:** I received this instruction through Alexander Grigoryevich ORLOV, who was military attache in Berlin at that time, who was connected with German intelligence in espionage

work. **Question:** How do you know

about this? **Answer:** This was first reported to me by EFIMOV, under whose leadership I carried out wrecking operations beginning in 1936.

work on the disruption of weapons in the Air Force Directorate, and then ORLOV personally during his stay in Moscow.

Question: In what connection did ORLOV tell you about his connection with German intelligence?

Answer: In 1936 EFIMOV put me in touch with ORLOV on the line of joint wrecking work. One day at the end of 1936, in a conversation with ORLOV on this topic in the building of the Artillery Directorate, he said that the Germans were well aware of our subversive work along the Air Force line and that they were interested in further strengthening the disruption of the weapons of the Red Army combat aircraft.

Knowing from Yefimov that ORLOV was connected with the Germans, it was clear to me that he was talking to me about intensifying subversive work on the instructions of German intelligence. I was convinced of this in 1939 at the next meeting with a representative of German intelligence.

Question: Who is he and what was your meeting with him?

Answer: In the middle of July 1939, I had another meeting with a German intelligence liaison in Serpukhovka. After giving him espionage information, he announced that I was to meet next Sunday and receive further instructions from the responsible representative of German intelligence. This meeting was scheduled outside the city on the Serpukhov Highway at 11 o'clock in the morning. We agreed that I would wear a white suit, brown shoes and a light brown cap.

At the agreed time, I was on the right side of the highway, in the place where the first descent begins and there is a wooden bridge. Soon, a closed car of a foreign brand stopped not far from me. The driver signaled with his hand that he wanted to ask me something. When I approached the car, he asked if it was possible to get to Tula by this road. I answered in the affirmative. At that moment, the car door

opened, and the passenger, after examining me intently, called out the agreed-upon password: "Greetings from Kursk," and invited me to sit in his car.

He was a German with a poor command of Russian, aged 32-35, of medium height, of a solid build, with dark brown hair and a chubby face. He was dressed in a light brown single-breasted suit. As a special sign, it should be noted that he had a small scar on the lower part of his left cheek.

On the way in the direction of Podolsk, the stranger took out a notebook from the side pocket of his jacket and opened it, in which I saw my photograph. After that, he asked: "I hope now you can be frank?" Having received an affirmative answer, the stranger asked me a series of questions in order to clarify some details, information that I had recently transmitted to German intelligence, and inquired about the security of the western border of the USSR with aircraft weapons. To all these questions, I gave him exhaustive information on classified data.

Question: How did this meeting differ from the

previous ones? You said that she had a special character, didn't you? **Answer:** In a further conversation,

the unknown person made it clear to me that he was aware of the wrecking work carried out by me in the area of military aviation. He drew my attention to the need to speed up subversive work, mainly in the following two directions: to delay the arming of aircraft with cannons and to disrupt the production of ammunition. In conclusion, he suggested that the

results of my wrecking work should be systematically reported to German intelligence. After that, our conversation ended. On the way back,

8-10 kilometers from Moscow, I got off the car and walked to the tram. **Question:** Again, you didn't say who this person was. **Answer:** I do not know his last name and place of work. From conversations, I became convinced that he had special knowledge in aviation and, obviously, was a military worker.

Question: What is it from?

Answer: When I got into the car, the unknown person uttered some phrase, from which I distinctly heard only one word "major". Whether it was a surname or a military rank, I did not understand.

Question: Did you only meet him once? **Answer:**

Yes. I never met this man again. However, in his sabotage activities in the field of military weapons, aviation continued to inform German intelligence, as before, through messengers. **Question:** It is to be assumed that

your information was not left unanswered and that you received further instructions?

Answer: I do not deny that I also received instructions on wrecking work from the German military attache in Moscow, Major General Koestring*. **Question:** When,

where? **Answer:** I

have known Koestring since 1931 and was first introduced to him before my business trip to Germany. In May or June 1940, I happened to meet Koestring in the premises of the CDKA while watching a film about the actions of the German air forces in Poland.

After the end of the film, the German representatives, together with the command staff of the Red Army, were given a dinner in the premises of the CDKA, to which I was

also invited. As we left the auditorium, Koestring greeted me, politely took me by the arm, and led me into the room where supper was being arranged. We sat next to him, at the end of a common table among several foreigners. At supper, when those present had already drunk a good deal and the room had become quite noisy, Koestring started a conversation on the topic of my business trip to Germany.

I expressed my impression of the military exercises and thanked Koestring for the attention shown to me by the German officers.

KOESTRING then unequivocally emphasized that I should have a good impression of Captain SHPALKE, and unexpectedly for me quietly said: "Greetings from SHPALKE to you." It became

clear to me that Koestring was aware of my espionage connection with German intelligence. After

that, Koestring asked if I remembered meeting our mutual "friend" in 1939 in a car. Having received an affirmative answer, KOESTRING emphasized that the fulfillment of the task entrusted to me by this man was of particular importance at the moment, and therefore suggested that every effort be made to carry out this task in a forced manner. Thus, Koestring was aware

not only of my espionage work, but also of the subversive activities that I carried out in the Red Army Air Force on assignment from German intelligence. Saying goodbye, Koestring expressed confidence that he would soon

will be able to talk to me in detail and in a more frank manner.

Question: Did you meet with Koestring after that?

Answer: No. I never saw Koestring again. But after talking with him, I had two meetings with German intelligence signalers. One meeting took place in October 1940 at the

Mayakovsky Square metro station, and the last in January 1941 (I don't remember the exact date) on Petrovka, under the canopy of the Bolshoi Theater *.

In both cases, I transmitted information on the small arms and cannon and bomber armament of military aircraft to German intelligence agents; I also informed them about the results of the wrecking measures carried out by me through the Air Force. This is where my connection with German intelligence was interrupted. **Question:** Didn't you meet with any of its representatives after January? **Answer:** I was supposed to meet, but did not have time, because shortly before the agreed

meeting I was arrested. **Question:** When and with whom was your next appearance to take place? **Answer:** By

agreement with a German intelligence liaison, we were to meet at 12 noon on

May 3 at Krymsky Val, not far from the Central Park of Culture and Rest. The meeting on this particular day was appointed because it was a non-working day and I could leave home during the day.

Question: You are confusing something. The decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to postpone the day off to May 3rd took place only at the end of April 1941. How, back in January, did you appoint an appearance for

May 3rd as a non-working day? **Answer:** I did give an inaccurate answer. I only had an assumption that the day off would be moved to May 3rd. If this were not the case, then I would have had ample opportunities to be absent from management even during working hours on my own terms. personal matters.

Thus, all the objective conditions for a meeting on May 3 with a German intelligence liaison were in place. However, it did not take place for reasons beyond my control, as a result of my arrest. **Question:**

Did you receive monetary compensation from German intelligence for the great services rendered to it?

Answer: I did, but not regularly. In 1935 and 1936 I twice received 5,000 rubles through messengers. I do not deny that representatives of German intelligence offered me money in each case, but I refused.

Question: Is this true? **Answer:** Yes, that is correct. I spoke about my espionage work in basically everything.

Question: At the beginning of the interrogation, you admitted that in 1936 you were involved by EFIMOV in wrecking work to disrupt the weapons of the Red Army air force. About your subversive work and enemy connections,

you will be questioned further. The interrogation is interrupted. I read the protocol personally, everything is written down from

my words

correctly. SAKRIER

INTERROGATED: Deputy. early 3 Ex.

NCO USSR Major of State Security OSETROV

pom. head of the investigation

department of the NKGB of the USSR, captain

of state security RODOS pom. head of the

investigation department of the NKGB of the USSR Art. lieutenant of state

security KULESHOV AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 256. L. 28-64. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there

are Stalin's notes: "Only to Molotov"; "Read. V.

Molotov. * The paragraph is underlined in the margins with a single line. *—* Underlined in pe

No. 166

**L.P. Beria and V.N. Merkulova I.V. Stalin with
a draft resolution of the Central Committee of
the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and
the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR
on measures to cleanse the Lithuanian SSR of anti-Soviet, criminal
socially dangerous element**

05/16/1941

No. 1394/b

Sov. secret At the

same time, we present a draft resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on measures to cleanse the Lithuanian SSR of an anti-Soviet, criminal and socially dangerous element.

The draft resolution was agreed with the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)

of Lithuania, comrade. Snechkus.

We ask for your decision.

Appendix: according to the text. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR V. MERKULOV Top

secret

DECISION of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR

"On measures to cleanse the Lithuanian SSR of an anti-Soviet, criminal and socially dangerous element" In connection with the presence in the Lithuanian SSR of a significant number of former members of various counter-revolutionary nationalist parties, former policemen, gendarmes, landlords,

senior officials of the former Lithuanian state apparatus and other persons engaged in subversive anti-Soviet work and used by foreign intelligence services for espionage purposes, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decide:

1. Permit the NKGB and NKVD of the Lithuanian SSR to arrest with confiscation of property and send to camps for a period of 5 to 8 years, and after serving their sentence in camps, exile the following categories of persons to a settlement in remote areas of the Soviet Union for a period of 20 years:

a) active members of counter-revolutionary parties and participants in anti-Soviet nationalist White Guard organizations (tautinniks, Catholic action, Šaulists, etc.); b) former security guards, gendarmes, the leadership of former police officers and jailers, as well as ordinary police officers and jailers who have materials compromising them;

c) former large landowners, manufacturers and large officials of the former Lithuanian state apparatus;

d) former officers of the Polish, Lithuanian and White armies, on which contain compromising materials; e) a criminal element who continues to engage in criminal activity. 2. Allow

the NKGB and NKVD of the Lithuanian SSR to arrest and send into exile to a settlement in remote areas of the Soviet Union for a period of 20 years with confiscation of property the following categories of persons:

a) family members of the categories of persons specified in paragraph 1 - "a", "b", "c", "d" who lived with them or were dependent on them at the time of arrest; b) family members of members of k/r

nationalist organizations whose heads have gone underground and are hiding from the authorities; c) family members of participants in k/r nationalist organizations,

heads of which are sentenced to VMN;

d) persons who arrived from Germany in the order of repatriation, as well as Germans who signed up for repatriation to Germany and refused to leave, in respect of which there are materials about their anti-Soviet activities and suspicious connections with foreign intelligence agencies.

3. Allow the NKVD of the Lithuanian SSR to deport prostitutes, previously registered with the former Lithuanian police and now continuing to engage in prostitution, to the northern regions of Kazakhstan for a period of 5 years. 4. The consideration

of cases against persons arrested and exiled in accordance with this Decree shall be entrusted to the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR.

5. To oblige the NKGB and the NKVD of the USSR to develop a special instruction on the procedure for arresting and deporting the persons indicated in this Decree, in which to provide:

a) organization of a special camp, where the persons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Decree will be sent from Lithuania immediately after their arrest; b)

execution of decisions of the Special Meeting to be carried out after the concentration of those arrested in the camp indicated

above; c) the persons specified in paragraph 2 of this Decree, after arrest, immediately send to the place of settlement with subsequent registration at a Special Meeting of the NKVD of the

USSR; d) to determine the Omsk and Novosibirsk regions, the Krasnoyarsk Territory, Aktobe, Pavlodar, North Kazakhstan and Kustanai regions of the Kazakh SSR as places of

settlement. 6. Instruct the Central Committee of the CP(b) and the Council of People's Commissars of the Lithuanian SSR to take over, together with the NKVD and the NKGB of

the USSR, the leadership of the measures indicated in this Decree. 7. To instruct the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Lithuania and the Council of People's Commissars of the Lithuanian SSR to develop and immediately implement measures to

strengthen the grass-roots Party and Soviet apparatus and to decisively improve Party and Soviet work. 8. To oblige the NKVD and the NKGB of the USSR to assist the

NKVD and NKGB bodies of the Lithuanian SSR in carrying out the measures specified in this Decree, for which: Merkulov and Deputy People's

Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR comrade. Abakumov; b) send cadets of the Higher School of the NKGB of the USSR, Lithuanians by nationality, in the amount of 67 people for use in conducting operations and invest

c) temporarily, for the period of preparation and conduct of the operation, establish a barrier zone on the border between Lithuania and Belarus, allocating up to 400 border guards for this.

9. The operation of arrests and deportation in Lithuania must be completed *within

three days*. Published: 1941: In 2 books. Book. 2 / Comp. L.E. Reshin et al. M., 1998. S.

221-223. RGANI. F. 89. Op. 18. D. 3. L. 1-6. Copy. Typescript; CA FSB. F. 3 os. Op. 8. D. 1. L. 42-47. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a resolution: "T. Merkulov. For preparation. I. St. *—* Inscribed

instead of the crossed out "in the month".

No.

167 Special message by V.N.

Merkulova I.V. Stalin on the results of the operation to arrest and deport "anti-Soviet" elements from the Baltic republics

05/17/1941

2288 / M

of the Central Committee of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - comrade. TO STALIN The final results of the operation to arrest and deport an anti-Soviet criminal and socially dangerous element from the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSRs have been summed up.

I. In Lithuania:

arrested - 5664 people.

evicted - 10,187 people.

in total, 15,851 people were repressed.

In Latvia:

arrested - 5625 people.

evicted - 9546 people.

in total, 15,171 people were repressed.

In Estonia:

arrested - 3178 people.

evicted - 5978 people.

total repressed - 9156 people.

II. In total, in all three republics: 14,467

people were arrested.

evicted - 25,711 people.

total repressed - 40 178 people,

including:

a) active members of counter-revolutionary nationalist organizations were arrested -

5420 people. members of

their families were evicted - 11,038 people.

b) former guards, gendarmes, policemen, jailers arrested - 1603 people.
evicted members of their
families - 3240 people. c) former large
landowners, manufacturers and officials
the former state apparatus of Lithuania, Latvia and
Estonia arrested - 3236
people. evicted members of their families -
7124 people. d) former officers of the Polish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian
and White armies, who did not serve in the territorial corps and who had
compromising materials, were arrested - 643
people. evicted members
of their families - 1649 people. e) family
members of the participants of the c.-r. organizations sentenced to CMN,
arrested - 27 people. evicted
- 465 people. f) persons
who arrived from Germany in the order of repatriation, as well as Germans
who signed up for repatriation and for various reasons did not leave for Germany,
in respect of which there is compromising material, arrested - 56 people. evicted -
105 people. g) refugees from the
former Poland who
refused to accept the
Soviet
citizenship,
arrested - 337 people.
evicted - 1330 people. h)
the criminal element was
arrested - 2162 people. i)
760 prostitutes registered with the former police departments of Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia, who now continue to engage in prostitution, were evicted. j)
former officers
of the Lithuanian,
Latvian and Estonian armies who served in the territorial corps of the Red
Army, on which there was compromising material, arrested - 933 people,

including:

in Lithuania 285

people in Latvia 424

people in Estonia 224 people

III. During the operation, there were several cases of armed resistance on the part of the operated, as well as attempts to escape, as a result of which 7 people were killed, 4 people were injured.

Our losses: 4 people were killed, 4 people were wounded, including: killed - the commander of the Separate Reconnaissance Battalion 183 of the Rifle Division GRABOSENKO, the district police officer BERNARD, the policeman DUVELS, the activist of the Riga plant No. 464 KONDRATIEV involved in the operation; slightly wounded - a cadet of the Higher School of the NKGB SYPIN, a Red Army soldier SIROTA, a Red Army soldier BABKOV, a car driver.

IV. Those not seized during the operation for various reasons (illness, absence at the time of the operation, change of residence, etc.) will be additionally seized in the order of the current operational work of the NKGB and NKVD. People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR MERKULOV

RGANI. F. 89. Op. 18. D. 6. L. 1-4. Copy. Typescript.

No.

**168 L.P. Beria, V.N. Merkulova
I.V. Stalin with a draft resolution on
measures to seize "counter-
revolutionary elements" in the
western regions of the BSSR**

05/24/1941 No.

1591/b Sov.

secret of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks to Comrade STALIN In pursuance of the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist

Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of May 14, 1941 No. 1299-526ss, at the same

time we present a draft resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the

Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on measures to seize counter-revolutionary elements in the western

regions of the Byelorussian SSR. The draft resolution was agreed with the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party

Belarus comrade. PONOMARENKO. People's

Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA People's Commissar of State

Security of the USSR V. MERKULOV Sov. secret

Project

DECISION of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR

On the withdrawal of counter-revolutionary elements in the
western regions of the BSSR In order

to prevent the activation of counter-revolutionary organizations and groups in the western regions
of the Byelorussian SSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and
the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decide:

1. Oblige the authorities of the NKGB and the NKVD of Belarus to continue the seizure of members of Polish counterrevolutionary rebel organizations. 2.

Arrest and send into exile to a settlement in remote areas of the Soviet Union for a period of 20 years with confiscation of property: a) family members of members of Polish nationalist organizations, whose heads have gone illegal and are hiding from the authorities;

b) family members of participants in these counter-revolutionary nationalist organizations whose heads have been sentenced to VMN;

c) family members of members of counter-revolutionary organizations, officers of the former Polish army, former gendarmes, policemen, security guards and officials of the former Polish state who fled abroad. 3. Bodies of the NKGB and the NKVD to strengthen the intelligence and

operational work, ensuring the good organization and conduct of operational activities. The NKGB and the NKVD of Belarus to send operatives to help local authorities in the western regions to carry

out the above operations. 4. To oblige the NKGB and the NKVD of Belarus to ensure the seizure of illegally stored firearms from the population, arresting and prosecuting persons who are found to have weapons without proper permission.

5. To entrust the implementation of this resolution to the People's Commissar of State Security of the Byelorussian SSR comrade. TsANAVA and the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the BSSR comrade. MATVEEV, to help which the NKGB and the NKVD of the USSR send a group of operational workers. Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Chairman of the Council of People's

Commissars of the USSR I. STALIN RGANI. F. 89. Op. 18. D. 4. L. 1-3. Copy. Typescript.

No.

**169 Special message L.P. Berii I.V.
Stalin about the detentions
of German intelligence agents by
the NKVD border detachments**

05/29/1941

No. 1654 /

b Top secret of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and
the SNK of the UNION of the SSR to Comrade STALIN In April and May of this
year. There were three cases of detention by the border detachments of the NKVD of
qualified German intelligence agents equipped with radio

stations. April 18 this year in the section of the 94th border detachment (Skole,
Ukrainian SSR), an agent of the Berlin intelligence service TsVINAR was transferred to
the USSR, accompanied by three armed ferrymen who carried two transceiver radio
stations for him, one for a stationary installation, the other for a portable one.

The stationary station was planned to be installed in the mountains. Lvov. Through
it, intelligence data on the regions of Lvov, Drohobych, Stry, Borislav and Kremenets-
Brody were to be transmitted to Germany.

During the arrest, the agents offered armed resistance. ZVINAR was killed in a
shootout. May 14 at the site of

the 88th border detachment (Station Shepetovo, BSSR)
when crossing the border from Germany, P.F. POLESHCHUK was detained.

The investigation established that POLESHCHUK was recruited by German
intelligence in Berlin and sent to the USSR with the task of collecting information about
the Red Army garrisons, the state of roads and military construction along the Bialystok-
Kovel route.

For communication, POLESHCHUK was equipped with a radio
transmitter. On May 26, agents of the German intelligence BRZHEZNIAK and
KUSIY (Czech) were detained at the section of the 107th border detachment (Mariampol,
Lithuanian SSR).

BRZHEZNYAK I.T. - Russian, from 1912 to 1919 - an officer of the Russian, English, French and former Polish armies, and from 1940 - lieutenant of the German army. The

detainees were in possession of a long-range receiving and transmitting station with full equipment and code, items of secret writing, maps of the Suwalki district and the territories of the Lithuanian and Belorussian SSR, 6,000 rubles of Soviet money and fictitious Soviet passports.

For further investigation, all the detainees were transferred to the NKGB.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.

BERIA CA FSB. F. 3os. Op. 8. D. 9. L. 47-48. Script. Typescript.

No. 170

**Special message by V.N. Merkulova I.V. Stalin with the
annex of the draft resolution of the Central
Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and
the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the
organization of a new administration within the NKGB of the USSR**

05/29/1941

No. 1934 /

m of the Central Committee of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade STALIN In pursuance of your instructions, I present a draft resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the organization of the Main Directorate for the maintenance of the aviation industry, ammunition, weapons and power plants as part of the NKGB of the USSR . At the same time I present the control scheme. I ask for your decision. Appendix: according to the text.

People's Commissar of State Security MERKULOV Top secret

Project

DECISION of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR

"ON CHANGING THE STRUCTURES PEOPLE'S
COMMISSARY

STATE SECURITY OF THE USSR "In order to improve the service of the most important People's Commissariats of defense importance, and to strengthen the fight against espionage, sabotage, wrecking and terrorist activities

foreign intelligence services at the facilities and enterprises of these People's Commissariats of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decide:

1. As part of the People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR, organize a special department, which will be entrusted with servicing the People's Commissariats of the Aviation Industry, Ammunition, Armaments and Power Plants. 2. The organized management is called the Fourth Chief

(Special Directorate) of the NKGB of the USSR.

3. As part of the Fourth Main (special) Directorate of the NKGB, organize 4 departments:
a) the First Department for servicing the Aviation Industry; b) Second Ammunition Industry Service Department; c) the Third Department for the Maintenance of the Armaments Industry; d) The fourth department for the maintenance of power plants. Each department, in addition to intelligence and operational departments, has a special investigative department, which should conduct an investigation only on the cases of the corresponding People's Commissariat.

4. Similar departments and departments should be organized in all those peripheral bodies of the NKGB of the USSR, on the service territory of which there are large enterprises and facilities of the above four people's commissariats of defense importance. 5. To staff the organized departments of the Fourth Main (Special) Directorate, if possible, with workers who have the appropriate knowledge in the field of the aviation industry, the ammunition industry, armaments and power plants.

6. The existing First (intelligence), Second (counterintelligence), Third (secret-political) Directorates of the NKGB of the USSR shall be renamed respectively into the Main Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR. Rename the investigative unit into the Investigation Department of the NKGB of the USSR. 7. To propose to the NKGB of the USSR within two days to develop and * approve * the staff of the newly organized Directorate, staff it and begin work. 4th MAIN (special) DEPARTMENT

1. Авиация НКАП	2. Боеприпасы НКБ	3. Вооружение НКВ	4. Электростанции НК
Самолетостроение	Пороховое	Артиллерийское	электростанций
Моторостроение	Снаряжательное	Патронное	Эксплуатация электростанций
Авиаприборы	Снарядное капсюльно- взрывательное	Стрелковое	Строительство электростанций и линий электропередач
Опытное амолетостроение	Опытное НИИ	Следственное	Следственное
Опытное моторостроение	Следственное		
Следственное			

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 6. L. 136-140. Script. Typescript. *—*
Emphasized by Stalin, with a "?" in the margin.

No. 171

Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks "question of the NKGB (Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR)" [44]

06/03/1941 177

- Question of the NKGB (decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the SNK of the USSR) Satisfy the request of the NKGB that before the hearing of the case Pumpura in court to transfer this case for investigation to the NKGB. Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I.
STALIN RGASPI. F. 3. Op. 57. D. 96. L. 173. Copy. Typescript. Protocol number 33.

No. 172

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central
Committee of the All-Union Communist
Party of Bolsheviks "on awarding Mercader
K.R., Eitingon N.I., Vasilevsky L.P. and
others." with a note by L.P. Beria [45]**

06/14/1941

25 - On the awarding of Mercader K.R., Eitingon N.I., Vasilevsky L.P. etc.
(without publication) Approve

the draft Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on
awarding t.t. Mercader K.R., Eitingon N.I., Vasilevsky L.P. and others (see
Appendix). The project is not
subject
to publication

DECREE

of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR On the awarding of vol. Mercader K.R., Eitingon
N.I., Vasilevsky L.P. and
others. For the successful completion of a special task to award:
Order of LENIN 1.
Mercader Karidad Ramonovna 2.
Eitingon Naum Isaakovich Order of
the RED BANNER 1. Vasilevsky Lev
Petrovich 2. Sudoplatov Pavel
Anatolyevich Order of the RED STAR 1.
Grigulevich Iosif Romualdovich 2.
Pastelnjak Pavel Panteleimonovich a

June 6, 1941 No.

1894 of

the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to Comrade Stalin I.V. In 1940, a group of NKVD workers successfully

completed a special task. The NKVD of the USSR asks to award the orders of the Union to six comrades, involved in this task. I am enclosing a draft

Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. I ask for your

decision. People's

Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA RGASPI.

F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1316. L. 45. Original. Manuscript; L.

46-47. Script. Typescript. Protocol

No. 34. On the

note to L.P. Beria has a resolution and notes: "For (without publication). I. St. "IN. Molotov. "M. Kalinin. "TO. Voroshilov. "T. Kaganovich is in favor, Comrade Mikoyan is in favor."

No.

173 Special message by V.N. Merkulova I.V. Stalin about the military preparations of Germany [46]

06/17/1941 No.

2279/M Sov.

secret of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks to Comrade STALIN We are sending an intelligence message received by the NKGB of the USSR

from Berlin. People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR V. MERKULOV

Reason: report of the

"Foreman" and "Corsican" No. 4261 and 4262 dated 16.VI.41 Report from Berlin the actions against the USSR are completely

over, and a blow can be expected

at any time. In the circles of the aviation headquarters, the TASS message of June 6 was perceived very ironically. Emphasize that this statement is not

cannot matter.

The objects of the German air raids will primarily be: the Svir-3 power plant, Moscow factories producing (electrical equipment, individual ball bearings, tires), as well as car repair shops.

parts

To

aircraft

Hungary will take an active part in hostilities on the side of Germany. Part of the German aircraft, mainly fighters, is already on Hungarian airfields. Important German aircraft repair shops are located: in Königsberg, Gdynia, Graudenz, Breslau, Marienburg.

Milich aircraft engine workshops in Poland, in Warsaw - Ochachi and especially important ones in Heiligenkeil.

A source working in the German Ministry of Economy reports that the appointment of the heads of the military economic departments of the "future districts" of the occupied territory of the USSR has been made, namely: Amonn, one of the leading workers of the National Socialist Party in Dusseldorf, has been appointed for the Caucasus, Burandt, a former an employee of the Ministry of Economy, who until recently worked in the economic department in France, for Moscow - Burger, head of the Economic Chamber in Stuttgart. All these persons are enrolled in military service and left for Dresden, which is a collection point. For the general management of the economic administration of the "occupied territories of the USSR," Schloterer, head of

the foreign department of the Ministry of Economy, who is currently in Berlin, was appointed. The Ministry of Economy says that Rosenberg also spoke at a meeting of business executives destined for the "occupied territory

of the USSR", who stated that "the concept of the "Soviet Union" should be erased from the geographical map." Head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR FITIN AP RF. F. 3. Op. 50. D. 415. L. 50. Original. Typescript. There is a resolution on the sheet: "T-schu Merkulov.

Maybe send your "source" from the German headquarters. Aviation to the fucking mother. This is not a "source", but a misinformant. I. St.

No.

174 Special message by V.N.

**Merkulova I.V. Stalin on the results of
the operation to arrest and evict "anti-**

Soviet" elements from the western regions of Be

06/21/1941

2427 / m

of the Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks - comrade. TO STALIN The final results of the operation to arrest and deport an anti-Soviet and socially alien element from the Western regions of the Byelorussian SSR have been summed up.

I. In the Bialystok region: 500 people

were arrested. 11,405

people were evicted. in total,

11,905 people were repressed. In the Brest

region: 300 people were

arrested. 3039 people were

evicted in total 3339 people

were repressed. In the Baranovichi region:

476 people were arrested. 2723

people were evicted. in

total 3199 people were

repressed. In the Pinsk region: 363 people

were arrested. 2299 people

were evicted. in total 2662

people were repressed. In

the Vileyka region: 420 people were

arrested. 2887 people were

evicted. in total 3307 people

were repressed.

II. Total for all Western regions of the Byelorussian SSR:

2059 people arrested

22,363 people were

evicted. in total 24,412 people were repressed,

including:

a) leaders and active members of various Polish, Belarusian, Ukrainian, Russian and Jewish nationalist organizations, officials of the former. Polish state, etc.

element

2059 people arrested

members of their families were evicted

6655 people. b) 1293 people were evicted from family members

of those sentenced to CMN. c) 3,652 people were evicted from family members of persons

who went into an illegal position. d) family members of persons who fled

abroad, 7105 people were evicted. e) 2093 people were evicted from family members of leaders and active members of various k-r organizations who were previously

arrested and are now

under investigation. f) 47 people were evicted from family members of

previously repressed landowners. g) family members of previously repressed gendarmes and 231 policemen were evicted. h)

merchants, manufacturers, merchants and members of their families evicted 708

people. i) family members of previously repressed major officials and former officers. 469 people were evicted from the Polish army.

III. During the operation, while trying to escape, 2 people were killed and 1 person was injured. There are no losses on our side. In the Bialystok region, the wife of a former colonel to be evicted. Polish and imperial white armies KMIZHUK cut her throat with a razor and died.

In the Pinsk region, the wife of the arrested person subject to arrest participant k.-r. organization BARKEVICH poisoned herself and died.

There were no other incidents.

IV. Those arrested were imprisoned in the prisons of the Western regions of the Byelorussian SSR, and those evicted were loaded onto trains and sent to places of settlement.

People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR V. MERKULOV
RGANI. F. 89. Op. 18. D. 7. L. 1-3. Copy. Typescript.

No. 175

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the
All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On the
Headquarters of the High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR"**

06/23/1941

Strictly secret 99 -

On the Headquarters of the High Command of the Armed Forces of the Union

SSR (Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks)

To create the Headquarters of the High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR, consisting of comrades: People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Timoshenko (chairman), Chief of the General Staff Zhukov, Stalin, Molotov, Marshal Voroshilov, Marshal Budyonny and People's Commissar of the Navy Admiral Kuznetsov. At the Headquarters, organize the institution of permanent advisers to

the Headquarters, consisting of comrades: Marshal Kulik, Marshal Shaposhnikov, Meretskov, Chief of the Air Force Zhigarev, Vatutin, Chief of Air Defense Voronov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Beria, Voznesensky, Zhdanov, Malenkov, Mekhlis.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 36. Part 1. L. 22. Original.
Typescript.

Minutes No. 34.

Extracts sent to: v.t. Timoshenko, Zhukov, Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Budyonny, Kuznetsov, Kulik, Shaposhnikov, Meretskov, Zhigarev, Vatutin, Voronov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Beria, Voznesensky, Zhdanov, Malenkov, Mekhlis, Chadayev; Military Councils of fronts, districts, navies.

No. 176

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central
Committee of the All-Union Communist Party
of Bolsheviks on the approval of the resolution
of the Council of People's
Commissars of the USSR "on
measures to combat enemy paratroopers and saboteurs in the**

06/24/1941

112 - On measures to combat enemy paratroopers and saboteurs in the front line Approve the resolution of the Council of

People's Commissars of the USSR "On measures to combat enemy paratroopers and * saboteurs" in the front line." Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks (decree attached)

RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONERS

OF THE

UNION OF THE SSR "On measures to combat paratroopers and saboteurs of the enemy in the front line" In order to timely and successfully eliminate saboteurs thrown by the enemy by parachute or in another way, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR DECIDES: fight against** parachute saboteurs in the

Leningrad region, Murmansk region, Kalinin region, Karelian-Finnish Republic*, Ukraine, Belarus, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian

and the Moldavian SSR**, the Crimean Autonomous Republic, the Rostov Region, the Krasnodar Territory, and the western part of the Georgian SSR.

2. For this purpose, at the city, district and county departments of the NKVD stationed in the territory indicated in paragraph 1, create extermination battalions of 100-200 people from among the verified party, Komsomol and Soviet activists capable of owning weapons. 3. Appoint reliable operatives of the NKVD and the police as the

heads of the destruction battalions. 4. To equip each fighter battalion of the city, district and district department of the

NKVD with two light machine guns, rifles, revolvers and, if possible, grenades.

5. To oblige the People's Commissariat of Defense to give instructions on the allocation of the required number of weapons for the needs of the destruction battalions *at the

request of the NKVD*. Grant the destruction battalions the right to use, in necessary cases, all types of local communications and transport (cars, motorcycles, bicycles, horses and carts)***.

To oblige Party and Soviet bodies to provide all possible assistance to the NKVD bodies in organizing and manning destroyer battalions to combat enemy paratroopers***. The leadership of the destruction battalions shall be entrusted to

Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Comrade Beria ****.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR

I. STALIN

Ya. CHADAEV RGASPI, manager of the affairs of the Council of People's

Commissars of the USSR. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1316. L. 161-162. Script.

Typescript; L. 163-164. Script. Manuscript. Protocol

No. 34. *—*

Inscribed by Stalin. **—**

Inscribed by Stalin instead of the crossed-out "population according to detection and elimination.

*

Crossed out by Stalin: "Western regions". Crossed

**

out by Stalin: "Murmansk region, on the coast

The Black Sea from Izmail to Batumi to be entrusted to the NKVD.

— Entered by Stalin instead of the crossed out "100-120".

****—**** Inscribed by Stalin instead of crossed out

"easel".

*** In paragraphs 6 and 7 of the document, it is crossed out: "task forces".

**** Point 8 was entered by Stalin.

No. 177

Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on the surrender of radio receivers and transmitters by the population" with

the attachment of L.P. Beria, V.N. Merkulova, I.T. Peresypkin

06/25/1941

119 - On the surrender of radio receivers and transmitters by the population

Approve the following resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR: Considering that, due to wartime circumstances, radio receivers and transmitters can be used by enemy elements for purposes aimed at harming Soviet power, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR

Decides : 1. To

oblige all citizens, without exception, living on the territory of the USSR and having radio receivers (tube, detector and radio sets), to hand them over to the bodies of the People's Commissariat of Communications at the place of residence within five days. Radio

transmitting devices are also subject to mandatory surrender.

of all types, both individual and collective use.

2. Establish that the People's Commissariat for Communications accepts radio receivers from the population for temporary storage until the end of the war.

Oblige the People's Commissariat of Communications to organize reception from the population and storage of radio receivers and

transmitters to be handed over. 3. To oblige the local Soviets of Working People's Deputies to provide the Narkomsvyazi bodies with appropriate warehouse space for storing radio receivers and transmitters confiscated from the population

4. Allow institutions, enterprises, radio centers, clubs, Leninsky corners and other public organizations

the use of radio receivers exclusively for collective listening to a radio transmission at strictly defined hours.

5. Establish that persons who have not handed over their radio receivers and transmitters within the prescribed period are subject to criminal liability under the law of war. Assign to the bodies of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs and state security the supervision of the implementation of this

resolutions.

6. To oblige the bodies of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and state security to assist the bodies of the People's Commissariat of Communications in organizing the delivery by the population of all the radio devices indicated in this resolution. June

25, 1941 No.

2513/m of

the Central Committee of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade Stalin In pursuance of your instructions, we present a draft resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the surrender of radio receivers and transmitters by the

population.

Appendix:

according to the text. BERIA MERKULOV PERESYPKIN RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1316. 175-176. Script. Typescript. Protocol No. 34.

The text contains a

typewritten note about the distribution: "Beria, Merkulov, Peresypkin, Chadaev.

There is a resolution on the note: "I agree. I. St., V. Molotov, K. Voroshilov, A. Mikoyan, L. Kaganovich, M. Kalinin.

No. 178

Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on the chiefs of the guards of the military rear"

06/25/1941

120 - On the chiefs of the guards of the military rear
Approve the following decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR: * On the chiefs of the guards of the military rear * To protect the rear of the troops and establish the strictest order there, organize the institute of front and army chiefs of the guards of the military rear.

First of all, organize the institute of chiefs of the military rear in the area of the Western Front.

To appoint the head of the guard of the military rear of the Western Front Chief of the border troops of the NKVD Lieutenant-General Sokolov.

Tov. Sokolov was instructed to create an institute for the chiefs of the guards of the military rear of the armies of the Western Front and appoint the appropriate army chiefs.

The internal troops, the heads of the destruction battalions, the police, * located * in the area of \u200b\u200boperation of the military rear of the Western Front, subordinate Comrade Sokolov. The

main duty of the chiefs of the military rear is to restore order in the rear of the army, clear the rear roads of the troops from refugees, catch deserters, clear communications, regulate the supply *and* evacuation, ensure uninterrupted communications, and eliminate saboteurs.

All Party, Soviet and economic organizations are obliged to provide every possible assistance to the chiefs of the guards of the military rear and unquestioningly carry out **their** orders.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1316. L. 178. Original. Manuscript; L. 179-180. Script. Typescript. Protocol number 34.

— Inscribed by hand by Stalin. **—**

Inserted instead of "his". The text

contains a typewritten notation about the distribution: "To the Military Councils of the fronts and armies, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the BSSR Comrade Bylinsky, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) Comrade Ponomarenko, Beria, Sokolov,

Malenkov, Chadayev. Copies of vol. Khrushchev, Zhdanov, Goglidze.

No. 179

**Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of
the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on
the removal from Moscow of state stocks of precious metals**

06/27/1941

MOST SECRET 144 - On

the removal from Moscow of state stocks of precious metals, precious stones, the USSR diamond fund and valuables of the Kremlin Armory

Approve the following resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR: "The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decides: 1. To allow the NKF of the USSR, the NKVD of the USSR and the Kremlin Administration of the NKGB to remove from Moscow to Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk the precious metals, precious stones, the diamond fund of the USSR and the values of the Armory Chamber located in the State Storage Kremlin.

2. Propose to the People's Commissariat of Trade of the USSR to immediately hand over to the National Commissariat of the USSR the reserves of precious metals and precious stones in products, ingots, scrap and coins in excess of the quantity necessary for the sale.

3. Propose to the NKPS of the USSR to urgently provide the NKF of the USSR and the NKVD of the USSR with the necessary number of wagons for the export of the values indicated in clause 1 of this resolution. 4. Oblige the

People's Commissariat of Forestry of the RSFSR to immediately provide Gokhran The NKVD of the USSR the required number of containers (boxes) for packaging.

5. Propose to the NKVD of the USSR and the NKF of the USSR to allocate the necessary number of service personnel and military guards to accompany and protect the exported valuables. RESOLVED: 6. To oblige the NKVD of the USSR and the

NKF of the USSR to carry out the entire operation for the export of valuables within three days. 7. To oblige the NKVD of the USSR

to withdraw from the Gokhran of the NKVD of the USSR products from precious metals and stones in museums and the Hermitage.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 50. D. 424. L. 11-12. Copy. Typescript.
Protocol No.

34. The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t.
Beria, Bulganin, Zverev, Chadayev - all; Lyubimov - 2; Kaganovich¹, 3.
Tov. Merkulov - all, Koldanov - 1, 4.

No. 180

Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on the procedure for the evacuation of families of leading party, Soviet workers and families of the commanding staff of the Red Army, fleet and NKVD troops from the front

07/05/1941

Top secret 187 — On

the procedure for the evacuation of families of leading party, Soviet workers and families of the commanding staff of the Red Army, fleet and troops of the NKVD from the front line
Approve the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR

"On the procedure for the evacuation of families of leading party, Soviet workers and families of the commanding staff of the Red Army , Fleet and Troops of the NKVD from the frontline" (decree attached).

To paragraph 187 (op) pr. PB No.

34 Sov. secret

ON THE PROCEDURE FOR THE EVACUATION OF THE FAMILIES OF THE LEADING PARTY

OF THE SOVIET WORKERS AND FAMILIES OF THE COMMANDING STRUCTURES
OF THE RED ARMY, FLEET AND NKVD TROOPS FROM THE FRONT
STRIP Decree of the Council of People's

Commissars of the USSR (Approved by the Politburo of the Central
Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on July 5,
1941) The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decides:

1. To allow the families of leading party, Soviet workers and the families of the commanding staff of the Red Army, Navy and NKVD troops during the evacuation, at the direction of the military command from the front line, to choose their own place of residence, with the exception of the years. Moscow and Leningrad.

2. To oblige the local military command, local Soviet authorities and railway authorities to provide the evacuated families specified in paragraph 1 with the necessary means of transport (vehicles, railway tickets, wagons), provide them with food, medical care and, if necessary, clothing. 3. Oblige the Councils of People's Commissars of the republics and the regional (territory) executive committees to ensure the resettlement and priority employment of the evacuated families

arriving at the residence of the leading party, Soviet workers and families of the commanding staff of the Red Army, Navy and NKVD troops and provide them with the necessary financial and material assistance for the first time . Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR

I. STALIN

Y. CHADAEV RGASPI, manager of the affairs of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

F. 17. Op. 162. D. 36. Part 2. L. 42, 218. Original.
Typescript.

Minutes No. 34. The

text contains a typewritten note about distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Shvernik, Zhukov, Kuznetsov, Beria, Kaganovich, Chadaev, Krupin.

No. 181

From the resolution of the Politburo of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks "on the procedure for evacuating the population in wartime"

07/05/1941

Strictly secret

186 - On the procedure for the evacuation of the population
in wartime
population in wartime" (the resolution is attached).

"ON THE ORDER OF POPULATION EVACUATION DURING WARTIME"

Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR

<...>

8. In order to prevent the penetration of evacuees and refugees into Moscow, oblige the NKVD of the USSR to organize barriers for the RK police at railway stations and highway stations, in accordance with the appendix.

Place on police barriers

at the above points: a) all persons from among the evacuees who will try to

enter Moscow, detain and place them in the next echelons to follow the route of the evacuees. Arrest the most malicious violators of the evacuation order;

b) if necessary, check the persons,
those in the cars, search of the evacuees and seizure of weapons;

c) to organize an inspection of all passenger trains bound for Moscow on the hauls and, in case of detection of refugees, remove the latter from the trains and send them to the points of the evacuees. 9. To

oblige the NKVD of the USSR at the points of formation and at the stations of destination to put at the disposal of the heads of local bodies

The Soviet government has a sufficient number of police personnel to ensure order during the loading and unloading of evacuees.

10. Oblige comrade. Pronina (Mossovet), comrade. Zhuravlev (UNKVD of the Moscow Region) and comrade. Kubatkina (UNKGB of the Moscow Region) within 3 days to clear the railway stations of the mountains. Moscow and suburban areas from evacuees, arriving in groups and single order. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 36. Part 2. L. 42, 214. Original.

Typescript.

Protocol No. 34. The
text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts
sent by: t.t. Shvern timer, Beria, Kobzin, Kaganovich, Chadaev"

No.

182 GKO resolution on measures to combat enemy landings and saboteurs in Moscow and adjacent areas

07/09/1941

No.

76 1. In addition to the main task of destroying enemy landings and saboteurs, the destruction battalions of Moscow and suburban areas are to be assigned: a)

the fight against possible counter-revolutionary actions; b)

organizing a patrol service and assisting the police in maintaining public order during an air raid; c) the establishment of careful surveillance in areas

of possible

landings of enemy troops and saboteurs. 2.

The heads of the district departments of the NKVD and the heads of the fighter battalions, within a day's time, develop a plan for the interaction of the fighter battalions with the police, units and subunits of the NKVD troops, paramilitary guards, providing, first of all, measures to ensure the security of military facilities and airfields not guarded by the Red Army and landing sites.

3. Arm the police with rifles and grenades. 4. Fighter battalions of the city of Moscow and suburban areas to be brought up to 500 people each, supplementing them with proven, courageous communists, Komsomol members and Soviet activists capable of owning weapons. 5. In order to

consolidate the permanent staff and stop the turnover in the battalions, release the fighters of the destruction battalions of Moscow and the surrounding areas from mobilization into the Red Army and conscription into the people's militia.

6. Train the composition of the fighter battalions in grenade throwing. In each battalion, prepare special groups of fighters to destroy enemy tanks.

7. In the fighter battalions of Moscow and suburban areas, all personnel should be released from work at enterprises and institutions and kept permanently in the barracks with payment from production. With the staff of the battalion released from work, systematically conduct classes in combat training.

8. Ensure that each battalion is assigned 4-5 cargo vehicles for dropping the reserve at the time of the air raid.

9. To attach 15-20 horses to the fighter battalions of the districts of the region to carry out patrol service at points of probable landings.

10. To supply the composition of 35 destruction battalions of Moscow and adjacent areas with uniforms (cap, tunic, belt) and special identification cards.

11. To appoint commanders from the NKVD troops administrations as commanders of battalions in the Kuntsevsky, Krasnogorsk, Krasnopolyansky, Mytishchi, Balashikha, Perovsky, Ukhtomsky, Leninsky, Khimki and Lyublinsky districts adjacent to Moscow.

12. For work in the fighter battalions of Moscow and suburban areas, attach 15 Chekists to each battalion. 13. To supply the personnel of the fighter battalions of the outlying districts of Moscow

and the districts of the Moscow Region with entrenching tools. 14. Propose to NCOs to allocate 300 light machine guns, 55,000 hand grenades, 6,000 revolvers and pistols for the Moscow and

Moscow region fighter battalions. GKO I. STALIN RGASPI. F. 644. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 260-261. Script.

Typescript.

No. 183

GKO resolution on the composition of the council for evacuation

07/16/1941

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE

DECISION No. GKO-173 of July 16, 1941

Moscow, Kremlin. On the composition of the
Council for the evacuation As amended by

the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee
of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 24, 1941 No. 1740-748ss, State Defense Committee
decides:

Create an Evacuation Council with the following composition:

comrade Shvernik N.M. - Chairman of the Council

Comrade Kosygin A.N. - Deputy Chairman of the

Council Comrade Pervukhin M.G. - Deputy Chairman
of the Council

Comrade Mikoyan A.I. Comrade Kaganovich L.M. - (with the
replacement of Comrade Arutyunov B.N.) Comrade

Saburov M.Z. - (with the

replacement of Comrade Kosyachenko G.P.) Comrade Abakumov V.S.

(NKVD) Chairman of the State Defense Committee I. STALIN

Published: "News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. No. 7. 1990. P. 213.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Shvernik,
Kosygin, Pervukhin, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Saburov, Abakumov, Chadaev, Arutyunov, Kosyachenko.

No.

**184 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about
the OTB specialists who
participated in the creation of the 103-
U aircraft**

07/16/1941

No. 2217/

b Sov. secret

TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE
OF THE UNION OF THE SSR, comrade STALIN a

petition to the Government of the USSR for an amnesty with the removal
of a criminal record of 30 imprisoned specialists of the Special Technical Bureau
who were directly involved in the creation of the 103-U aircraft.

It would be expedient to recruit a group of released specialists to
the staff of the Special Technical Bureau and send them to the Omsk
plant to participate in the serial construction of the 103 aircraft.

Sending you a list of specialists from the Special Technical Bureau, who
especially distinguished themselves in the construction of aircraft "103", the NKVD of
the USSR asks for your instructions.

APPENDIX: List of imprisoned Special Tech.

Bureau, especially distinguished themselves in the construction of aircraft "103".

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA
TOP SECRET

LIST

prisoners of the Special Technical Bureau, who particularly distinguished themselves in the construction of aircraft

"103" 1. Tupolev Andrei Nikolaevich
2. NADASHKEVICH Alexander Vasilyevich
3. BONIN Alexander Romanovich
4. VIGDORCHIK Semyon
Abramovich 5. Yeger Sergei
Mikhailovich 6. FRENKEL Georgy
Semenovich 7. NEMAN Iosif
Grigorievich 8 SAUKKE Boris
Andreevich 9. MARKOV Dmitry
Sergeevich 10. CHIZHEVSKY Vladimir
Antonovich 11. SAPRYKIN Timofey
Petrovich 12. PETROV Mikhail
Nikolaevich 13. ALEKSANDROV Vladimir
Leontievich 14. OZEROV Georgy
Alexandrovich 15. ALLE Vladimir
Vasilyevich 16. SHPAK Fedor
Maksimovich 17. ZVONOV Ivan
Mikhailovich 18 19. STRASHNOV
German Vasilievich 20. TSVETKOV
Alexey Ivanovich 21. DENISOV
Vladimir Sergeevich 22.
MUTOVCHINSKY Ivan Khristoforovich 23.
VOITOV Vasily Stepanovich 24.
TOMASHEVICH Dmitry Lyudvigovich 25.
SOKOLOV Nikolay Andreevich 26.
BOROVSKY Ivan Kazimirovich 27.
SKLYANSKY Joseph Markovich
28. Cheremukhin Alexey Mikhailovich
29. ROGOV Aron Yulievich
30. STERLIN Alexander Emanuilovich
AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 142. L. 108-110. Script.

Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a resolution: "T-schu Beria. Agree. I. Stalin.

No. 185

From the resolution of the Politburo of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on the organization of the struggle in the rear of the German troops"

07/18/1941

Strictly secret

250 — On the organization of the struggle in the rear of the German troops In the war against Nazi Germany, which seized part of the Soviet territory, the struggle in the rear of the German army acquired exceptional importance. The task is to create unbearable conditions for the German interventionists, to disorganize their communications, transport and military units themselves, to disrupt all their activities, to destroy the invaders and their accomplices, to help in every possible way to create cavalry and foot partisan detachments, sabotage and extermination groups, to deploy a network our Bolshevik underground organizations in the occupied territory to guide all actions against the fascist occupiers. To ensure the broad development of the partisan movement behind enemy lines, party organizations must immediately organize combat squads and sabotage groups from among the participants in the civil war and from those comrades who have already shown themselves in extermination battalions, in detachments of the people's militia, as well as from workers of the NKVD, NKGB and other. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks demands that the leaders of party organizations personally led all this struggle in the rear of the German troops.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 36. L. 55-57. Script.
Typescript.

Protocol number 34.

No. 186

Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the approval of the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the unification of the NKVD into a single People's Commissariat

07/21/1941

259 - On the merger of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the People's Commissariat
state security into a single People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs

Approve the draft decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On the unification of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the People's Commissariat of State Security into a single People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs" (see annex).

DECREE OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR

"On the unification of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the People's Commissariat of State Security into a single People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs

"In connection with the transition from peacetime to military conditions of work, it is expedient to unify the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs and the People's Commissariat for State Security into a single People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. An appropriate unification of the organs of the NKVD and the NKGB should be carried out in the union and autonomous republics, territories and regions. domestic

[illegible]

Tov. Appoint Vsevolod Nikolayevich Merkulov as First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M. KALININ
Secretary of the

Presidium A. GORKIN

July 20, 1941

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 7. L. 141, 143. Copy. Typescript.
Protocol number 34.

No.

**187 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin with the
attachment of a special message to P.N.
Kubatkin and M.I. Zhuravlev about
the consequences of the German
air raid on Moscow**

07/22/1941

1,443

Copy

Top secret To the

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Commissar General of
State

Security Comrade L.P. Beria As a result of an enemy
aircraft raid on the night of July 22 in Moscow and the Moscow Region, we
registered the following damage and fires of industrial facilities and residential
buildings .

In total, 1166 fires started in Moscow from incendiary bombs,
of which a significant part was localized in a timely manner.

792 people suffered from fires and destruction. Of them killed
- 130 people, seriously injured - 241 people, slightly injured - 421 people.

From industrial and defense facilities and residential buildings
subjected to air attack:

To the factory "Trekhgornaya manufactory" them. Dzerzhinsky
(Krasnopresnensky district) a series of incendiary bombs were dropped. As a
result of the resulting fires, a refrigeration warehouse, a spinning mill, a chemical
laboratory and a workers' dormitory burned down. There are no human casualties.
Losses are cleared up. About 15 incendiary bombs
were dropped at the Krasny Fakel plant

bombs. Factory warehouse burned down.

From hit of an incendiary bomb burned down the warehouse of the factory.
Dunaev. Losses are specified.

As a result of the bombardment, the distillery was destroyed with material warehouses, bins and all the railway platforms adjoining it.

1 incendiary bomb was dropped on Dorkhimzavod. The fire was extinguished by the local fire brigade. Hit by an incendiary bomb on plant 46 (Kuntsevsky district) the garage and shed burned down. Losses are estimated at 2-3 thousand rubles.

One incendiary bomb fell on the roof of plant 95 (Kuntsevsky district). The fire was quickly extinguished. To the plant number 7 named.

Koshkin (Rostokinsky district) 19 incendiary bombs were dropped. The centers of the arisen fires are quickly eliminated. When the production tank flared up, one worker was injured. From the hit of a high-explosive bomb on the Stankolit plant, the 12th span, the

laboratory and the 3rd household area were partially destroyed. There are no victims. Losses are cleared up. 11 incendiary bombs were dropped on plant No. 115 of the NKAP. The resulting fires

were eliminated in a timely manner without material damage. Factory watchman wounded. At high voltage

networks Mosenergo damaged the Krasnopresnenskaya and Sokolnicheskaya 30 kilowatt lines. The amount of loss is set.

An incendiary bomb dropped at an electrical substation (Fili) destroyed reserve tanks with oil. 3 incendiary bombs were dropped on plant No. 240 of the NKAP. The fire was immediately extinguished. There are no losses. 3 incendiary bombs dropped at Kuntsevskaya electrical substation bombs. The resulting fire was quickly localized without loss.

At the Frunzenskaya CHPP, 7 incendiary bomb hits were noted, the fires from which were eliminated in a timely manner. There is no material damage. At the plant number 132

of the NKAP on the territory of the 12th shop dropped 27 workers were wounded by a high-explosive bomb, 11 of them were seriously injured.

High-explosive bombs were dropped in the immediate vicinity of the Kalibr plant. The plant is not damaged. A fire broke out at factory No. 22 from incendiary bombs, which destroyed the preparatory workshop and residential barracks. One fighter killed

protection. At the Krasnaya Roza plant, a dye shop was set on fire by an incendiary bomb. The fire was extinguished by the local fire brigade. There are no losses.

8 incendiary bombs were dropped on Mosminzavod. Emerged the fires were quickly extinguished.

10 bombs were dropped on the territory of the Auto Repair Plant, which were extinguished in a timely manner, and no fires broke

out. An incendiary bomb destroyed the Directorate's sugar warehouse. State reserves. Losses are cleared up.

A high-explosive bomb hit the shelter of the Lakov and Krasok plant, killing 13 people and wounding

14. In the Pervomaisky district, as a result of fires, 5 military warehouses caught fire, 2 vehicles and one tank were destroyed. 2 incendiary bombs were dropped on the food warehouses of Transtorgpit, located near the Yaroslavl railway station. The fire was extinguished in a timely manner. Losses are cleared up. The hit of a high-explosive bomb on

the workshops of the Northern Depot of the Metropolitan (Railway District) disabled the ball shop. Losses are specified.

In the Kiev region, a club, a canteen, a procurement shop and a garage burned down at the HPP plant from an incendiary bomb. There are no human casualties. A fire caused

by incendiary bombs destroyed the warehouse and the carpentry workshop of the bakery No. Khrushchev (Kr. Presnensky district). 5 people were injured.

The explosion of a high-explosive bomb dropped on Krasnopresnenskoye tram depot wounded 2 people.

Incendiary bombs dropped on the Moskvotol plant destroyed residential barracks and a cork factory. At the oil depot of the

Krasnopresnensky district, a fire broke out from an incendiary bomb, as a result of which part of the oil tanks ignited. The fire has been extinguished.

A high-explosive bomb dropped in the Molotovskiy district destroyed the warehouse of the GU-TAP. Losses are

cleared up. A high-explosive bomb partially destroyed the building of the Moscow city fire department on the street. Kropotkina, 22.

The explosion killed 1 person and injured

17. 6 incendiary bombs were dropped on the motor depot and boiler room of the Pravda plant. The fires were extinguished in a timely manner. There are no losses.

At the Actor's House on the street. Nemirovich-Danchenko, 4 incendiary bombs were dropped. The resulting fire was localized by local forces. Losses are specified. 15 incendiary bombs were dropped

on Pushkin Square, as a result of which the Moskva cafe building caught fire. The fire was extinguished in a timely manner. A bomb was dropped on the building of the Academy of the General Staff.

Fire,
not having time to spread, localized by local forces.

A dropped high-explosive bomb shattered windows and frames in the building of the Party Collegium of the MK VKP(b) (Kuibysheva St., 13). Glass fragments wounded 3 commandant's office employees and some employees of the Komsomol Committee.

Three incendiary bombs were dropped on the building of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute. The fires were quickly extinguished
local forces.

In the Kiev region, a branch of the Academy of Sciences, secondary school No. 57 and the canteen of the Palace of Soviets were completely destroyed by incendiary bombs. There are no human casualties. Two high-

explosive bombs dropped on the library building. Lenin. There are no serious injuries or human casualties. A high-explosive bomb was
dropped on the Ustinsky bridge, by the force of the explosion
which the hole was formed.

The explosion of 2 high-explosive bombs dropped on the village to them. 1905 (Krasnopresnensky district), the kindergarten of the Trekhgornaya manufactory factory and the headquarters of the MPVO were destroyed. In the same area, the theater them. Lenin, club them. P. Morozova, Moscow container plant, timber processing plant, Cavalry school and 3 horse parks. The fires have been extinguished. In the village Shelepikha (Krasnopresnensky district) from incendiary

bombs ignited an oil and chemical plant, a cotton factory and a fruit and vegetable stock.

The explosion of a high-explosive bomb that fell into a field-type slot (Krasnopresnensky district) killed 7 people.

In the Kuntsevsky district, 27 residential buildings were destroyed and partially destroyed by fires from incendiary bombs. During explosions and fires, 3 people were killed and 4 injured.

9 high-explosive and incendiary bombs were dropped on the track of the District Railway. Art. Bratsevo, telephone and telegraph communication from the Likhobory stretch to Vorobyovy Gory, 3 military wagons, when damaged, 30 soldiers were injured.

5 high-explosive bombs were dropped on the building of the Kievsky railway station. Killed 3 person.

Dropped at st. Podmoskovnaya Kalinin Railway 4 high-explosive and incendiary bombs damaged 4 railway lines and 3 wagons with military cargo. Killed 2 person.

The hit of incendiary bombs on the Moscow Western Railway ignited tanks and fuel storage facilities. Losses are specified. 2 bombs were dropped on the Moscow-

Yaroslavl railway, which partially destroyed the building of the Moscow-Tovarnaya station.

A high-explosive bomb dropped at the transfer point between the Kursk Railway and Kalanchevskaya Square damaged the track at a distance of 40-50 meters. In total, 65 industrial

enterprises, 3 water pipelines, 2 power plants, 1 bridge, 3 railway tracks, 3 contact networks, 1 gas pipeline and 169 residential buildings were partially damaged and destroyed in the districts of Moscow as a result of the bombardment. 7845 people were left homeless. In a

number of districts of Moscow and the region (Moskvoretsky, Dzerzhinsky, Stalinsky, Kominternovskiy, Ukhtomskiy, Kievskiy, Zvenigorodskiy, Naro-Fominsk, Krasnogorskiy, Kuntsevskiy, Ruzskiy)

leaflets.

By the measures taken, about 600 leaflets were collected and confiscated. Text flyers are attached. The

data received on the night of July 22 about allegedly seen enemy landings in the regions of the region were not confirmed by the check.

By the forces of the NKVD of Moscow and the Moscow Region, Senior Major of State Security

The extermination mobilizations of the Naro-Fominsk, Khimki, Uvarovsky, Mytishchi, Pushkinsky, Dmitrovsky and Stalinsky districts of Moscow carried out combing of villages, forests and fields, as a result of which enemy landings were not detected. Head of the NKVD of Moscow and the Moscow Region, Senior Major of State Security

ZHURAVLEV, Head of the UNKGB of
Moscow and the Moscow Region, Commissar of
State Security of the 3rd rank

KUBATKIN RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 181. L.
18-30. Copy. Typescript. On the first sheet there is a handwritten
note: "My archive. St. "; N.B.

No.
188 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin
on statistical data on the
result of a German air raid on
Moscow with a note by M.I.
Zhuravleva [47]

07/22/1941

To the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the
USSR, Commissar General of State Security Comrade Beria L.P.
On the results of an
enemy air raid on the city of Moscow on the night of July 21-22, 1941.
According to preliminary data: In
total, 792 people were injured as a
result of the raid,
of them:

130 people were killed. seriously
injured..... 241 people. slightly

wounded.....
of them:
at defense facilities..... 36 at the facilities
of military science..... 70 at the
facilities of railway transport..... 8 at objects of
economic importance..... 241 in scientific and cultural
institutions 151 in the housing
sector..... 660

Head of the UNKVD of Moscow and the Moscow

Region, senior major of state security ZHURAVLEV RGASPI.

F. 558. Op. 11. D. 181. L. 33-34. Copy. Typescript. On the first sheet there is a typewritten note: "Sent out to:

comrade Stalin, comrade Molotov."

No.

189 Special message by V.N. Merkulova I.V. Stalin about leaflets dropped by the enemy from aircraft

07/22/1941

No. 2246/

b STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE sends leaflets to Comrade STALIN of the NKVD of the USSR, which the enemy drops from aircraft *.

Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
MERKULOV Proletarians of all countries, unite to fight against Bolshevism!

WHAT LENIN PROMISED AND WHAT STALIN GIVED

1. Lenin promised to give all the land to the peasants. — Stalin drove peasants into collective farms and made them his serfs.

2. Lenin promised to give the workers factories and factories. "Stalin made plants and factories state property, and attached workers to them as slaves and put them in jail for a 20-minute delay. 3. Lenin promised free education in all

educational institutions. - Stalin established tuition fees in all secondary and higher schools.

4. Lenin promised workers free medical care. - Stalin established a fee for treatment and medicines. 5. Lenin promised to free the

workers and peasants from all taxes. - Stalin imposed dozens of explicit and indirect taxes and fees on the working people (income tax, cultural tax, loans), and takes everything they produce from the peasants for free (state deliveries).

6. Lenin promised complete freedom of speech. - Stalin took away all freedom of speech, except for the freedom to read akathists and sycophant words of gratitude to the "great and wise" for the allegedly "happy and cheerful life".

7. Lenin promised complete freedom of the press. - Stalin also took away the freedom of the press: try to write in a newspaper that there is nowhere to buy boots or pants.

8. Lenin promised freedom of rallies, meetings and demonstrations. - Stalin drives the ragged, hungry and exhausted workers of Stakhanovism to rallies and makes them shout about a cheerful life and send greeting resolutions to him, the "father of the peoples".

9. Lenin promised the abolition of the death penalty. "Stalin shoots hundreds of thousands of people in the cellars of the NKVD just because they dared to protest against the Stalinist regime. 10. Lenin promised

the freedom of societies and trade unions. - Stalin liquidated the trade unions, turning them into the executive body of his party, and does not allow any societies other than communist or singing along to them.

11. Lenin promised freedom of choice of profession. - Stalin forcibly takes away children from their parents to the barracks of vocational schools and makes of them his eternal convicts - miners, locksmiths, stokers. 12. Lenin promised people's power in the form of

Soviets of Working People's Deputies. "Stalin took all power in the USSR for himself, and turned the Supreme Soviet into a puppet comedy, where all Stalin's laws and decrees are "unanimously" approved, more and more enslaving the Soviet people. 13. Lenin promised a reduction in the working day. Stalin increased the working day. 14.

Lenin promised an increase in wages. - Stalin did not increase wages, but by increasing the working day and production standards, -

lowered it.

15. Lenin promised an abundance of goods and a secure life for everyone. - Stalin ensured the complete absence of the most necessary goods: shoes, textiles, ready-made clothes, etc. - and the half-impooverished, half-starved existence of the Soviet working people. But your support:

Chekists, party workers and commanders of the Red Army - generously awards both orders and money.

16. Lenin promised complete inviolability of the individual. - Stalin made the life of the Soviet people under the eternal fear of arrest and execution.

17. Lenin promised a fair people's trial. - Stalin, without any trial, arrests millions of defenseless Soviet citizens on suspicion of "anti-Soviet sentiment" and throws them into concentration camps and special settlements (in 1940 there were over 10 million innocent Soviet people in Soviet prisons and concentration camps).

18. Lenin promised the liquidation of the army and the organization of a volunteer workers' militia. - Stalin increased the army to 5 million, the maintenance of which is a heavy burden on the backs of the working people. 19.

Lenin promised to establish good neighborly relations with all countries. "Stalin attacks peaceful countries and seizes them, leaving millions of his people to die because of this and restoring the whole world against the Russian people.

COMRADES OF THE RED ARMY!

Isn't it clear to you now that the person who committed all the listed crimes against the Russian people is not "the greatest, wisest, most brilliant and beloved leader of the working people and the father of peoples," as he calls himself, but the greatest criminal before all mankind, the real enemy of all working people, oberbandit and enemy of peoples.

DOWN WITH STALIN'S POWER!

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 181. L. 1, 11v. Script.

Typescript.

* One leaflet is published.

No.

190 Cipher telegram G.A. Borkova I.V. Stalin on the evacuation of the families of the leadership

07/24/1941

No. 1477

sh from

Khabarovsk Moscow, Chairman of the State Defense Committee

Comrade STALIN, the

Military Council of the Far Eastern Front, was ordered by the Government to conduct large training camps for assigned staff. The timeliness and expediency of these measures, in view of the fact that the Japanese military has recently raised its head firmly and has already carried out a number of mobilization measures, is quite obvious and does not require any additional explanation. However, in the instruction of the General Staff of the Red Army on this issue dated July 21, 1941, the Front Command was warned that all work on raising the ascribed must be carried out covertly, without unnecessary publicity and noise. Now the front command has begun and, in our opinion, is basically solving this problem correctly.

Personally, there is only one circumstance that confuses me in this whole matter. It seems to me that our military leaders are too hasty with the evacuation of the families of the commanding staff. Helping this haste, to our regret, directive instructions of individual senior officials of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.

So, for example, in the encryption of the General Staff of the Red Army of July 21 of this year. Paragraph 10 clearly states: "Evacuate the families of command personnel from threatened areas to the eastern regions of the Siberian Military District, and first of all, the families of command personnel of

units that have departed for other districts." Somewhat earlier, in a cipher dated July 18 of this year, signed by Comrade Yermolin, the head of logistics, it was explained to the front command that "the objects and time of evacuation of both the population and

material assets are established by the Council for the Evacuation of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Military Council of the Front, which, due to the current situation, has been given the opportunity to independently establish the procedure and timing of evacuation. Further,

in the same instruction it is said: "The evacuated families of military personnel of the army, navy and respondent workers are given the right to choose a place of residence at their discretion, except for Moscow and Leningrad." The instructions we have taken for endurance contradict not

only one another, but, most importantly, they contradict the resolution we have of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated July 5, 1941 on the question "on the procedure for evacuating the population in wartime."

Finally, yesterday, on July 22 this year, the head of the regional department of the NKVD received a coded message signed by Comrade Chernyshov, addressed to the NKVD authorities of the Khabarovsk, Primorsky Territories, Buryat-Mongolian, Yakut ASSR, Chita and Irkutsk regions. In this cipher, it was ordered to take the families of NKVD workers from the threatened front line to the rear areas and report on the implementation of this instruction on July 30 of this year. Such a stream of confused and contradictory evacuation directives, if they are immediately implemented, cannot bring anything good. On the contrary, any premature

evacuation of the families of commanding officers, NKVD workers, and even if we add to this the families of responsible party and Soviet workers, in our opinion, will sow panic among the population and cause unnecessary and harmful hype, from which the government is now warning us, the Far East. I understand that it is necessary to prepare for the evacuation of some families from the frontline zone, and especially children and the elderly. * It is necessary now to have evacuation plans thought out in a narrow circle of people. We are now being offered to move from plans to action, they are offering to start evacuation. Isn't it premature? Are we getting too

far ahead of ourselves here? I ask, Comrade Stalin, for your instructions on this matter*. Secretary of the Khabarovsk Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks BORKOV RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 59. L. 17-18. Script.

Typescript.

— Crossed out in the margins with two

lines. On the first page there is Stalin's resolution: "Khabarovsk. To the secretary of the regional committee Borkov. Families of border guards and command personnel must be evacuated from the front line. The absence of such an event led to the destruction of family members of the command staff during a sudden attack by the Germans. The same thing can happen with a sudden attack by the Japanese.

No. 191 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about the structure of the NKVD

07/30/1941

Copy

No.

2311 / b Top secret

of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to Comrade STALIN Council of People's Commissars of the USSR structure of the NKVD of the USSR, proposals for the appointment of senior officials of the People's Commissariat and its peripheral bodies. The structure submitted

for approval, in particular, provides for the creation in the NKVD of the USSR: a) a transport department for

Chekist work on railway, sea, river, road transport and along highways and civil air fleet;

b) economic management as part of departments for Chekist work at the most important enterprises in the aircraft industry, weapons, ammunition, mechanical engineering, chemistry, the oil industry, power plants and

communications; c) in order to improve the quality of investigative work and to link it more closely with intelligence and operational work, it is planned to create an investigative unit at each operational-Chekist department or

department. d) a single department of the internal troops of the NKVD (instead of the two existing ones), which will manage the troops guarding the industrial enterprise, railway. nodes and structures, and escort

troops. In addition, we are working on and in the coming days will submit for your consideration the question of creating, on the basis of the existing operational troops, a corps of the NKVD troops.

In order to ensure systematic verification and assistance in the work of the NKVD bodies of the Primorsky Territory, the Chita Region and the Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the NKVD of the USSR asks the head of the UNKVD of the Khabarovsk Territory, Comrade. Goglidze to approve at the same time authorized by the NKVD of the USSR for the Primorsky Territory, the Chita Region and the Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. I ask for your decision. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs
of the USSR L. BERIA Top secret

STRUCTURE

PEOPLE'S COMMISSARY OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF
THE

SSR People's Commissar.

Deputy People's Commissars. 1. Secretariat
of the NKVD of the USSR. 2.

Control and Inspection Group under the People's Commissar.

3. Secretariat of the Special Meeting under the People's Commissar.

I. OPERATIONAL-CHEKIST DEPARTMENTS 4. Intelligence

(First) Directorate. 5. Counterintelligence (Second)

Directorate. 6. Secret-Political (Third) Administration. 7.

Directorate of Special Departments. 8. Transport

Administration (railway, sea, river and

road transport, civil, air fleet, highways). 9. Economic Administration (the most important industrial enterprises of the people's commissariats of aviation, weapons, ammunition, mechanical

engineering, chemistry, the oil industry, power plants and communications). 10.

Investigative unit for especially important cases. 11. First Department (Security

Department). 12. First Special Department (accounting, statistical and

investigative). 13. The second special department (control

over all types of communications,

broadcasting, radio interception, operational equipment).

14. Third Special Department (surveillance, searches, arrests).

15. Fourth Special Department (HF communications, radio laboratory, special groups of operatives and the use of prisoners).

16. Fifth Special Department (ciphers).

17. Sixth Special Department (Gokhran).

II. ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPERATIONAL DEPARTMENTS 18.

Main Police Department. 19. Main

Directorate of Fire Protection. 20. Main

Directorate of Local Air Defense. 21. Department of State Archives. 22.

Prison administration. 23. Directorate for

Prisoners of War and

Internees. 24. Office of the Commandant of the Moscow Kremlin. 25.

Headquarters of the NKVD destruction battalions.

III. DEPARTMENTS OF THE

TROOPS 26. Main Directorate of the Border Troops of the

NKVD. 27. Main Directorate of the Internal Troops of the NKVD (protection of railway facilities, especially important industrial enterprises and escort service).

28. Directorate of operational troops of the

NKVD. 29. Department of Military Supply of the

NKVD. 30. Political Directorate of the NKVD

troops. 31. Military Construction Department of the NKVD.

IV. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL LABOR CAMPS 32. Main

Directorate of Correctional Labor Camps and Colonies. 33. Main Directorate of airfield

construction camps. 34. Main Directorate of Railway Construction

Camps. 35. Main Directorate of Hydraulic Construction Camps. 36. Main

Directorate of Industrial Construction Camps. 37. Main Directorate of the

camps of the mining, metallurgical and fuel industries. 38. Directorate of

timber industry camps. 39. Administration of camps for the construction of

Kuibyshev factories. 40. Dalstroy.

41. Main Department of Highways. 42. Department of

material and technical supply of the NKVD. 43. Economic Management.

44. Personnel

department. 45. Central planning and financial

department. 46. Mobilization

department. 47. Department of railway and water

transportation. AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 7. L. 144-148. Copy. Typescript.

No.

192 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin about the arrest of two German [48] paratroopers

08/02/1941

No. 2580/b

Sov. secret of

the Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade S T A L I N U on July 30 of this year. 2
German intelligence agents landed in the Valdai district of the Leningrad region, who
were immediately arrested and taken to the NKVD of the USSR.

During the interrogation, the detainees

identified themselves as: 1. GAVKIN-KHAUK MA, born in 1905, a
native of the Ukhta region of the Karelian-Finnish SSR, Karelian by
nationality. Since 1927 he lived in Finland, worked as a magazine
distribution agent. 2. PIRAG

K.G., a Latvian by nationality, a native of Latvia, mountains. Dvinska,
who lived there until February 1941, after which he left for Germany
through the evacuation commission. By profession an electrician. During
the preliminary interrogation, the detainees testified that both of
them, before the start of hostilities between Germany and the Soviet
Union, were sent to the cities. Stetin and Konigsberg, where they were
trained in demolition, radio service, grenade throwing and shooting from hand weapons.

July 29 this year German captain MAURITS in the OPOCHKA region
of the Leningrad region suggested that both of them cross over to Soviet
territory in the area of \u200b\u200bthe city of Valdai to ascertain the
number and deployment of Red Army units.

On the night of July 30 this year. both scouts with radio equipment
on a German plane, but with Soviet identification marks, were delivered
to the Valdai district of the Leningrad region.

The plane flew back after landing, and GAVKIN-KHAUK and PIRAG
went into the forest in order to change the Red Army

civilian uniform, where they were arrested by local collective farmers with the help of the commander.

Detainees were seized transceiver radio equipment, ciphers for transmission, two pistols with cartridges, two sets of spare uniforms, 2000 rubles of money, 9 pieces of forms with a stamp and a round seal of a military unit and 6 forms of travel railway reserved seats. The NKVD of the USSR considers

it expedient, together with the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, to use the radio operator GAVKIN-KHAUK, *under our control*, to misinform the German command in Finland about the situation on the North-Western Front. I ask for your instructions.

APPENDIX: Photos of the

detainees and the radio

station. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR

L. BERIA AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 256. L. 67-68.

Script. Typescript. On the first sheet there is a resolution: "I agree.

I. Stalin. *—* Underlined by a wavy line.

No.

193 Decree of the State Defense Committee "on the procedure for the arrest of military personnel"

08/11/1941

Approve the following procedure for the arrest of military personnel: 1. Red Army soldiers and junior command personnel are arrested according to agreement with the military prosecutor of the division.

2. Arrests of persons of the middle command staff are made by agreement with the command of the division and the divisional prosecutor.

3. Arrests of persons of senior command personnel are carried out in agreement with the Military Council of the army (military district). 4. The procedure

for the arrest of senior officers remains the same (with the sanction of an NPO). In case of emergency, the

Special Bodies can detain middle and senior command personnel, with subsequent coordination of the arrest with the command and the prosecutor's office. Chairman of the State Defense Committee I. STALIN AP RF F. 3. Op. 58. D. 7. L. 150. Copy. Typescript.

No.

194 L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin on the organization of the protection of the most important enterprises in Moscow

08/21/1941

Top secret No. 2494/
b of the

Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks TO COMRADE STALIN In pursuance of your instructions, in order to prevent enemy elements from giving light or other signals to enemy aircraft, the NKVD of the USSR selected 11 most important enterprises in the city of Moscow and in the adjacent enterprises territory

introduced a special regime. These enterprises are as follows: plants of the People's Commissariat of Aviation Industry - No. 1, No. 22, No. 24, No. 39, the Stalin Automobile Plant, the 1st State Bearing Plant, the Hammer and Sickle Plant and the Elektrokombinat, an electric machine plant, an autotractor electrical equipment plant, a transformer plant named

after Kuibyshev and the lamp factory. Around these enterprises, 7 protection sites have been created. At all sites for the duration of the air raid, any movement is prohibited,

except for special passes. From 9 pm to 6 am it is forbidden to stay in the quarters on the territory of the site of persons not registered in this apartment. In each house, persons responsible for the state of blackout in the house and the registration of residents are identified.

Registration in houses on the territory of the site of new arrivals has been terminated if they are not directly related to enterprises or institutions located on the territory of the site. A

continuous check of persons living on the territory of the sites has begun in order to relocate suspicious ones outside the site.

The state of the blackout of these enterprises and the housing sector is being checked, the state of the military guards of enterprises and the personnel of workers and employees is being checked.

Responsible employees of the NKVD of the USSR were appointed heads of the sections, who were assigned 10 Chekists and 25 operative police officers to carry out work. In addition to the police and

the NKVD, the local verified population from among the workers and employees of the respective enterprises was involved in carrying out patrol and security service at the sites.

A number of other activities are being carried out, detailed in application.

The procedure for the protection of sites is agreed with the MC of the CPSU (b) - comrade.

Shcherbakov. Supervision of the implementation of the planned activities is entrusted to Comrade.

Merkulov. At the same time, I am enclosing a list of measures to create a special regime in the areas where the largest defensive enterprises of the mountains are located. Moscow and a copy of the order on the introduction of a special regime in the areas where the largest defensive enterprises of the mountains are located. Moscow and a copy of the order on the

introduction of a special regime. Appendix: According to the text People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA Published: Lubyanka during the battle for Moscow. I 58.

On the first sheet there is a resolution: "T-schu Beria. It would be nice to add power plants. I. Stalin. Published without attachment.

No. 195

**L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin with the annex of the
draft resolution of the Council of People's
Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of
the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks
on the procedure for the resettlement of
Germans from the Republic of the Volga
Germans, Saratov and Stalingrad regions [49]**

08/25/1941

No. 2514 /

b Copy

of the Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade STALIN In accordance with your instructions, I am submitting a draft resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the procedure for resettlement

from the Republic of Volga Germans and the Saratov and Stalingrad regions. In total, 479,841 people are subject to eviction from the indicated areas, including 401,746 people from the Republic of Volga Germans, 54,389 people from the Saratov region and 23,756 people from the Stalingrad region. The resettlement is planned to be carried out in the North-Eastern regions of the Kazakh SSR, the Krasnoyarsk and Altai Territories, the Omsk and Novosibirsk Regions. The first secretaries of

the regional committees of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Saratov comrade were familiarized with the forwarded draft resolution. VLASOV, Comrade Stalingrad. CHUYANOV, Nemtsev of the Volga Region Comrade. MALOV. I ask for your

instructions. People's Commissar
of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. BERIA

Copy

Top secret

RESOLUTION

OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE UNION
OF

THE SSR AND THE CC OF THE

AUCP(b) "" August 1941 Moscow, Kremlin The Council of People's
Commissars Of

The Union Of SSR And The Central Committee Of The AUCP(b)
DECIDES: 479,841 people in the following territories and regions:

Krasnoyarsk Territory - 75,000

people. Altai Territory - 95,000

Omsk Region - 84,000

Novosibirsk Region. -

100,000 Kazakh SSR - 125,000

including:

Semipalatinsk region - 18,000

Akmola region - 25,000 North

Kazakhstan. region — 25,000

Kustanai region — 20,000

Pavlodar region — 20,000 East

Kazakhstan. region - 17,000 All

Germans, without exception, both urban and rural residents,
including members of the AUCP(b) and VLKSM, are subject to

resettlement. AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 178. L. 6-9. Script. Typescript.

The draft resolution is published in part.

No. 196

**Special message by P.M. Fitina I.V. Stalin
about the recording of A.**

**Eden's conversation with the Polish
ambassador in London received by the
intelligence department of the NKVD**

08/28/1941

Copy

of the Soviet.

secret We report the recording of the conversation between British Foreign Minister IDENA and the Polish Ambassador in London dated August 18 of this year. The recording of the conversation was obtained by the Intelligence

Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR from London through undercover means. "1. This afternoon, on behalf of General SIKORSKY, the Polish ambassador in London came to me to talk about the difficulties that the Polish government has to face as a result of the conclusion of the Soviet-Polish

agreement and recent events. 2. He said that, since he would probably be entrusted with the leadership of Poland's foreign policy in the near future, he would now try to give me a detailed description of these difficulties. Polish public opinion, both here and in Poland, was undoubtedly alarmed by the conclusion of the Soviet-Polish agreement. In general, the Poles regard the entry of the USSR into the war as a positive development, not only because this war will place a heavy burden on German resources, but also because the USSR will be weakened as a result of it. The Poles understand that the transformation of the USSR into an ally somewhat casts Poland and Polish interests into the background. Frankly speaking, the Poles had the general impression that the conclusion of the Soviet-Polish agreement weakened rather than strengthened the position of Poland against the USSR with regard to

Polish eastern borders. To top it all off, a joint Anglo-American declaration was issued which, by emphasizing the principle of self-determination, would disappoint the Poles also in regard to their western frontiers. Danzig is undoubtedly a German city, but on economic grounds it is important to Poland, and as long as the Germans remain in East Prussia, the Polish western frontier is almost impossible to defend from a military point of view. The morale of the Polish population is still not broken, but for the first time there are signs that German propaganda is beginning to take a line that may find some success with the Poles, that is, that the Allies want to make a Russian slave out of Poland.

The Ambassador suggested, although he did not at present wish to insist on this point, that His Majesty's Government should make any public statement or address the Polish Government with a representation in the sense that it had no intention of insisting on the strict application of the principle self-determination by excluding other considerations such as economy and defence. He is compelled to state frankly that the joint Anglo-American declaration aroused apprehension in Polish public opinion. I told Count RACHINSKY that we are always glad to hear everything

what can he say about the views of the Polish government.

In my opinion, it is unlikely that the President and the Prime Minister, when drawing up their declaration, had the Polish borders in mind. It will be very difficult for His Majesty's Government to gloss over the Declaration in the sense desired by the Polish Government, except perhaps in the most general terms; nevertheless, I am always ready to explore this issue in more depth with the Ambassador.

Count RACHINSKY then touched on the topic of the Polish internal crisis, which General SIKORSKY hoped to resolve very soon. It has now become clear that the inclusion of members of national democratic parties in the government is impossible. General SIKORSKY is still in trouble with some of his colleagues as a result of the article in The Times of August 1, and if I were to agree to issue the communiqué the draft of which Count RACHINSKY handed me, it would help the general.

I told him that although I agreed with everything that was written in the draft, I did not find it very convenient to raise the issue of the Time article in an official public statement. Nevertheless, I can write a letter to the ambassador with approximately the same content as the project. I can also try to convince Time to publish another article that will satisfy the Polish government. I may also consider whether, in the speech I am due to give in the provinces on August 30th, I should say something to offset the impression made by the article in The Times. After that, I dictated and gave him my letter, a copy of which is attached ... "

Attached to the record of the conversation is a draft communiqué and a copy of the secret letter given to SIKORSKY by IDEN. Both documents state that Time is not a government agency and does not reflect the official views of the British government. Head of the

Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD USSR FITIN

Published: Essays on the history of Russian foreign intelligence: V 6 vol. T. 4. 1941-1945. M., 1999. S. 528-530.

No. 197

Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "on the Germans wailing on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR"

08/31/1941

Top secret 21 - On the Germans living on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR Approve the following proposal of the NKVD on the Germans living on the territory of the Voroshilovgrad, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye, Kiev, Poltava, Stalin, Sumy, Kharkov and Chernihiv regions: 1) Germans, consisting of accounted for as an anti-Soviet element,

to arrest; 2)

the rest of the able-bodied male population aged 16 to 60 should be mobilized by NGOs into construction battalions and handed over to the NKVD for use in the eastern regions of the USSR.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 37. L. 4. Original. Typescript. Minutes No.

35. The text

contains a typewritten note about distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Beria, Shchadenko, Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine.

No. 198

**Decree of the State Defense Committee on
imposition [50] of death sentences^{the}**

09/06/1941

No. 634-

ss Apply capital punishment - execution to 170 prisoners convicted at different times for terror, espionage, sabotage and other counter-revolutionary work. The consideration of the materials is entrusted to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court.

Chairman of the State Defense Committee I. STALIN AP RF. F. 3.
Op. 24. D. 378. L. 191. Copy. Typescript.

No.

**199 Special message by P.M. Fitina
I.V. Stalin about England's plans for the
Caucasian oil fields**

09/22/1941

Sov. secret

USSR STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE TO Comrade
STALIN

According to our intelligence data, the British command of the Middle East army, shortly after the start of the Soviet-German war, received the sanction of the British War Ministry to organize a special mission. This mission was given the task of destroying our Caucasian oil fields in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Germans in the event that such a danger turned out to be real.

This mission, which received the code name "Mission No. 16 (P)", settled in Northern Iran, where it is in full readiness for transfer at the right time by aircraft to the Caucasus.

In their correspondence on this subject, the British repeatedly stressed the need for maximum care so that even the very existence of such a mission would not become known to the Soviet government, as this could seriously compromise the work of KRIPPS and MAC-FARLAN.

KRIPPS had already raised with Comrade STALIN the question of cooperation in preparing for the destruction of Soviet sources of supply that could be used by the Germans, but received the answer that the Soviet government itself would decide when exactly the time for such cooperation would come.

Somewhat later, at the direction of London, KRIPPS again returned to this question in a letter to Comrade STALIN, but again to no avail.

After that, CRIPPS made a proposal (with which London agreed) that the solution of this issue could be accelerated if it was allowed, at the appropriate moment, to promise the USSR compensation for the destruction of the Caucasian oil fields. As a result of numerous meetings of a special committee under the chairmanship of Lord Hankey and with the participation of a member of the British economic mission in the USSR - BERTRUD, a draft of the following English declaration was drawn up, which has now been sent to KRIPPSU: 1. In the event that the Soviet government, in order to prevent the

seizure of oil fields by the Germans, destroy them, the British government undertakes to supply the USSR during the war and two years after its end with oil in an amount equal to that received by Great Britain from its empire.

2. The British Government undertakes to provide the USSR with oil tonnage in an amount equal to that which she herself will have in the same period. 3. The British

government undertakes to help the Soviet Union in the acquisition of drilling equipment to replace the destroyed one.

To give this declaration more weight and real significance, BERTRUD traveled to Washington, where, at the direction of ROOSEVELT, the State Department dealt with this issue. The other day BERTRUD was to return to London with an American draft declaration requiring, after London had become acquainted with this draft, only the signature of ROOSEVELT. It is now assumed that BERTRUD will go to Moscow together with the BEaverbrook mission and will take with him everywhere the coordinated and approved texts of the British and American declarations to the Soviet government on this question.

At the same time, in the relevant circles in London, the opinion is expressed that, since the Soviet government will still be forced to destroy the oil fields, one should not rush to hand over these declarations, since they impose certain obligations on the British, which it may be possible to avoid. On the other hand, opponents of this course point out that, being unsure of a further oil supply, the Soviet government will not decide on a timely

the destruction of the oil fields and eventually they will pass intact to the Germans. In any case, now the question of whether such declarations should be handed over to the USSR or whether it can be dispensed with is essentially left to the discretion of KRIPPSA.

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the

USSR FITIN Published: Essays on the history of Russian foreign intelligence: V 6
vol. T. 4. 1941-1945. M., 1999. S. 533-535.

No.

200 Decree of the GKO on holding special events for enterprises in Moscow and the Moscow Region

10/08/1941

Sov. secret In

connection with the current military situation, the State

The Defense Committee decides:

1. For special events for enterprises

of the city of Moscow and the Moscow region to organize a five consisting of:

1) Deputy internal people's commissar affairs of the USSR

Comrade Serov (head); 2) Head of

the Moscow Department of the NKVD Comrade Zhuravlev; 3) Secretary of the Moscow City

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks, Comrade Popov; 4) Secretary of the Moscow

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Comrade Chernousov; 5) Head of the Main

Military Engineering Directorate of the People's

Commissariat of Defense Comrade Kotlyar. 2. To create in the districts of Moscow and the Moscow region troikas in composition:

First Secretary of the District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (head), head of the RO NKVD and representatives of the engineering units of the Red Army.

3. Oblige the Commission within one day to determine and submit to the State Defense Committee a list of enterprises where special events should be held.

Develop a procedure that ensures the implementation of these activities, select performers and provide enterprises with the necessary materials. 4.

Instruct the five to carefully

check the performers and

organize their appropriate technical training.

commissions to establish proper communication with district troikas and notifying them of the start of action.

Chairman of the State Defense Committee I. STALIN Published: Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. No. 12. 1990. S. 210-211.

No.

**201 Note of the commission on
the conduct of special events by
I.V. Stalin on the preparation of
enterprises in Moscow and the Moscow region for
destruction**

10/09/1941

SOV. SECRET

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE Comrade IV

STALIN At the same time,

we are sending a list of enterprises in the mountains. Moscow and the Moscow Region, for which special events are planned. The list includes 1119 enterprises, which are

divided into two categories: a) 412 enterprises of defense importance or partly

working for defense. The liquidation of these enterprises is supposed to be by means of an explosion; b) 707 enterprises of non-defense people's commissariats,

the liquidation of which planned by mechanical damage and arson.

To carry out the special measures outlined by the decision of the State Defense Committee, we appointed and began to work district troikas and leading groups at enterprises.

During October 10 this year. "VV" will be brought to the enterprises and taken under

protection. For communication with regional troikas, as well as alerting them we develop a special instruction on the beginning of actions.

We ask you to approve the list of facilities for which special events are planned.

APPENDIX: lists.

COMMISSION:

Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR SEROV

Secretary of the Moscow City

Committee POPOV Secretary of the

Moscow Region CHERNOUSOV Head of the UNKVD of the Moscow Region

ZHURAVLEV Head of the State Military Inspectorate of the People's
Commissariat

of Defense KOTLYAR

No. 41/2662 October 9, 1941 Published: News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. No. 12. 1990. S. 211-212.

**No.
202 Reference S.R. Milstein L.P.
Beria on the number of
arrested and executed
servicemen who fell behind their
units and fled from the front**

10/01/1941

Top secret TO THE
PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF
THE USSR TO THE GENERAL COMMISSAR OF
STATE SECURITY COMRADE BERIA
Special

departments of the NKVD and barrage detachments of the NKVD
troops for the protection of the rear detained 657,364 servicemen who
had fallen behind their units and fled from the front. Of these, 249,969
people were detained by the operational barriers of the Special
Departments and 407,395 military personnel by the barrage
detachments of the NKVD

troops for the protection of the rear. Of those detained by the
Special Departments, 25,878 people were arrested, the remaining
632,486 people were

formed into units and again sent to the
front. Among

those arrested by
the Special

Departments: spies - 1505

saboteurs - 308

traitors - 2621 cowards and alarmists - 2643

deserters - 8772

disseminators

of provocative rumors - 3987 self-shooters - 1671 others - 4371 Total: - 25 878

According to the decisions of the Special Departments and the verdicts of the Military Tribunals, 10,201 people were shot, of which 3,321

people were shot in front of the line.

These data are distributed

according to the

fronts: Leningrad: arrested -

1044 shot - 854 shot before

the line - 430

Karelian: arrested - 468 shot

- 263 shot before the line

- 132 Northern:

arrested - 1683 shot - 933

shot before the line - 280 North-

West: arrested —

3440 shot — 1600 shot

before the formation —

730 Western:

arrested — 4013 shot —

2136 shot before the formation

— 556

Southwestern: arrested —

3249 shot — 868 shot

before the

formation — 280 Southern:

arrested — 3599 shot —

919 executions

but before the line - 191

Bryansk: arrested - 799 shot

- 389 shot before

the line - 107 Central:

arrested - 686 shot - 346 shot

before the line -

234 Reserve armies: arrested

- 2516 shot - 894 shot before the

line - 157 Deputy. early Directorate of the NGO NKVD

of the USSR Commissar of State Security 3rd rank MILSHTEIN "" Oct

RGANI. F. 89. Op. 18. D. 8. L. 1-3. Script. Typescript.

No. 203

**L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin on the expansion of the
rights of a special
meetings**

11/15/1941

Copy

2805/

b Top secret State

Defense Committee comrade. TO STALIN In the republican, regional and regional bodies of the NKVD, prisoners sentenced by the military tribunals of the districts and local judicial bodies to capital punishment are kept in custody for several months, pending the approval of the sentences by the highest judicial instances.

According to the current procedure, the verdicts of the military tribunals of the districts, as well as the supreme courts of the union, autonomous republics and territorial, regional courts, enter into legal force only after their approval by the Military Collegium and the Criminal Judicial Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR - respectively.

However, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the USSR in essence are not final, since they are considered by the commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which also submits its opinion for approval by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and only after that the final decision is made on the case, which again descends to the Supreme Court, and this latter is sent for execution by the NKVD of the USSR.

The exceptions are areas declared under martial law and areas of hostilities, where, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 27-41, the military councils of the fronts in especially exceptional cases caused by the deployment of hostilities are given the right to approve sentences of military tribunals with the highest measure. punishment with immediate execution.

At present, 10,645 prisoners sentenced to capital punishment have accumulated in the prisons of the NKVD of the republics, territories and regions, awaiting the approval of sentences in their cases by the highest judicial instances.

Based on wartime conditions, the NKVD of the USSR considers it expedient: 1. To

allow the NKVD of the USSR in respect of all prisoners sentenced to capital punishment, now held in prisons pending approval of sentences by higher judicial authorities, to carry out the sentences of the military tribunals of districts and republican, regional, regional judicial authorities.

Grant the right to the Special Conference of the NKVD of the USSR, with the participation of the prosecutor of the USSR, on cases arising in the NKVD bodies on counter-revolutionary crimes and especially dangerous crimes against the order of government of the USSR, provided for by Art. 58-1a, 58-1b, 58-1c, 58-1d, 58-2, 58-3, 58-4, 58-5, 58-6, 58-7, 58-8, 58-9, 58-10, 58-11, 58-12, 58-13, 58-14, 59-2, 59-3, 59-3a, 59-3b, 59-4, 59-7, 59-8, 59-9, 59-10, 59-12, 59-13 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, to impose appropriate penalties up to and including execution. Decision of the Special Meeting be considered final.

I ask for your decision.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union
of the
USSR L. BERIA Information on the number of those
arrested, sentenced to the VMN, held in NKVD-UNKVD prisons in anticipation
statements

sentences by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court
of the USSR 1. North Ossetian ASSR - 769

people. 2. Khabarovsk
Territory - 467 3. Molotov Region

- 420 4. Sverdlovsk Region - 419

5. Tatar ASSR - 400 6.
Kazakh SSR - 396 7.

Georgian SSR - 395 8.
Chelyabinsk Region - 394 9.

Uzbek SSR - 361 10.

Stalingrad region - 356

11. Primorsky Territory -
350 12. Saratov Region - 342
13. Kirov Region - 320 14.
Dagestan ASSR - 300 15.
Gorky Region - 300 16.
Krasnoyarsk Territory - 290
17. Komi ASSR - 272
18. Novosibirsk Region - 269 19.
Arkhangelsk region - 268 20.
Moscow region - 265 21.
Azerbaijan SSR - 243 22.
Kuibyshev region - 235 23.
Krasnodar region - 220 24.
Tambov region - 214 25.
Irkutsk region - 200 26. Omsk
region - 182 people 27. Chkalovskaya
region - 160 28. Bashkir ASSR
- 156 29. Voronezh region -
150 30. Penza region - 150 31.
Vologda region - 144 32. Altai
region - 143 33. Chita region -
140 34. Udmurt ASSR -
120 35. Yaroslavl region -
118 36. Ivanovo region - 113
37. Kabardino-Balkarian ASSR
- 99 38. Buryat-Mongolian
ASSR - 79 39. Mari ASSR - 70 40.
Ryazan region - 63 41. Kirghiz SSR
- 60 42. Tajik SSR - 55 43.
Mordovian ASSR - 50 44.
Armenian SSR - 40 45.
Turkmen SSR - 38 46.
Rostov region - 23 TOTAL:
10,645

Deputy USSR popular Commissioner domestic affairs
KOBULOV ""

November 1941

RGANI. F. 89. Op. 18. D. 9. L. 1-4. Copy. Typescript.

No.

204 Special message by P.M. Fitina

I.V. Stalin about the content of the telegram to the Japanese ambassador in Berlin

12/10/1941

USSR STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE

Comrade Stalin

We report the contents of the telegram dated November 27 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin. This telegram was intercepted and partially deciphered by British political intelligence.

The content of the telegram was received by the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR

from London undercover. "Negotiations with the US have stalled and the Japanese government is facing a major decision. Meet with HITLER and RIBBENTROP and secretly explain the situation to them. The democratic powers behave in the East in a monarchical manner. They move their troops and force Japan to do the same. These transfers could lead to armed conflict, probably much sooner than expected ... (a number of groups are not deciphered in the original) in the event of a war with the democratic powers, Japan will continue to pin down Russian forces in the Far East, and if the Russians unite with the democracies in the attack us, Japan will put up a strong resistance. However, explain to HITLER that the main Japanese efforts will be concentrated in the south, and we intend to refrain from deliberately taking action in the north ... "Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the Union

SSR FITIN

Published: Essays on the history of Russian foreign intelligence: V 6 vol. T. 4. 1941-1945. M., 1999. S. 542-543.